Philosophy 190: Plato Fall, 2014 Prof. Peter Hadreas Course website:

Philosophy 190: Plato Fall, 2014 Prof. Peter Hadreas Course website: http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/courses/Plato

PLATO: PROTAGORAS

Time: The dramatic date of the dialogue is shortly before the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War, probably about 433, Socrates is about 37, Alcibiades is about 17. Place: Socrates relates the conversations that took place earlier in the morning to an unnamed friend. It interchanges between famous sophists took place at the house of Callias, characterized as the wealthiest man in Athens.

Protagoras Who is Protagoras? “Protagoras was a native of Abdera, the city in the remote north-east of Greece, which also gave birth to Democritus. Since for our purposes relative dates are more important that absolute, we may note that Plato makes him say, before a company which included Socrates, Prodicus and Hippias, that he is old enough to be the father of any one of them (Prot. 317C). In the Hippias Major (282E), too, Hippias describes himself as a much younger man than Protagoras. This suggests a date of not later than 490 for Protagoras’ birth (which would make him about twenty years older than Socrates, probably the eldest of his auditors), in the Meno (91E) he is said to have died at the age of about seventy-four after forty years as a practicing sophist.”1 1. Guthrie, W. K. C., The Sophists, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 262.

Protagoras Who is Protagoras? “Protagoras was the most famous, and perhaps the earliest, of all the professional Sophists, who trained others for the profession as well as for public life.”1 “The theoretical foundation for all these statements [claims made about Protagoras’ doctrine that truth and values are relative] lies in the thesis which which he opened his work on Truth:2 “Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are that they are, and of the things that are not that they are not.” 1. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 263. 2. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 183.

I. Introductory conversation between Socrates and an unnamed friend. Socrates tells that friend that he had visited Protagoras in the morning. Socrates begins to recount happenings: (pp. 747-748; 309a1-310a7) Opening Conversation: FRIEND: Where have you just come from, Socrates? No don’t tell me. It’s pretty obvious that you’ve been hunting the ripe and ready Alcibiades. Well, I saw him just the other day, and he is certainly a beautiful man – and just between the two of us, ‘man’ is the proper word, Socrates: his beard is already filling out. SOCRATES: Well, what of it? I thought you were an admirer of Homer, who says that youth is most charming when the beard is first blooming – which is just the stage Alcibiades is at. Is this gossip?

Opening Conversation continued: FRIEND: So what’s up? Were you just bwith him? And how is the young man disposed towards you? SOCRATES: Pretty well, I think, especially today, since he rallied to my side and said a great many things to support me. You’re right, of course: I was just with him. But there’s something really strangte I want to tell you about. Although we were together, I didn’t pay him any mind; in find I forgot all about him most of the time. FRIEND: How could anything like that have happened to the two of you? You surely haven’t met someone else more beautiful, at least not in this city. SOCRATES: Much more beautiful FRIEND: What are you saying? A citizen or a foreigner? SOCRATES: A foreigner. FRIEND: From where? SOCRATES: Abdera [Socrates refers to Progaoras as beautiful because of his wisdom.]

Greek (Athenian and some other, but not all, Greek city-states of the 5th and 4th century BCE) Homosexuality Between men: The Greeks of the classical period did not identify people according to their sexual orientation. There is no term for ‘homosexual’ in Attic (classical Athenian) Greek. Behavior was distinguished by the role that each participant played in the sex act. It was understood as active or passive. This active/passive polarization corresponded with dominant and submissive social roles: the active role was associated with masculinity, higher social status, and adulthood, while the passive role was associated with femininity, lower social status, and youth.1 1. Oxford Classical Dictionary entry on homosexuality, pp.720–723; entry by David M. Halperin.

Greek (Athenian of the 5th and 4th century BCE) Homosexuality Between women: Sexual relations between women can be conjectured from the prominence and eminent status of Sappho, a poet from the island of Lesbos. Sappho wrote many love poems addressed to women and girls. The love in these poems is sometimes requited, and sometimes not. Sappho is thought to have written close to 12,000 lines of poetry on her love for other women. Among the writers that were most revered in antiquity Sappho’s writing have particularly suffered from a lack of preservation through the Dark Ages. Of her 12,000 lines of poetry that were judged frequently as the finest lyric poetry in Greek, only about 600 lines have survived.

Protagoras introduces himself p. 754 (317B-C) PROTAGAROS: “I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate men, and I consider this admission to be a better precaution than denial. And I have given thought to other precautions as well, so as to avoid, God willing, suffering any ill from admitting I am a sophist. I have been in the profession for many years now, and I’m old enough to be the father of any of you here. So if you do have a request, it would give me the greatest pleasure by far to deliver my lecture in the presence of everyone in the house.”

Protagoras explains what he can teach p. 755 (319A) PROTAGORAS: . . . “but if he [Socrates’ friend Hippocrates] comes to me he will learn only what he has come for. What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters – how best to manage one’s household, and in public affairs – how to realize one’s own potential for success in political debate and action.”

Socrates doubts that Protagoras can teach what he claims to p. 755 (319A) SOCRATES: . . . But when it is a matter of deliberating on city management, anyone can stand up and advise them, carpenter, blacksmith, shoemaker, merchant, ship-captain, rich man, poor man, well-born low-born – it doesn’t matter – and nobody blasts him for presuming to give counsel without any proper training under a teacher. The reason is clear. They do not think that this can be taught. . . . also in private life, where the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to to others the virtues that they possess. Look at Pericles, the father of these young men here. He gave them a superb education in everything that teachers can teach, but as for what he himself is really wise in, he neither teaches them that himself. nor has anyone else teach them either . . .

Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be taught by a story p. 756-62 (320A-328E) 1. Epimetheus [literally meaning "hindsight, hindthought"] gave animals, tough hides and thick pelt capable of warding off winter storms (p. 757) 321B. He shod some with hooves, others with think pads of bloodless skin. He provided various forms of nourishment. He gave some multiple births to ensure species and others few births. . But he used up all the power and abilities on the nonreasoning animals. 2. Prometheus [literally ‘thinking ahead’] trying to help the human race, stole fire from Haephestus, and then from Athena practical arts and wisdom.

Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be taught by a story p. 756-62 (320A-328E) mosaic of Epimetheus and Prometheus

Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be taught by a story p. 756-62 (320A-328E) 3. But political wisdom was in keeping of Zeus. Zeus gave humans justice and shame, (p. 758) 322C. Zeus insisted that everyone or at least most have this: “To all”, said Zeus, “and let all have a share. For cities would never come to be if few possessed these, as is the case with the other arts. And establish this law as coming from me: Death to him who cannot partake of shame and justice, for he is a pestilence to the city."

Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be taught p. 756-62 (320A-328E) 4. Reasonable punishment is established for social benefits. “Among these evils are injustice and impiety and in general everything opposed to civic virtue." (p. 759 324A) ”Reasonable punishment is not a vengeance for a past wrong -- but is undertaken with a view to the future and to deter the wrong-doer and whoever sees him being punished from repeating the crime" (p. 759 324C).

Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be taught p. 756-62 (320A-328E) 5. As to question of why good men are notable to teach their sons. There is one thing that is needed for a city to exist, justice, temperance and piety. This is taught privately and publicly collectively by all. The answer why good men can't teach their children. (p. 761, 327C): Suppose there could be no city unless all were flute-players. Everybody to the best of their ability was teaching this art and reprimanding those who couldn't do it. Yet, "When a son happened to be naturally disposed to flute-playing, he would progress and become famous; otherwise, he would remain obscure obscure" (327c)Thus those great men are naturally disposed.

How Protagoras Determines What His Students Pay p. 761, 328B-C “I consider myself to be such a person, uniquely qualified to assist other in become noble and good and worth the fee that I charge and even more, so much so that even my students agree. That is why I charge according to the following system: a student pays the full price only if he wishes to; otherwise, he goes to a temple, states under oath how much he thinks my lessons are worth, and pays that amount.”

Socrates Questions Protagoras on the Unity of Virtue p 762 (329D-330A) SOCRATES: Is virtue a single thing with justice and temperance and piety its parts; or are the things I have listed all names for a single entity: This is what still intrigues me? “That is an easy question to answer, Socrates,” he replied. “Virtue is a single entity, and the things you are asking about are its parts.” SOCRATES: Parts, as in the parts of a face: mouth, nose, eyes, and ears? Or parts as in the parts of gold, where there is no difference except for size, between parts or between parts and the whole?” “In the former sense . . . wisdom is the greatest part . . . each of them is different from each other.”

Socrates’ first dialectical argument against the independence of virtues: (p. 763ff., 330A3 - 331B8): 330A3 1. Each virtue is numerically distinct from each other. 330A4 2. Each virtue has its own specific power. 330A4-B6 3. No virtue is like any other, either in itself or with respect to its power. 330C1-2 4. Justice is something. 330C1-2 5. Justice is something just. 330C7-D1 6. Justice is such as to be just (from 5). 330D2-5 7. Holiness is something. 330D5-E2 8. Holiness is such as to be holy.

Socrates’ first dialectical argument against the independence of virtues (continued) (p. 763ff., 330A3 - 331B8): 331A7-8 9. Holiness is not such as to be something just (from 3 and 5). 331A8 10. Justice is not such as to be holy (from 3 and 8). 331A8-9 11. Justice is such not to be not-holy. 331A9 12. Holiness is such as to be not-just (from 9). 331A9-B1 13. Holiness is such as to be unjust (from 12). 14. Justice is such as to be unholy (from 11). 331B1-3 15. But justice is holy and holiness is just. 331B3-6 16. Therefore justice and holiness are like one another (i. e., 3 is false, by reductio ad absurdum.

Socrates’ second dialectical argument against the independence of virtues (continued) (p. 763ff., 330A3 - 331B8): 1. Wisdom is the opposite of folly (332a4; agreed without argument.) 2. Acting temperately is the opposite of folly (332e4-5; established by argument in three stages, (i) 332A6-B4, (ii) B4-C2, (iii) D1-E5. 3. Each thing which is an opposite has only one opposite (332D7-8); established by induction in 332D7). 4. Therefore, wisdom and temperance are one are thing (333B4-5). But this argument won’t work. Does each thing have only one opposite? Pleasure is the opposite of pain. But isn’t also painlessness?

Protagoras interrupts the Socrates relentless use of dialectic with a short speech on the complexity and relational nature of goodness. PROTAGORAS: “. . . Or take olive oil, which is extremely bad for all plants and is the worst enemy of the hair of all animals except humans, for whose hair it is beneficial, as it is for the rest of their bodies. But the good is such a multifaceted and variable thing that, in the case of oil, it is good for external parts of the human body but very bad very internal parts . . .” p. 767; 334B

333B7-334A2) Socrates begins a dialectical argument to prove the identity of justice and temperance. Crisis Protagoras interrupts Socrates’ dialectical questioning. Socrates gets ready to leave saying he just can’t keep up with long speeches. Calliasholds Socrates back. Hippias proposes they make a compromise (p. 770; 338A Socrates must not insist on an excessively brief form and Protagoras should not have free reign to speeches. He suggests a referee, but it’s decided that the group will all supervise together.

p. 768 335C SOCRATES : “ . . . You are a wise man [Protagoras], after all. But I don’t have the ability to make those long speeches: I only wish I did.” . . . But, Plato has framed the dialogue as Socrates’ recalling to Hippocrates the whole collection of conversations that took place that morning with Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus and many others. (p. 748; 310B) So if we accept the frame that Plato has set up, Socrates obviously had the ability to recall long speeches. He’s been doing it from the beginning by recalling the the dialogue. How is Plato playing on the reader’s involvement?

From, “Plato’s Way of Writing,” by Mary Margaret McCabe. Detachment1 “By contrast, when we are shocked, by devices in the frame, into looking at what is going on, we do so from a position of detachment, contemplating both points of view from the outside. We both consider the sorts of conditions that will come to bear on either point of view, including the condition for argument as such, and think about the subject in question from a position of detached reflection. So, I suggest, the active role of the reader is crucial to understanding why the dialogue is so multiform.” 1. McCabe, Mary Margaret, “Plato’s Way of Writing,” in The Oxford Handbook to Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 106.

Bertold Brecht and the Alienation Effect Alienation effect, also called a-effect or distancing effect, German Verfremdungseffekt or V-effekt.1 1. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/15423/alienation-effect

Alienation effect, also called a-effect or distancing effect, German Verfremdungseffekt or V-effekt, idea central to the dramatic theory of the German dramatist-director Bertolt Brecht. It involves the use of techniques designed to distance the audience from emotional involvement in the play . . . Examples of such techniques include explanatory captions or illustrations projected on a screen; actors stepping out of character to lecture, summarize, or sing songs; and stage designs that do not represent any locality but that, by exposing the lights and ropes, keep the spectators aware of being in a theatre. The audience’s degree of identification with characters and events is presumably thus controlled, and it can more clearly perceive the “real” world reflected in the drama.1 1.http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/15423/alienation-effect, downloaded 9/15/2014.

Inspired by the philosophies of G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx and by Viktor Shklovsky’s theory of ostranenie (“making it strange,” or defamiliarization), Brecht regarded his method as a way of helping spectators understand the complex nexuses of historical development and societal relationships. By creating stage effects that were strange or unusual, Brecht intended to assign the audience an active role in the production by forcing them to ask questions about the artificial environment and how each individual element related to real-life events. In doing so, it was hoped that viewers would distance themselves emotionally from problems that demanded intellectual solutions.

A Neo-Fregean Analysis of Abstract Objects as Essences1 “In each case, the abstract object is essentially the value of an abstraction function for a certain class of arguments. This is not a claim about the meanings of linguistic expressions. It is a claim about the essences or natures of the objects themselves.2 So for example, the Fregean number two (if there is such a thing) is, essentially, by its very nature, the number that belongs to a concept F if and only if there are exactly two Fs. More generally, for each Fregean abstract object x, there is an abstraction function f, such that x is essentially the value of f for every argument of a certain kind.” [Emphasis added] 1. downloaded from Rosen, Gideon, "Abstract Objects", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2014/entries/abstract-objects/>. 2. For the relevant notion of essence, see Fine, Kit, 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives 8, 1–16.

A Neo-Fregean Analysis of Abstract Objects as Essences1 “Abstraction functions have two key features. First, for each abstraction function f there is an equivalence relation R such that it lies in the nature of f that f(x) = f(y) iff Rxy. Intuitively, we are to think that R is metaphysically prior to f, and that the abstraction function f is defined (in whole or in part) by this biconditional. Second, each abstraction function is a generating function: its values are essentially values of that function. Many functions are not generating functions. Paris is the capital of France, but it is not essentially a capital. The number of solar planets, by contrast, is essentially a number.” 1. downloaded from Rosen, Gideon, "Abstract Objects", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/abstract-objects/>.

A Neo-Fregean Analysis of Abstract Objects as Essences1 The notion of an abstraction function may be defined in terms of these two features: f is an abstraction function iff for some equivalence relation R, it lies in the nature of f that f(x) = f(y) iff Rxy; and for all x, if x is a value of f, then it lies in the nature of x that there is (or could be) some object y such that x = f(y). We may then say that x is an abstraction if and only if, for some abstraction function f, there is or could be an object y such that x = f(y) And x is an abstract object if (and only if) x is an abstraction 1. downloaded from Rosen, Gideon, "Abstract Objects", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/abstract-objects/>.

So Socrates begins again. This time appealing to the ‘truth’ of celebrated poetic to determine if the virtues are unified.

Socrates’ opinion of investigating philosophical questions through poetry p. 778; 347C-E “Discussing poetry strikes me no different from the second-rate drinking parties of the agora crowd. These people, largely uneducated and unable to entertain themselves over their wine by using their own voice to generate conversation, pay premium prices for flute-girls and rely on the extraneous voice of the reed flute as background music for their parties.”

Socrates return to dialectical questioning pp. 779- 781 (349B-351B) The guests agree to abandon criticism of poetry and to resume the original discussion. Socrates returns to questioning Protagoras about the unity of the virtues, in this case about the relation of wisdom to courage.

Socrates breaks off the discussion to propose a version of ethical hedonism. p. 781 (351C) “What Protagoras?” Surely you don’t, like most people, call some pleasant things bad and some painful thing good? I mean, isn’t a pleasant thing good just insofar as it is pleasant, that is, if it results in nothing other than pleasure; and, on the other hand, aren’t painful things bad in the same way, just insofar as they are painful.” NOTE: How Socrates belittles what ‘most people’ believe.

Socrates argues the most people not agree with the truth of ethical hedonism because of cases of ‘akrasia’‘weakness of the will,’ becoming overcome by passions. p. 782; 352D SOCRATES: “Right you are. You realize that most people aren’t going to be convinced by us. They maintain that most people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they know what it is and are able to do it. And when I have asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are overcome by pleasure or pain or are being ruled by one of the things I referred to just now.” [Socrates has mentioned: desire, love, often fear, but not knowledge.]

But cases of ‘akrasia’ being overcome by passions are due to a type of faulty cognition – bad measurement. p. 785; 356D “The power of appearance often makes us wander all over the place in confusion, often changing our minds about the same things and regretting our actions and choice with respect to thing large and small, the art of measurement in contrast, would make appearances lose their power by showing us the truth, would give us peace of mind firmly rooted in the truth and would save our life.”

The capacity to measure correctly is a kind of knowledge. p. 786; 357D “For you agreed with us that those who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, on other words, with regard to good and bad, do so because of a lack of knowledge but a lack of that knowledge you agreed was measurement.”

Socrates connects courage with knowledge and cowardice with ignorance p. 788-9; 360B-361A SOCRATES: “If a thing is noble and good it is also pleasant?” “That was definitely agreed upon.” “So, the cowardly with full knowledge, are not willing to go toward the more honorable, the better, the more pleasant.” . . . . “And aren’t cowards shown to be so through ignorance of what is to be feared?”

Socrates connects courage with knowledge and cowardice with ignorance p. 788-9; 360B-361A continued . . . . SOCRATES: So, can we conclude that cowardice is ignorance of what is and what is not be feared?” He nodded. “Now, courage is the opposite of cowardice” He said yes. . . . . “So the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is courage and is the opposite of this ignorance?

Socrates connects courage with knowledge and cowardice with ignorance p. 788-9; 360B-361A continued . . . . PROTAGORAS: He would not even nod at this. He remained silent. SOCRATES: And I said, “What’s this Protagoras? Will you not say yes or no to my question?” “Answer it yourself.” “I have only one more question to ask you. Do you still believe, as you did at first, that some men are very ignorant and and yet still very courageous.” “I think you just want to win the argument, Socrates, and that is why you are forcing me to answer. . .

Socrates’apparent quandary at the end of the Protagoras 361A-B 1 1. If X is an art or skill, then it is teachable. 2. Virtue is a kind of knowledge – that is, an art or skill. 3. Virtue is not teachable. 1. See Devereux Daniel, “Socrates Ethics and Moral Psychology, in The Oxford Handbook to Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),. pp. 142-3

Socrates’ implicit teaching as collected from the Protagoras as a whole 361A-B 1 1. If X is an art or skill, then it is teachable 2. (Genuine) virtue is an art or skill and therefore teachable. 3. (Sophistical) virtue is not teachable 1. See Devereux Daniel, “Socrates Ethics and Moral Psychology, in The Oxford Handbook to Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),. pp. 142-3

References to pictures used in this powerpoint slide #2, bust of Plato: http://www.ancientgreece.com/s/People/Plato/ slide #10 and ff., bust of Pythagoras: http://www.quotecollection.com/image-view.php?img=protagoras-3.jpg slide# 14, mosaic of Epimetheus and Prometheus: http://bashapedia.pbworks.com/w/page/51086174/Prometheus%20and%20Epimetheushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicias#mediaviewer/File:Nicias,_p_105_(World%27s_Famous_Orations_Vol_1).jpg Slide # 27, Picture of Bertold Brecht: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertolt_Brecht: http://www.livius.org/a/greece/mantineia/mantinea_battlefield_jvv.JPG slide #32 and ff., bust of Socrates: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socrates#mediaviewer/File:Socrates_Louvre.jpg

Philosophy 190: Plato Fall, 2014 Prof. Peter Hadreas Course website: