Revitalizing Public Irrigation in India: The Evolution of ITP Thinking

1. Revitalizing Public Irrigation in India:The Evolution of ITP Thinking Tushaar Shah

2. What is the problem? We do not know. But there are visible symptoms of stagnation in public irrigation systems in India.

3. Symptoms of Stagnation? • Command area is inelastic w.r.t investment in new projects, rehabilitation, modernization • ‘Build-neglect-rebuild’ (BNR) syndrome in place of ‘build-serve-earn-maintain-grow’ (BSEMG) syndrome • Persistence of head-tail inequity. • Poor ISF recovery. • Shrinking of ‘illegal payments’ by farmers to irrigation officials. • Tubewell boom in canal commands: ‘vote by feet rather than by voice’? • Little or no verifiable information on performance of public irrigation systems against objectives. • Governments/funders interested more in construction than in management?

4. Public Irrigation Systems:Design v/s Reality? This change demands proactive management of systems

5. Indian canal irrigation systems are ‘under-managed’; modicum of management effort dramatically enlarges the area and farmers benefitted, as a case study ( Palliwal & Gupta) submitted to ITP shows.. Under political pressure to cope with 2009 drought, Mahi-Bajaj Sagar managers covered 20 percent more wheat area with 60 percent less water to produce a bumber wheat crop with a curtailed budget by: Frequent consultations with farmer leaders on reservoir water level Scientific water scheduling; IEC campaign to involve farmers in desilting canals; Activating and involving WUAs in water distribution; Home-grown ‘wara-bandi’ by WUAs

6. Increase in System GDP How do public utilities reinvent themselves to remain relevant? External Conditions seem to explain why canal irrigation in India was far more central to agriculture and livelihoods during 19th century and earlier than it is now. Nature of the state Nature of society Agency Irrigation Service; system maintenance Irrigation Service Fee; labor; rule compliance State of Technology Physical System State of Institutions Farmers

7. Chinese Irrigation Modernization Plan: [a] US $ 600 b for modernization over the decade; [b] Irrigation Service Contracts with WUAs; [c] quality irrigation service; [d] ISF at US $ 75-400/ha; [e] water distribution below outlet by WUAs.. Text book example of PIM..Is such a turn around possible in India.. In any public utility?

8. Turn around of Gujarat Electricity Board • G For years until 2000, Gujarat Electricity Board was a drag on the government’s finances, and on the state’s development, roundly hated by consumers and abhorred by farmers. • A decade later, the same agency metamorphosed into a model public utility, efficient, agile and profitable, winning global awards for innovation and customer service.

9. Water User Associations in Sri Lanka • Sri Lanka had centuries old traditional institutions for water management sustained by the authority of medieval and then Colonial state. • These declined after Independence because of powerlessness of local leaders to enforce rules. • Pres. Rajapakse’s decision to channelize fertilizer subsidies through WUAs breathed new life in WUAs which are more lively and vigorous than before 2005. Neither in Chinese irrigation nor in Gujarat Electricity nor in Sri Lankan WUAs was the institutional turn-around spontaneous and endogenous. The impetus for change came from the external task environment..

10. Contingency Hypothesis on Canal Irrigation Performance There is no best way to organize and manage a canal irrigation system or to improve its performance. Instead, the optimal course of action is contingent upon its internal and external situation.

11. Low-level Equilibrium in India’s Canal Irrigation NIMF attacks here

12. IWMI-Tata Recommendation:A US $ 1.25 billion National Irrigation Management Fund in India’s 12th Five Year Plan: 2013-2017 • GoI will compensate every state rupee to rupee, the Irrigation Service Fee they collect from farmers; • There will be a 30 percent bonus on all ISF collected through WUAs; • Additional 20 percent bonus for ISF collected through WUAs for volumetric water supply based on service contracts provided: • [a] GoI funds are not used to replace state budget to ID; • [b] GoI incentive is distributed among systems in proportion to their ISF collection; • [c] 50 percent of ISF collection are retained by WUAs; and 20 percent retained by their federations at Distributary level; • [d] there is an independent third party verification of the claims made by each state

13. Irrigation Service Fee Collection as the Lever of MMI Management Reform:Outcome-based support rather than Input-based support Short term medium term long term Partnership between ID & WUAs Rationalization of ISF Collection Ratio Improves IPU>=IPC Volumetric water supply Better data on IPU Irrigation service contracts Strong fillip to PIM Incentive to increase ISF collection through WUAs Conjunctive mgt of ground & surface water Faster CAD

14. The Rs 6700 crore (US $ 1.25 billion) question is whether state Irrigation Departments will buy into NIMF Will NIMF incentives spur PIM? How best to respond to farmer-led modifications in irrigation systems? Would better information about performance improve performance?

15. Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. Albert Einstein Thank You.