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Secure Supply-Chain Collaboration (SSCC)

Secure Supply-Chain Collaboration (SSCC). Mike J. Atallah, Hicham G. Elmongui, Vinayak Deshpande, Leroy B. Schwarz. SSCC and Supply-Chain Management. Information-Sharing is Revolutionizing Supply-Chain Management But Buyers and Sellers are Afraid to Share Information

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Secure Supply-Chain Collaboration (SSCC)

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  1. Secure Supply-Chain Collaboration (SSCC) Mike J. Atallah, Hicham G. Elmongui, Vinayak Deshpande, Leroy B. Schwarz

  2. SSCC and Supply-Chain Management • Information-Sharing is Revolutionizing Supply-Chain Management • But Buyers and Sellers are Afraid to Share Information • Fear of Leakage to a Competitor • Fear that “Partner” will take Advantage • Under SSCC Protocols Partners can make Collaborative Decisions without Divulging any Private Information

  3. The Benefits of SSCC • Increased Supply-Chain Profit • Reduction in: • Unnecessary Capacity • Unwanted Inventory • Quoted Leadtimes • Better Customer Service • Potential to Revolutionize Supply-Chain Practice

  4. Research Issues • Required Information and Decision-Rules • Protocol design • Trade off between Level of Security and Cost • Choice of Architecture

  5. Example: Bidding and Auctions • Pricing: • Non- Discriminatory versus Discriminatory • S=Supplier; Ri=Retaileri • Architectural Issues • E-commerce Scenarios, Frameworks • How to keep participants honest

  6. Non Discriminatory Clearing • Each retailer i has one (pi , qi) pair • Supplier has a supply curve q = p + q • The fixed price would be p = Sqi – q • Only retailers with pi < p are allowed to pull out

  7. Pick and Choose • The seller can sell at most K identical units. • Each retailer has a number of price-quantity pairs (gets only one). • Find the minimum number of units to be sold with the maximum possible seller’s revenue.

  8. All or Nothing • Each retailer i has one (pi , qi) pair • Supplier has a supply curve q = p + q • Supplier is to accept all bids or none • Is Spiqi ≥ (Sqi -q)(Sqi) ?

  9. Discriminatory Pricing • Filling an order from retailer i reveals to the seller (pi , qi). This reveals the retailer demand curve! • Buyer’s proxy

  10. Capacity Allocation Models • Proportional Allocation qi = {qi , Kqi/Sqi} • Linear Allocation q1 ≥ q2 ≥ … ≥ qN qi = qi - max{0 , S0nqi - K}/n

  11. Ongoing and Future Work • Enhancing protocols’ performance • Other capacity allocation models • Collusion resistance • Auditability • Non-repudiation • Multi-supplier scenarios • Multi-commodity (combinatorial) scenarios

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