WHY JAPAN NOW? Keith Donaldson Director, Japan

1. WHY JAPAN NOW? Keith DonaldsonDirector, Japan

2. 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 MSCI Japan MSCI World WHERE DID IT ALL GO WRONG? Source: Datastream. As at 31 December 2005.

3. 14 year bear market

4. Bankingcrisis 14 year bear market

5. Deflation 14 year bear market

6. Unwind 14 year bear market

7. Income correction 14 year bear market

8. Land price* Bank sector performance** 400 1600 TopixBanks 350 1400 Topix 300 1200 CORNER TURNED IN 2003 250 1000 200 800 150 600 100 400 50 200 0 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 Mar-91 Mar-92 Mar-93 Mar-94 Mar-95 Mar-96 Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Mar-04 Mar-05 THEN AND NOWPost bubble problems *Source: Japan Real Estate Institute. As at 30 November 2005. ** Source: Datastream. As at 31 December 2005.

9. 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 INFLATION IS THE BULL 1.50 1.00 0.50 0 -0.50 -1.00 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 CPI % change Martin Currie estimate THEN AND NOWPrice deflation is the bear Source: Datastream. As at 31 December 2005.

10. 1000 500 0 -500 -1000 -1500 -2000 -2500 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 to date Banks Insurance companies THEN AND NOWUnwind Bn ¥ Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange. As at 31 October 2005.

11. THEN AND NOWCorporate restructuring ended – now investing again Capacity* ROE** 12.0 10.0 Denial 8.0 Growth 6.0 Correction Bull market 4.0 2.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 *Source: METI and KBC. As at 31 December 2005. **Source Daiwa. As at 31 December 2005.

12. 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 Job offers:applicants 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Mar-88 Mar-89 Mar-90 Mar-91 Mar-92 Mar-93 Mar-94 Mar-95 Mar-96 Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Mar-04 Mar-05 THEN AND NOWTightening labour market RISING INCOMES Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. As at 30 November 2005.

13. OUTLOOK Economy  Consumption  Capex  Corporate change  Financial system  Supply and demand  Reform 

14. WHY MARTIN CURRIE FOR JAPAN?

15. Keith Donaldson: Director 26 years’ investment experience 17 years’ experience of Japan John Millar: Director 11 years’ experience of Japan Michael Thomas: Director, team leader 30 years’ experience of Japan 16 years at Martin Currie Michael McNaught-Davis: Director 17 years’ experience of Japan JAPAN INVESTMENT TEAM John-Paul Temperley: Director, Japanese linguist 8 years’ experience of Japan Kevin Troup: Director 10 years’ experience of Japan Katy Marchbank-Smith: Investment analyst 3 years’ experience of Japan Eri McKenna: Japan investment research co-ordinator Japanese national As at 31 December 2005.

16. OUR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES • Proven and experienced team • Independence of mind • Dynamic decision-making • Collaboration • Size and location advantage • Big enough to get quality service • Investment team in one location • Ideal time zone – reflect on Tokyo, react to Wall Street

17. INVESTMENT UNIVERSE Japan equity universe Research universe Topix 33 sectors1,643 stocks Other2,057 stocks Total3,700 stocks Research focus Japan core 65-75 stocks 700 stocks 200 to300 stocks Japan Alpha 30-40 stocks • Select for portfolios on: Fundamental analysis Company meetings Team discussion Valuation screens Technical analysis Filter on: Liquidity (>$2m of average daily turnover) Market cap >$300m Filter on:Relevance to top-down analysis

18. INVESTMENT PROCESS Technical overlay • Supply/demand • Entry/exit points • Bottom-up • Prospects for top line growth • Competitive advantage • Attractive stage in margin cycle • Focused management • Financial strength • Valuation Top-down • Macro analysis • Market structure • Regulatory environment • Looking for top line growth

19. +21.3 +20.4 +16.4 +11.8 +7.9 +7.1 +6.5 +6.2 +5.9 +4.7 +3.3 +1.6 +0.9 +0.5 +0.2 -1.7 -4.2 1989* 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE RECORD Martin Currie Japan Fund Martin Currie Japan Fund – Out-performance versus the Topix Past performance is not a guide to future returns.Source: Lipper Hindsight. Bid-bid basis with gross income reinvested over calendar years to 31 December 2005 (£). Net of fees performance has been grossed up internally using a fee rate of 1.25% to 31 May 2002 and 1.50% going forwards. *From 14 September 1989.

20. SUMMARY • The bear market is over • The economic backdrop is positive • We have an experienced and well resources team • We have a proven, tried and tested investment process

21. REGULATORY INFORMATION Martin Currie Investment Management Limited (MCIM) has issued and approved this presentation in its capacity as investment adviser. MCIM is referred to throughout as ‘Martin Currie’. MCIM is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority and is a member of the Investment Management Association. Registered in Scotland (no 66107), registered address Saltire Court, 20 Castle Terrace, Edinburgh, EH1 2ES. The presentation may not be distributed to third parties and is intended only for the attendee. The presentation does not form the basis of, nor should it be relied upon in connection with, any subsequent contract or agreement. It does not constitute, and may not be used for the purpose of, an offer or invitation to subscribe for or otherwise acquire shares in any of the products mentioned. The information contained in this presenter has been compiled with considerable care to ensure its accuracy. But no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made to its accuracy or completeness. Martin Currie has procured any research or analysis contained in this presentation for its own use. It is provided to you only incidentally, and any opinions expressed are subject to change without notice. Past performance is not a guide to future returns. Markets and currency movements may cause the value of investments and income from them to fall as well as rise and you may get back less than you invested when you decide to sell your investments. There can be no assurance that you will receive comparable performance returns, or that investments will reflect the performance of the stock examples, contained in this presenter. Movements in foreign exchange rates may have a separate effect, unfavourable as well as favourable, on the gain or loss otherwise experienced on an investment. Funds which invest in one country carry a higher degree of risk than those with portfolios diversified across a number of markets. Investment in the securities of smaller and unquoted companies can involve greater risk than is customarily associated with investment in larger, more established, companies. In particular, smaller companies often have limited product lines, markets or financial resources and their management may be dependent on a smaller number of key individuals. In addition, the market for stock in smaller companies is often less liquid than that for stock in larger companies, bringing with it potential difficulties in acquiring, valuing and disposing of such stock. Proper information for determining their value, or the risks to which they are exposed, may not be available. Investment in derivative instruments, including futures, options or contracts for differences, carries a high risk of loss, the markets in these investments being very volatile. A relatively small adverse market movement may result not only in the loss of the original investment but also in unquantifiable further loss exceeding any margin deposited. Warrants often involve a high degree of gearing so that a relatively small movement in the price of the security to which the warrant relates may result in a disproportionately large movement, unfavourable as well as favourable, in the price of the warrant.