History Of Planning for a Mars Sample Return Mission

1. History Of Planning for a Mars Sample Return Mission Presentation to the Planetary Protection Advisory Subcommittee August 4, 2010 Pericles D. Stabekis

2. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • NASA began planning for an MSR even before the launch of the Viking spacecraft. • The first NASA workshops were in 1973 and 1974, at the NASA Ames Research Center, and NASA Headquarters, respectively. • Both workshops addressed various technical and scientific aspects of a Mars surface sample return mission. Particular attention was focused on the question of back contamination. Data are also given on problems inherent in the back contamination issue and return sample mission; areas where additional research is needed were pointed out. Quarantine procedures, safety measures, and sterilization effects on organic-inorganic data, and biological problems were also dealt with.

3. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • In the 1975-1978 timeframe more effort was undertaken, including a JPL- led study in 1976 (Christensen, Wolfson, Stabekis, and Bagby) and a PP MSR workshop in 1978, to define the specific science, technology, and Mars Receiving Laboratory- related needs that had to be addressed in preparation for an MSR.

4. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Three phases were considered in those studies: • The Outbound Phase • The Sample Acquisition and Delivery Phase (SADP), and • The Sample Opening and Science and PQ Investigation Phase • The outbound phase was assumed to have similar requirements to those for Viking. • The SADP phase begins with sample acquisition and ends with the physical transference of the sealed sample and associated responsibility to the MRL. It includes near Mars activity; Mars-to-Earth transit; Earth entry; Earth recovery and transport to the MRL. Requirements for this phase included sealing, sterile insertion, verification, and controllable safety features.

5. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • The third phase commences with receipt of the sealed Martian sample in the MRL. The PQ requirement is to provide for the safety of the Earth during the opening and study of the sample. No detailed requirements were developed for this phase.

6. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Following these studies and just prior to the PP workshop in 1978, a ten year plan was developed (Stabekis)that listed the project timeline along with parallel timelines for PP-related science/technology developments and MRL management and construction.

7. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • In 1981 a study was concluded on an orbiting quarantine facility (Anteus report) which examined requirements for handling extraterrestrial samples in such orbiting quarantine facility. The major concepts and findings of the study are outlined. One approach that could be taken for receiving, containing, and analyzing samples returned from the surface of Mars in a mission analogous to the lunar return missions of the late 1960s and early 1970s is described. It constructs a general mission scenario and presents an overall systems design, including an approach to cost assessment. Particular attention is paid to the design of system hardware components and to the elaboration of an experimental protocol. The cost of the facility was estimated to be $1.2B (in 1978 dollars).

8. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • This concept along with one proposed later about using the Space Station for a sample receiving laboratory were eventually rejected, primarily because of two reasons: • The orbiting platforms would eventually come down to Earth, and • The problem of a contaminated astronaut

9. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Following the rather negative life-detection results of Viking, planning activities for MSR were stopped to be resumed in the late eighties. • In June of 1988, a PP workshop on MSR was held which, in essence, reviewed previous studies and planning. The 1978 ten-year plan was reaffirmed and efforts began anew towards an anticipated MSR mission in the late 90’s to early 2000’s.

10. Reports & Workshops Relevant to Mars Sample Return Planning Apollo ‘67 Antaeus Report ‘81 NRC ‘97 MSR NRC ‘92 Fwd.Contam. • ‘96 ALH ‘97 Quarantine Workshop NRC ‘98 Small Bodies MSHARP ‘99 NRC ‘99 Size Limits NRC ‘01 COMPLEX DP 1 2 2a 3 4 Sample Handling/ Protocol Workshops

11. NRC Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations (1997)Key Findings: • Life on Mars possible; Unlikely to pose risk to Earth • BUT risks not zero– Therefore adopt Conservative Approach • Samples must be contained and treated as potentially hazardous • No uncontained martian materials returned to Earth (unless sterilized) • Break Chain of Contact with Mars; Maintain Containment Integrity • On Earth, no distribution of unsterilized materials unless • Rigorous analyses demonstrate no ET life or biological hazard • Materials sterilized first • Sample Evaluation • Sample receiving, containing and processing facility needed • Multidisciplinary science team: develop/validate procedures for detection, characterization & containment of organisms; & for sample sterilization • SRF completed least 2 years prior to launch • Scientific Advisory Panel for Oversight of Lab • Program Oversight: • Establish Interagency Panel to coordinate and advise on implementation • Administrative structure within NASA to verify and certify PP adherence • Public should be openly informed

12. Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol Workshop, NASA Ames June 1997NASA/CP-1999-208772 (DeVincenzi et al. 1999) • Part of MELTSWG (1995-97): Provide preliminary design/costs for PP areas • First Attempt to consider SSB MSR findings • Subgroup reports on: • Containment- Build on Apollo but update and revise • Focus on Sample Canister and Receiving Laboratory (BSL-4) • Mission Architecture– PP concerns built into many part of mission • Identified R&D needs (filtration; canister verification; false positives; cleaning etc) • Life Detection –Preliminary Protocol built on • Organic chemical analyses/detection (functional groups assoc. with energy transfer) • Light and/or electron microscopy (SEM, TEM)– for screening • Culturing of secondary importance • NASA needs to focus on life detection technologies/methods • BiohazardPreliminary Testing Protocol • Emphasized Chemical Toxicity & Pathogenicity • In vitro methods rather than whole organism tests • Microcosm tests for ecosystem effects (TBD) • Attempt to outline Criteria for Release (no consensus)

13. Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) NASA/TM-1999-209145 (JPL) (M.H. Carr et al. 1999) • Established by NASA Office of Space Science to make recommendations on: • Sample collection and transport back to Earth • Certification of samples as non-hazardous • Sample receiving, curation and distribution • Panel built on NRC SSB findings (1997 MSR Report) Overall Approach: • Samples to be treated as hazardous until proven otherwise • Seal within canister on Mars– not opened until inside BSL-4 facility • Facility to meet or exceed cleanliness requirements of JSC curation facility • Noted: No facility exists to meet both containment and cleanliness needs • Hazard Assessment and Life Detection to be done in containment facility • Geochemical characterization on sterilized subset of sample OK (release to science community) • Once samples proven harmless, transfer to a curation facilty (e.g. JSC)

14. Mars Sample Handling/ Protocol Workshops (2000-02) Protocol Process • Workshop 1: March 2000 Bethesda MD (Rummel & Race, 2000) • Workshop 2: Oct. 2000, Bethesda MD (Race et al. 2001a) • Workshop 2a: Nov. 2000, Rosslyn VA (Bruch et al, 2001) • Workshop 3: March 2001, San Diego CA (Race et al. 2001b) • Workshop 4*, June 2001, Arlington VA (Race et al., 2001) * Advance Copy (May 2001) of SSB/COMPLEX Rept.: Quarantine & Certification of Martian Samples THEN • Consensus Working Draft of Protocol, June 2001 • Oversight and Review Committee Review (Oct-Nov 2001) (NYC) • Draft Test Protocol for Detecting Possible Biohazards in Martian Samples Returned to Earth (October 2002)

15. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • In the late nineties, NASA initiated an MSR project, the 2003-2005 MSR project. The project was issued the following PP requirements: • Outbound Phase • Launch Vehicle - The probability of impact of Mars by the launch vehicle, including upper stages, shall not exceed 10-4

16. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Orbiter - Category III mission - Assembly and maintenance in 100,000 (or better) clean room facilities - The probability of impact on the surface of Mars shall not exceed 10-2 for the first twenty years from the date of the launch, and 5x10-2 for the period of twenty to fifty years from the date of the launch (alternatively, the orbiter may reduce the total -surface, mated, and encapsulated- bioburden to 5x105 spores) • Lander (including rover) - Category IVB mission

17. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Bioburden on exposed surfaces should be equivalent to the Viking post-sterilization surface bioload ( by inference, 30 spores; that is, 3x105 reduced by no more than 4 decades -per the specification for hardy organisms) • Organic materials inventory (for material in quantities of 1 kg or more). Samples of not less than 50 gms of each organic material present in quantities >25 kgs. • Inbound (return) phase •The sample return canisters should be sealed to a yet to be specified integrity (for planning purposes, such that the probability of releasing a >0.2 micron particle is <10-6), and should be able to maintain the required seal integrity under all nominal environmental conditions. For non-nominal conditions, consideration should be given to automatic or commandable safety control options.

18. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • The Earth Entry Vehicle (EEV) shall be kept free of unsterilized Mars contamination. Only the sealed sample canister or hardware that have been sterilized shall be transferred to the ERV. The canister exterior shall be surface sterilized (or otherwise shown to be free of Martian contamination). The transfer operation shall be accomplished aseptically. • There should be the capability to verify the successful execution of events (such as containment, sealing, and aseptic transfer) and the condition of the sample container at key points in the mission.

19. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • For the nominal case, probability of impact of Earth by the EEV shall be minimized (for planning purposes, to a level <10-6.) For a non-nominal case, impact shall be avoided. • Contingency requirements will be in place in the event that cursory examination of the sample canister upon recovery reveals containment breach(es). Additionally, there will be requirements for the transportation of the sample to the MRL.

20. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Certifications • There will be multiple certifications. That is, before launch from Earth, before "launch" from Mars, before Earth entry, and before the release of returned samples. These certifications will require timely information, some provided through the verification requirement stated earlier.

21. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Subsequently, the project was given an alternative to the system sterilization of the lander: • The lander could be cleaned to the level of the Viking pre-sterilization levels (3x10^5 total surface spores), but the sample handling elememts should be sterilized and protected from recontamination. The project should demonstrate that the likelihood of contaminating the Martian sample by a terrestrial microorganism is less than 10^-2.

22. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • The MSR 2003-2005 project was canceled in 2000.

23. Request from NASA February 6, 2008 • Review Findings of 1997 Report • Update Recommendations in the Light of: • Current Understanding of Mars’s Biological Potential • Improvements In Biol, Chem, & Phys. Sample Analysis Capabilities & Technologies. Particular Attention to: • Potential for living entities to be included in returned samples • Scientific investigations to reduce uncertainty in the above assessment • Potential for large-scale effects on Earth by any returned entity released to the environment • Technol. measures to prevent inadvertent release of returned sample to Earth’s biosphere • Criteria for intentional sample release, noting current & anticipated regulatory frameworks

24. Changes Since 1997: Science New insights & Understanding of • Surface and subsurface water throughout martian history • Potential for habitable environments • Microbial ecology and limits of life • Physical & chemical mechanisms by which evidence of life might be preserved on Mars; how life might be detected in martian samples • Pathogenesis & nature of biological epidemics. • Possibility for viable martian organisms to be transported to Earth by meteorites

25. Changes Since 1997: Technical/Policy • Expansion of Mars community • Broadening of mission scope • Internationalization of MSR, sample handling, policies • Draft MSR protocols developed • Development of nondestructive methods for micro-scale mapping of biol. & mineral components of samples • Lessons from Genesis & Stardust • Greater awareness of potential harm from technical activities • Proliferation of biocontainment facilities & changes in public policy/acceptance of facilities

26. Potential for Living Entities Controlled Distribution Prevent Release- Canister SRF & Oversight Oversight of PP Program Public Engagement Potential for Living Entities Conservative Approach Controlled Distribution +4 provisos Prevent Release - Canister Different Approach SRF & Facility Oversight Focus on Timing/ Clarify Oversight of PP Program Revised for Clarity Public Engagement: Earlier and More Comprehensive Comparative OverviewScienceTechnical/PolicyPublic

27. Potential for Living Entities in Returned Samples Controlled Distribution Prevent Release- Canister SRF & Oversight Oversight of PP Program Public Engagement Concur …based on increased knowledge about Mars and expanded limits to life on Earth. Risks low but no demonstrably zero. Maintain strong conservative program of planetary protection for MSR Samples contained, treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise No uncontained martian materials,including spacecraft surfaces that have been exposed to the martian environment, should be returned to Earth unless sterilized Identified Scientific Investigations to reduce uncertainty Comparative OverviewScienceTechnical/PolicyPublic

28. Potential for Living Entities Controlled Distribution Prevent Release- Canister SRF & Oversight Oversight of PP Program Public Engagement CONCUR with need for Detailed Protocols for containment , handling, testing and criteria for release from SRF Protocols articulated in advance and reviewed periodically as part of SRF oversight Incorporate new lab findings and advances in methods and containment technologies Consult and Involve international partners Comparative OverviewScienceTechnical/PolicyPublic

29. Potential for Living Entities Controlled Distribution Prevent Release- Canister SRF & Oversight Oversight of PP Program Public Engagement CONCUR with need for Detailed Protocols for containment , handling, testing and criteria for release from SRF Protocols articulated in advance and reviewed periodically as part of SRF oversight Incorporate new lab findings and advances in methods and containment technologies Consult and Involve international partners Comparative OverviewScienceTechnical/PolicyPublic

30. Potential for Living Entities Controlled Distribution Prevent Release- Canister SRF & Oversight Oversight of PP Program Public Engagement Concur on SRF & Facility Oversight with clarification based on experiences with other high containment labs Must include SRF planning at earliest MSR mission phases due to lengthy time for SRF development, and plans for protocol, instruments & operations SRF construction commissioning at least 2 years prior to sample return to Earth Multidisciplinary science team to develop, validate & perform battery of tests & determine release criteria Independent science and technical advisory committee with oversight of returned martian samples. Comparative OverviewScienceTechnical/PolicyPublic

31. Potential for Living Entities Controlled Distribution Prevent Release- Canister SRF & Oversight Oversight of PP Program Public Engagement Concur about need for Oversight of PP Program, planning & implementation (avoid conflict of interest) To ensure independent oversight throughout all mission phases, need PP policy and regulatory oversight by interagency PP Subcommittee (or equivalent) and NASA PP Officer Comparative OverviewScienceTechnical/PolicyPublic

32. Potential for Living Entities Controlled Distribution Prevent Release- Canister SRF & Oversight Oversight of PP Program Public Engagement CONCUR on importance of Public Engagement: Earlier and More Comprehensive Public informed about all aspect of NASA’s PP efforts beginning with earliest stages of mission planning and continuing throughout construction, testing, & SRF operation Comparative OverviewScienceTechnical/PolicyPublic

33. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • In 2006, the International Mars Exploration Working Group (IMEWG) formed the iMARS Working Group, and requested that it propose an architecture and planning structure required for a first truly international Mars mission. IMEWG is “an international interagency forum set up with the overall goal of fostering international scientific and technical co-operation for the development of Mars exploration” (IMEWG Terms of Reference). This voluntary co-operation has provided a forum for international cooperation and dialog.

34. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • In the 2008 iMARS report, the following were the proposed baseline planetary protection requirements for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission • COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy provides specific categories and requirements for spacecraft intended to orbit or to land on Mars, as well as for spacecraft returning samples to Earth. Restrictions on Earth return impose more stringent requirements on the orbiter and lander systems than outbound-only missions.

35. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Contamination control for planetary protection, as well as sample curation for scientific purposes, must begin with mission design, to avoid the potential that contaminants present in hardware could be transferred to samples during the process of sample return. This section describes preliminary baseline planetary protection requirements for a MSR mission. It does not provide a formal planetary protection categorization of an IMARS mission set.

36. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Orbiter • Orbital elements of a MSR mission must meet the requirements for Category III, either via orbital lifetime or bioburden control. Additional requirements specific to an MSR mission would necessitate any orbiter hardware that might potentially contaminate the returned samples to meet cleanliness levels equivalent to the landed assets (i.e. Category IVb).

37. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Lander • Landed assets involved in acquiring the samples to be returned should meet the requirements for Category IVb, missions performing life detection analyses. Category IVb requirements call for either sterilization of the entire landed system OR the sterilization of all elements involved in the sample acquisition, analysis, and storage, and their protection from recontamination by the non-sterile landed elements. The Category IVb designation for sample return missions is intended to minimize false positive detection events due to contamination of a Mars sample by Earth organisms, during life-detection and biohazard assessments that will be performed on the samples either before or after return to Earth. A false positive detection would delay distribution of the sample from containment, and could lead to unnecessary rigor in the requirements for all later Mars missions.

38. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Earth Return • Missions returning samples from Mars to Earth are assigned Category V, restricted Earth return. These missions merit the highest degree of containment, throughout the return phase, of all returned hardware that had been in direct contact with Mars, because martian materials could include living and/or biohazardous contaminants. Hardware returning to Earth from Mars must not carry any martian materials that might reach the Earth in an uncontained state (provisionally, a <1x10-6 probability that a single ≥0.2 micron particle could be released into the Earth's environment). This means that a sample container launched from Mars, that might have martian dust or other materials on the outside of the container, must be placed in a secondary containment device that is not contaminated on the exterior. This transfer must be done in such a way that martian materials (e.g. atmospheric dust) on the launched spacecraft do not contact the return vehicle.

39. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • The security of containment must be verified before final targeting to Earth return, and at Earth the Earth entry capsule must be capable of withstanding all damage potentially caused by off-nominal entry events. The requirement is to break the chain of contact between Mars and Earth, which needs to be reflected in both mission and spacecraft design. • Containment and Curation • After Earth return, samples and flight hardware must continue to be contained at a very high level, (provisionally, a <1x10-6 probability that a single ≥0.2 micron particle could escape containment), to protect the Earth's biosphere from any harmful effects that could be caused by the returned material.

40. History of Planning for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission • Concomitantly, the returned samples must be curated to protect them from terrestrial contamination at a sufficient level to preserve the potential to perform scientific analyses. An appropriate Sample Receiving Facility must be constructed and operated so as to ensure proper curation, containment, and public confidence in that containment. Timely biohazard and life-detection analyses must be performed on a statistically-significant subset of the samples, using the most appropriate sensitive techniques. A MSR Test Protocol is being developed that describes detailed analyses to be performed on the returned samples for planetary protection purposes. If any evidence is found for the existence of a non-terrestrial replicating entity, and/or the biohazard assessment is positive, the returned sample shall remain contained unless treated by an effective sterilization procedure. Only samples that are demonstrated to be harmless may be released from containment.