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1.25 worm incident: JP situation. Suguru Yamaguchi JPCERT/CC. Overview (1). Pandemic, but not severe impact to our infrastructure in Japan 1.25 around noon, first observation in SOC at a company in Tokyo 1.25 1400-1430, first observation in OP center in many ISP’s and backbone holders
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1.25 worm incident: JP situation Suguru Yamaguchi JPCERT/CC
Overview (1) • Pandemic, but not severe impact to our infrastructure in Japan • 1.25 around noon, first observation in SOC at a company in Tokyo • 1.25 1400-1430, first observation in OP center in many ISP’s and backbone holders • 1.25 around 1800 officially announced this was done by SQL slammer by one of SOC in JP • 2 or 3 ISP’s installed filter to international link GW. • “too simple” filtering made some troubles, but immediately fixed • Simple filter out for 1434/UDP is not good. • Bound for 1434/UDP, except from 53/UDP (DNS)
Overview (2) • 1.26, NPA and IPA released out alert. • About SQL slammer • 1.27, JPCERT/CC released out technical bulletin for fixing the security hole, again.
Technical Aspect (1) • 1Mbps generated by a single worm • 1434/UDP • Faster than other worms • Random IP address selection for attack, so IP packet forwarding cache at router made bad influences on its performance. • Completely same to CodeRed, Nimda cases. • Many backbone holders have its “walk-around” techniques to keep its performance.
Technical Aspect (2) • DNS trouble? • Korean specific problem, at the beginning. • Not directly, but made some influences on the DNS lookups, because of saturated link.
Lessons • Update your software properly. • Prepare for the case, as we did so far. • Quick response • Traffic/incident observations on the backbone