CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 2

1. CMSC 414Computer and Network SecurityLecture 2 Jonathan Katz

2. Why things are not quite so bad… • In practice, we do have trust (unlike Thompson’s article) • We have made great strides in computer security over the past decades • As security improvements are made, ever more functionality is desired • People unwilling to trade off openness for security • (Arguably) many of the most significant problems are no longer technical • User education • Policy issues

3. Assigned readings -- discussion • “Inside the Twisted Mind of the Security Professional” • Security mindset… • “We are All Security Customers” • Cost-benefit analysis • “Information Security and Externalities” • Security as an economics problem; liability

4. CIA Triad [FIPS PUB 199] • Confidentiality/secrecy • Restrictions on information access and disclosure, including personal privacy • Integrity • Guarding against improper modification or destruction of information; ensuring non-repudiation and (source) authenticity • Availability • Ensuring timely and reliable access to information and resources

5. Other? • Improper resource usage • Entity authentication

6. A high-level survey of cryptography

7. Caveats • Everything I present will be (relatively) informal • I may simplify, but I will not say anything that is an outright lie… • Cryptography offers formal definitions and rigorous proofs of security (neither of which we will cover here) • For more details, take CMSC 456 in the Fall (or read my book)! • If you think you already know cryptography from somewhere else (CMSC 456 in the spring, CISSP, your job), you are probably mistaken

8. Goals of cryptography • Crypto deals primarily with three goals: • Confidentiality • Integrity (of data) • Authentication (of resources, people, systems) • Other goals also considered • E.g., non-repudiation • E-cash (e.g., double spending) • Secure distributed computation • Anonymity • …

9. Private- vs. public-key settings • There are two settings for cryptography: • Private-key / shared-key / symmetric-key / secret-key • Public-key • The private-key setting is the “classical” one (thousands of years old) • The public-key setting dates to the 1970s

10. Private-key cryptography • The communicating parties share some information that is random and secret • This shared information is called a key • Key is completely unknown to an attacker • Key is uniformly random • The key k must be shared in advance • We don’t discuss (for now) how they do this • You can imagine they meet on a dark street corner and Alice hands a USB device (with a key on it) to Bob

11. Canonical applications • Two (or more) distinct parties communicating over an insecure network • E.g., secure communication • A single party who is communicating “with itself” over time • E.g., secure storage

12. Bob Bob Alice Alice K K K shared info K

13. Bob Bob K K

14. Private-key cryptography • Two complementary goals: • Secrecy and integrity • For secrecy: • Private-key encryption • For integrity: • Message authentication codes

15. Attacker types • Passive eavesdropping vs. active interference • Secrecy is a concern for passive or active adversaries • Integrity is a concern for active adversaries

16. Private-key encryption

17. Functional definition • Encryption algorithm: • Takes a key and a message (plaintext), and outputs a ciphertext • c  Ek(m), possibly randomized! • Decryption algorithm: • Takes a key and a ciphertext, and outputs a message (or perhaps an error) • m = Dk(c) • Correctness: for all k, we have Dk(Ek(m)) = m • We have not yet said anything about security…

18. Bob Bob Alice Alice K K K shared info K c cEK(m) m=DK(c)

19. Secrecy • Want secrecy against a passive eavesdropper who observed the ciphertext • This adversary does not know the key

20. Security through obscurity? • Always assume that the full details of crypto protocols and algorithms are public • Known as Kerckhoffs’s principle • The only secret information is the key • “Security through obscurity” is a bad idea… • True in general; even more true in the case of cryptography • Home-brewed solutions are BAD! • Standardized, widely-accepted solutions are GOOD!

21. Security through obscurity? • Why not? • Easier to maintain secrecy of a key than an algorithm • Reverse engineering • Social engineering • Insider attacks • Easier to change the key than the algorithm • In general setting, much easier to share an algorithm than for everyone to use their own

22. A classic example: shift cipher • Assume the English uppercase alphabet (no lowercase, punctuation, etc.) • View letters as numbers in {0, …, 25} • The key is a random letter of the alphabet • Encryption done by addition modulo 26 • Is this secure? • Exhaustive key search • Automated determination of the key

23. Another example: substitution cipher • The key is a random permutation of the alphabet • Note: key space is huge! • Encryption done in the natural way • Is this secure? • Frequency analysis • A large key space is necessary, but not sufficient, for security

24. Another example: Vigenere cipher • More complicated version of shift cipher • Believed to be secure for over 100 years • Is it secure?

25. Attacking the Vigenere cipher • Let pi (for i=0, …, 25) denote the frequency of letter i in English-language text • Known that Σ pi2 ≈ 0.065 • For each candidate period t, compute frequencies {qi} of letters in the sequence c0, ct, c2t, … • For the correct value of t, we expect Σ qi2 ≈ 0.065 • For incorrect values of t, we expect Σ qi2 ≈ 1/26 • Once we have the period, can use frequency analysis as in the case of the shift cipher