1 / 10

The Political Economy of Infrastructure Planning in Sweden

The Political Economy of Infrastructure Planning in Sweden. Johanna Jussila Hammes VTI, TEK-Stockholm. Background. An explorative study Analyse data from two Swedish National Transport Infrastructure Plans, for 2004-2015 and for 2010-2021.

alva
Download Presentation

The Political Economy of Infrastructure Planning in Sweden

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. The PoliticalEconomyofInfrastructure Planning in Sweden Johanna Jussila Hammes VTI, TEK-Stockholm

  2. Background • An explorative study • Analyse data from two Swedish National Transport Infrastructure Plans, for 2004-2015 and for 2010-2021. • Whatfactorsexplainwhichprojects get included in a Plan? Examinepoliticaleconomyexplanations.

  3. Hypotheses • There is a geographic-political aspect to the choice of infrastructure projects. • The preferred transport mode varies depending on government colour. • There is a rural-urban split in project choice depending on the colour of the government. • Lobbying affects the choice of which projects are included in a National Transport Infrastructure Plan.

  4. Data

  5. t-tests

  6. Regression results: basic regression

  7. Regression results: bigcities

  8. Regression results: lobbying

  9. Conclusions • The politicalvariables get positive and statisticallysignificantcoefficients in the regression analysis. • t-tests show no difference in the meansof the variablesbetween the two Plans.  Weconsider the regression analysistoprovide at least partial support for the firsthypothesis. • Railinvestments get a positive and significantcoefficient in the regression analysis. • The meanvalue for ’Rail’ is greater for the 2004-15 Plan than for the 2010-21 Plan.  Bothgovernmentsfavourrailinvestments over road but the left-winggovernmentfavoursrailmore.

  10. Conclusions • The regression coefficientsfor the bigcitiesareinsignificant. • The meanvalue for Stockholm County is lower for the 2004-15 Plan than for the 2010-21 Plan. • The left-winggovernmentseemstohavediscriminatedagainst the Stockholm County. • The regression coefficients for ’Co-financing/IC’ are positive and significant. The coefficients for ’NPV Freight/IC’ are borderline significant and positive. •  Lobbying matters, especially lobbying by the municipalitiesthrough co-financing.

More Related