PPA 573 – Emergency Management and Homeland Security

1. PPA 573 – Emergency Management and Homeland Security Lecture 4a – Disasters and Decisions

2. The Structure of Disaster Decision-Making • Disaster management provides a unique arena in which to examine the interplay of vulnerability, media sensitivity, political leadership, and intergovernmental implementation. • Disasters are, by definition, unpredictable events. • The natural sciences have advanced enough to increase significantly the warning times on some types of natural disasters. • The social and natural sciences can do some to predict the occurrence of technological disasters, but can do little to predict acts of terrorism.

3. The Structure of Disaster Decision-Making • Early warning does little to limit the scope of damage. • Insurance covers most of the damage, but insurance companies do not always cover the most common types of disaster. • Flood insurance, for example, is offered by the federal government because no private insurance company will cover the losses. • The premiums on terrorism insurance have skyrocketed since September 11, prompting the U.S. government to temporarily backstop the insurance industry.

4. The Structure of Disaster Decision-Making • As a result, the public expects the government to be politically and financially accountable for disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. • This accountability in an intergovernmental context has led to the gradual development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for handling disasters despite the political advantages of treating each disaster as a de novo event.

5. The Structure of Disaster Decision-Making • The initial response rests with the local jurisdiction. • Go to www.co.kern.ca.us/fire/oes/. • Some of the disasters that impact local communities are likely to exceed their ability to respond. • In those instances, the governor in conjunction with the state emergency management agency invokes the state emergency plan, releasing state resources to the affected community. • Go to www.oes.ca.gov. • Some disasters exceed state capacity, invoking federal assistance.

6. The Structure of Disaster Decision-Making • If the disaster exceeds the state’s capacity to respond, federal policy allows the state governor to request aid from the national government. • The Federal Emergency Management Agency (part of the Department of Homeland Security) coordinates the disaster assessment, evaluates the request, prepares material for presidential approval, and coordinates the federal response once the president declares a disaster or emergency. • Go to www.fema.gov.

7. Governors and Presidents As Gatekeepers • Gubernatorial and presidential administrations are central to standardized disaster procedures. • The flow of money for federal post-disaster relief depends entirely on the request by the governor of the affected state and the disaster declaration by the President of the United States. • Whereas damage assessments require complex information on the scope of the disaster, the political decision-making process for disaster relief requires the creation of summary information that will serve as the basis for recommendations of gubernatorial and presidential aides.

8. Governors and Presidents As Gatekeepers • Gubernatorial and presidential administrations are central to standardized disaster procedures (contd.). • The combined recommendations of the emergency management agency and the aides serve as the basis for executive decision-making.

9. Cross-pressures on Disaster Decision-making • The political cross-pressures of simultaneously pursuing vulnerability management and political responsiveness place some strain on the decisions made by governors and presidents.

10. Cross-pressures on Disaster Decision-making • Disaster policy based on vulnerability reduction assumes that all disaster requests are interconnected. • Multiple requests from the same jurisdictions suggest a pattern of economic development and political decision-making that increases the jurisdictions’ susceptibility to natural and manmade disasters. • The appropriate policy response is mitigation and preparedness rather than response and recovery.

11. Cross-pressures on Disaster Decision-making • By contrast, disaster policy based on political responsiveness assumes that disaster requests are divisible. • Executives and legislators treat individual requests as both public responsibilities and political opportunities. • Decisions are made on the basis of the matrix of political forces existing at the time of declaration. • The focus is on response and recovery.

12. Cross-pressures on Disaster Decision-making • Gubernatorial administrations must balance several competing interests in making disaster requests to the federal government. • Media sensitivity prompts faster response and larger requests. • Proximity to state elections. • Pressures from federal government to eliminate repeated requests.

13. Cross-pressures on Disaster Decision-making • Presidential administrations face similar cross-pressures. • CNN Syndrome. • Congressional lobbying. • Local governments pass response and recovery up. • Federal government passes mitigation and preparedness down. • Vulnerability management makes presidents sensitive to socioeconomic vulnerability.

14. The Structure of Choice • Constraints on decision. • Disaster requests received in a memorandum of fixed format. • Information focuses on type of disaster, scope of disaster, financial capabilities of the jurisdiction, political affiliations of the jurisdiction, and previous decisions. • Two types of choices. • Turndown, emergency, or major disaster. • Types of aid.

15. The Structure of Choice • Types of aid. • Individual Assistance - for damage to residences and businesses or personal property losses, and • http://www.fema.gov/hazard/dproc.shtm. • Public Assistance - for repair of infrastructure, public facilities and debris removal. • http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/pa/index.shtm.