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Endpoint Protection Application and Device control to dynamically control storage devices From kludge to B.A.U. Rich Bagurdes, CISSP. Consultant - Threat Intelligence January 2014. SEP ADC Storage Control Agenda. Intro. 1. Problem Statement. 2. Requirements. 3. Design/Logic. 4.
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Endpoint Protection Application and Device control to dynamically control storage devicesFrom kludge to B.A.U Rich Bagurdes, CISSP Consultant - Threat Intelligence January 2014 Chicago User Group – January 2014
SEP ADC Storage Control Agenda Intro 1 Problem Statement 2 Requirements 3 Design/Logic 4 Policy Walkthrough 5 Reporting 6 Summary 7 V2.0 Chicago User Group – January 2014
Intro • Started out in IT in 1997 • Finance, Telecom, .com startups… • 13 years at Discover • 5 years • Datacenter design • OS2/Windows Engineering • Patch Management • 8 years InfoSec • Endpoint protection engineer • AV/HIPS/Encryption… Chicago User Group – January 2014
Problem StatementControl Storage Devices • 2000-2007 – Administrative Controls • Written policies – what can be attached • Purse Strings – prevent users and managers from acquiring • 2007 -2011 – Technical Controls • Microsoft GPO’s – often didn’t apply – weak enforcement • No reporting – fire and forget – or spray and pray… • Business reluctance • 2011 - Present • Top down decision – set at CIO level • Flexible but secure system • User self service • Detailed reporting (entitlement and actual use) • Future • DLP Chicago User Group – January 2014
RequirementsWhat you need to succeed! • Political support and good documentation • Windows XP – Windows 7 • XP requires KB943729 Group Policy Preference Client Side Extensions • Active Directory Functional level >2008 • SEP 12 with Application and Device control AND NTP • Groups and GPO’s to support 4 functional roles • Execute/Write/Read • Operations, End User Support, BCP users • Write/Read • VP’s and above, select groups that frequently write data (previous analysis) • Read • Default everyone • Lockdown • Contractors, offshore, PCI, PII, etc. • Employee self service • Centralized control, approval workflow Chicago User Group – January 2014
Design and LogicHow does this all work? • AD groups, AD policies and Security Filtering • 1:1:1 mapping Group GPO Location • Plus one catch all • GPO Security Filter • Members of AD group can read aka “apply” policy • If policy is read – registry key is set • HKLM – single key with changing value. • HKCU – changing key • Permission keys • Registry Keys are triggers for SEP ADC • HKLM keys processed by Location Awareness • HKCU keys are processed by ADC policy directly Chicago User Group – January 2014
Policy WalkthroughGPO Security Filtering • Security Filtering controls who receives policy • Remove Authenticated Users • Only allow members of AD group to read desired policy Chicago User Group – January 2014
Policy WalkthroughGroup and GPO details • Group Policy Preferences set via HKLM • String Value (REG_SZ) • Value Name is consistent across all 4 GPO’s – but Value Data changes. • “StorageKey” in sample policies Chicago User Group – January 2014
Policy WalkthroughSEP Locations • Create a location for every group, plus one (N+1) • Unassigned group • Catches non-domain machines or machines that have not been configured • Should be most common/default state – Read Only in our case. • Notification Messages are user friendly Chicago User Group – January 2014
Policy WalkthroughApplication Controls and Rule Sets • Unique ADC policy for each location • Rule set to control functions • Include rule set to protect Storage Control keys • Use the Test and Production modes • A rule that would normally “prevent” and action can easily be turned into a “monitoring” policy with a mode flip Chicago User Group – January 2014
Policy WalkthroughApplication Rules • Every rule must have at lease one application * • Rules are processed from the top down • Allow actions go before the block actions • Keep track of Rule Names, Actions and Severity • Important for later reporting and analysis • Concise/clear notifications on blocks <100 char • USB flash drives, and USB hard drives different controls • Flash Drives, Floppy Dives CD/DVD drives controlled via “Drive Type” • USB hard drives are controlled via USBSTOR* device ID type • Restricting DVD/CD burning is very tricky • IMAPI restrictions by file hash + restricted apps + GPO’s Chicago User Group – January 2014
ReportingNative Tools • Potential for a lot of data. • Consider users who frequently backup, or move many files around. • Deep analysis is hard with native reporting. • Logs – Filter, Export, Excel Filter, Merge Repeat • Event logs Monitors Logs and choose: • Log type = Application and Device Control • Log Content = Application Control Chicago User Group – January 2014
ReportingITAnalytics • ITAnalytics or other analytics platform is needed • Count of writes or execution use per user per month • Drill down to names of files written, types of USB devices in use. Etc. • Track execution of unauthorized software, “portable” executables • Build your case for DLP Chicago User Group – January 2014
SummaryImportant points • Support from the top • Test, then test some more. • Good documentation focus on process and help desk • Manage this like a program, not just a project • References • Best Practices for Deploying Symantec Endpoint Protection's Application and Device Control Policies • How to block CD/DVD Writing in Windows 7 • Location Awareness: Using registry values to switch locations • Creating custom application control rules • Testing application control rule sets Chicago User Group – January 2014
Rich Bagurdes RichardBagurdes@discover.com Chicago User Group – January 2014