CONTEMPORARY META-CHALLENGES FOR LABOR MOVEMENTS

1. “DECLINE, RESURGENCE, OR SURVIVAL?: UNIONS AMIDST GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO AND BRAZIL”Scott B. MartinThe New School

2. CONTEMPORARY META-CHALLENGES FOR LABOR MOVEMENTS • Globalization • Market reform • Decline of class- and labor-based politics

3. MICRO-STRUCTURALCHALLENGES • DEMOGRAPHIC • OCCUPATIONAL • PRECARIOUS WORK • INFORMALITY • FRAGMENTED WORK IDENTITIES AND SOLIDARITIES

4. THE COMPARATIVE PUZZLE OVER LAST TWO TO TWO AND HALF DECADES….. • BRAZIL: UNION STRENGTHENING AND SURVIVAL • MEXICO: UNION DECLINE AND WEAKENING

5. ARGUMENT IN BRIEF • WITHIN MORE/LESS FAVORABLE SEQUENCING OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS….. • DIFFERENT STRATEGIES OF ORGANIZATION, MOBILIZATION, AND COOPERATION OF BUSINESS AND LABOR

6. BR: Stress on autonomy, direct negotiation, and institution building by business and labor-- Collective bargaining • MX:Emphasis on maximizing advantage within existing institutions of state mediation--Political bargaining

7. Union Density Rates [1] Total wage-earners over 14 years of age employed and in a subordinate position [2] Includes employer sindicatos

8. Pinpointing Union Decline in MX • ILO in ’97 reports sharp drop in unionization from 1989-1991 (first three years of Salinas gov’t) • Minus 42.7% (-23.1 points) for non-agric’l labor force • Minus 28.2% (-16.8 points) for all wage and salary earners • Base: Federal jurisdiction workers (large and medium enterprises, including public sector)

9. CAVEATS ABOUT MEXICAN DATA • SOME CONTEMPORARY ESTIMATES SUGGEST RATE OF 14-20% (Reforma) • PRECISE MAGNITUDE OF DECLINE IN DOUBT, EXISTENCE OF TREND ISN’T • ISSUE OF SINDICATOS AND CONTRATOS DE PROTECCION

10. Contrast in Larger Regional and Global Perspective • Rest of Lat Am with Declines from mid 80s to mid-90s, exept Chile (ILO, World Employment Rpt 97/98) • Major Declines along w/ MX: ARG, COL, CR, CUB, GUA, URU, VEN • Small Declines: DR, ES • Major=Larger than -20% • Small=-= -5.0 to -19.9%

11. Declining Global Union Density in “Early Globalization” • 50 OF 66 COUNTRIES WITH DECLINES OF 5% OR MORE FROM MID-80s TO MID-90s: ILO • 35 COUNTRIES WITH MAJOR DECLINES– MEXICO IN GOOD COMPANY • BRAZIL IN MORE SELECT COMPANY • MORE SKETCHY DATA ON MORE RECENT PERIOD OF GLOBALIZATION

12. EXPLAINING UNION DECLINE/ RESURGENCE IN GLOBAL ERA • STRUCTURAL FACTORS • LABOR MARKETS • LABOR FORCE • PACE/EXTENT OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION • 2) POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS • REGIME CHANGE • ALLIANCES WITH PARTIES • LABOR RELATIONS INSTITUTIONS/LEGACIES • STATE PREFERENCES/RESOURCES

13. STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS • RESEARCH ON STRUCTURAL REFORM INDICES BY MORLEY ET AL (CEPAL, PAUNOVIC, ‘00; HUBER & HOLT ‘04): • BASED ON ’82-’95 REFORMS, BOTH ARE “CAUTIOUS REFORMERS,” BELOW MEDIAN OF REGION’S GENERAL REFORM INDEX (Huber & Holt) • BR SLIGHT LAGGARD IN ONSET (1994 VS. 1988) BUT…. • BY ’96, BR WITH REFORMS OF EQUAL OR GREATER DEPTH THAN MX IN TRADE, PRIVATIZATION & TAXES (BOTH LAGGARDS ON FIN’CIAL/CAP’L ACC’T)

14. STRUCTURAL (“NEOLIBERAL”) REFORM CONT’D • BY ’98, BR “LOSES” TO MX ONLY IN TRADE & CAP ACCOUNT--“AHEAD” IN PRIVATIZATION AND “TIED” ON TAX & CAPITAL ACCOUNT REFORM • CONCLUSIONS: BY MID TO LATE 90S, BR HAS “CAUGHT” MX • BRAZILIAN UNIONS “HOLD THEIR OWN” MUCH BETTER THAN MEXICAN ONES

15. NO APPARENT ASSOCIATION WITH GROWTH RECORD • ANNUAL GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH AVERAGES 1980-90 BR: -0.4% MX -0.2% 1991-98 BR +1.8% MX +3.1%

16. STRONG DEMOGRAPHIC AND LABOR FORCE STRUCTURE SIMILARITIES (CEPAL, 1990-05) • POPULATION GROWTH RATES • AGE STRUCTURE OF POPULATION • MINOR DIFFERENCES IN URBANIZATION RATIO (ABOUT 4 POINTS HIGHER IN BR)

17. DIFFERENCES WITH NO CLEAR CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP • CONSISTENTLY HIGHER LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE IN BR (56.2% in ’90 est’d 59.1% in ’05) THAN MX (48.9  est’d 54.1) • MOSTLY DUE TO CONSISTENTLY HIGHER FEMALE PARTICIPATION RATE IN BR (est’d 43.2% in ’05 vs. est’d 36.4% in MX) • MX LABOR FORCE 90-03: ↓AGRICULTURE, ↑ MFG., ↑SERVICES • BR: STEADY AGRICULTURE, ↓ MFG, ↑ TERTIARY CEPAL

18. LABOR FORCE STRUCTURE IN 2003 IN PRINCIPLE SHOULD FAVOR HIGHER DENSITY IN MX PRIMARY SECONDARY TERTIARY MX 16.6% 25.7 57.7 BR 19.8% 21,6 58.6 Source: CEPAL

19. HIGHER LEVELS OF URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT IN BR SHOULD DEPRESS UNION DENSITY • Ave. annual rates for 1995-2003 • BR 7.6% • MX 3.5% • Higher for each year since 1990 in BR except 1995-96 Source:CEPAL

20. INFORMALITY AND UNION DENSITY: UNCLEAR LINKS • CONSISTENTLY 2-7 POINTS HIGHER IN BR THAN MX OVER ’90-’03 (ILO) 2003: BR 44.6% MX 41.8% • STEADY INCREASE IN BOTH COUNTRIES • CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP (AND ARROW) TO UNION DENSITY UNCLEAR • UPHILL FIGHT FOR BRAZILIAN UNIONS

21. POLITICS & INSTITUTIONS • DEMOCRATIZATION’S DOUBTFUL IMPACT • PRO-LABOR QUALITIES EASILY OVERPLAYED, ESP. FOR BRAZIL’S ELITIST TRANSITION • COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE ON LATIN AMERICA • BR ONLY NEW DEM’CY WITH ↑ DENSITY FROM MID-80S TO MID-90S • 5 NEW DEMOCRACIES WITH ↓ DENSITY (ARG, GUAT, URU, ES, DR) • 3 EST’D DEMOCRACIES WITH ↓ DENSITY: CR, VEN, & COL

22. CROSS-REGIONAL EVIDENCE INCONCLUSIVE (ILO DATA BASE, 2005) • FOUR ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH SPAN ON UNION DATA FROM 80s TO 00s WITH MARKET REFORM, GLOBAL INTEGRATION, AND DEM. TRANSITIONS * PHILIPPINES & TAIWAN—STABLE RATES * S. KOREA WITH MAJOR ↓ ↓FOUNDATIONAL DEMOCRACIES DIFFERENT? • IMPACT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (H. KONG ALSO WITH ↑)? • TRANSITION AN INSUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR UNION DENSITY RISE

23. PARTY ALLIANCES • GIVEN ABOVE REGIONAL DATA ON ↓ UNIONIZATION THROUGH MID-90S IN LABOR-BACKED GOVT’S AND REGIMES (MEX, VEN, ARG, ETC.), BENEFITS OF “INSIDER STATUS” CLEARLY OVERRATED • “SIDE PAYMENTS” AND “DEAL MAKING” ON NEOLIBERAL REFORM TO PRESERVE CORE ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES OVERRATED IN TERMS OF IMPACT IN FORESTALLING DE-UNIONIZATION

24. Reform of Corporatist Labor Relations Institutions: “Less than Meets the Eye” • MX: NEITHER DEMOCRATIZING NOR FLEXIBILIZING LEGAL REFORMS OF CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS (LEY FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO, JUNTA, EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION) • GOOD FOR CORPORATIST UNION ACTIVITY, BAD FOR MODERN, INDEPENDENT UNIONISM, INDIFFERENT FOR UNION DENSITY PER SE

25. REGULATORY REFORM IN BR: ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK • 1988 CONSTITUTION AND SARNEY GOV’T: ↑FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, ↓STATE INTERVENTION IN UNION FORMATION, ↑BENEFITS (MATERNAL, PATERNAL), ↓ WORKWEEK • CARDOSO GOV’T: PARTIAL FLEXIBIZING REFORMS (P/T & TEMP CONTRACTS, ↓ EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION TO SEVERANCE PAY SYSTEM, ETC.) WHILE STILL OTHERS FAIL

26. BRAZIL IN 2005 • HYBRID CORPORATIST/PLURALIST LABOR SYSTEM STILL IN PLACE: • UNION TAX • PRINCIPLE OF UNICIDADE (MONOPOLY) • LABOR COURT SYSTEM • CLT VARGAS-ERA LABOR LAWS

27. CORPORATIST LABOR REFORM & STATE ELITES: SUMMING UP • GOVERNING ELITES DON’T GET MOST OF THE REFORM THEY SEEK IN EITHER: LONG LIVE CORPORATISM • MORE UNIFORM FLEXIBILIZING REFORM IMPULSE IN MX • DIFFICULT TO SEE THESE (NON) REFORMS AND POLICIES AS DECISIVE FOR (DE)UNIONIZATION

28. ARGUMENT IN BRIEF • WITHIN MORE/LESS FAVORABLE SEQUENCING OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS….. • DIFFERENT STRATEGIES OF ORGANIZATION, MOBILIZATION, AND COOPERATION OF BUSINESS AND LABOR

29. SEQUENCING OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS (ADAPTED FROM COOK ON LAB REFORM) • SEQUENCES SHAPE … - OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES FOR UNION ACTION—MORE OR LESS CLOSED • DEGREE OF CONSOLIDATION OF ANTI-LABOR FORCES IN BUSINESS AND STATE

30. SEQUENCING SCENARIOS • MARKETS FIRST, THEN DEMOCRACY: MX HIGHLY CONSTRAINING ENVIRONMENT FOR UNIONS - SIMILARITY (WITH CAVEATS) TO CHILE FROM PINOCHET TO CONCERTACION 2) DEMOCRACY FIRST, THEN MARKETS: BR  LESS CONSTRAINING ENVIRONMENT FORUNION ACTIVITY - PLAUSIBLE IN ASIAN CASES, BUT WHY DOESN’T WORK IN OTHER POST-TRANSITIONAL SETTINGS IN LAT AM (E.G., ARG, PERU)? *

31. Central Role for Agency and Strategy within Sequencing • Focus on labor and business actors and strategic interplay • Builds on historical literature on how nascent labor movements in now advanced countries achieve initial major growth spurts • Ratcheting up of unionization and collective bargaining through initial impulse from below of “social movement unionism,” followed by its institutionalization into reformist “social democratic unionism”

32. Responses to CUT’s Novo Sindicalismo: Focus on Autonomy, Mobilization, and Negotiation • BUSINESS: DEFENSIVE AND THEN PROACTIVE RESPONSES • REVITALIZATION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND EMPLOYER SINDICATOS • PROFESSIONALIZATION AND VALORIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND NEGOTIATION • ACCEPTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF AUTONOMOUS, DIRECT BARGAINING

33. Reaction of Rest of Union Movement to CUT’s Oppositional Militancy • Imitation • Differentiation • Reorganization • Competition

34. From 2 independent labor centrals in 1983 to seven today • Even with a 43% jump in number of unions nationwide, increased from 30 to 38% in sindicatos affiliated with (independent) labor centrals (’91-’01) • 52% of all unionized workers are in centrals (of which 71% are in CUT, 9% in Forca Sindical, and rest in other 5)

35. Revitalization of Collective Bargaining • INCREASE IN AUTONOMY, FREQUENCY, LEVELS, AND SUBJECT MATTER • HALF OF ALL URBAN UNIONS FOUND TO TAKE PART IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN BOTH 1991 AND 2001 • ↓ ROLE OF LABOR COURTS: FROM INVOLVEMENT IN 33% OF ALL SETTLEMENTS IN ’91 TO ONLY 12% IN 2001 • 81% OF ALL CONTRACTS REACHED THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

36. IN HIGHLY ORGANIZED SECTORS, CONSIDERABLE UNION INFLUENCE OVER PRODUCTIVE RESTRUCTURING (WORK RULES, PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS, OUTSOURCING, TRAINING, REDEPLOYMENT, ETC.)36

37. CONTRAST WITH STRATEGIES OF MEXICAN LABOR AND BUSINESS • UNIONS: LITTLE BREAK FROM CORPORATIST ORGANIZATIONS AND PRACTICES, EVEN AMONG DISSIDENTS AND INDEPENDENTS • BUSINESS: RELIANCE ON CORPORATIST CONTROLS FOR LABOR PEACE, NO COALITION-BUILDING WITH LABOR, RETOGRADE POSITION ON LEGAL REFORM

38. BR: Stress on autonomy, directengagement, and institution building by business and labor-- Collective bargaining • MX:Emphasis on maximizing advantage within existing institutions of state mediation--Political bargaining

39. CONCLUSION • GLOBALIZATION AND MARKET REFORM DON’T DETERMINE A SWEEPING AWAY OF UNIONS • NOR DOES DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION FOLLOWING LASTING AUTHORITARIAN RULE ENTAIL AN INEXORABLE STRENGTHENING OF UNIONS, THOUGH CAN OPEN OPPORTUNITIES FOR INNOVATIVE LABOR AND BUS. ACTIONS • CONSTRAINED BUT CONTINGENT PROCESS WHERE AGENCY AND STRATEGY OF ORGANIZED INTERESTS MATTER

40. WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT UNIONS’ FATE? • DIFFERENT SET OF QUALITATIVE WORKPLACE TRENDS DOCUMENTED IN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS LITERATURE…. • HISTORICALLY IN ADVANCED AND LATIN COUNTRIES, CLOSE CORRELATION WITH DEGREE OF WELFARISM • MAY HELP EXPLAIN GREATER AND MORE INCLUSIVE SOCIAL POLICY EFFORT IN BR THAN MX AND ALSO MORE ENERGETIC LABOR MARKET POLICIES…..

41. GREATER DYNAMISM IN BR IN REAL MFG WAGES AND REAL URBAN MINIMUM WAGES