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Challenger Case Study ( ver 2.0)

Challenger Case Study ( ver 2.0) This course is based on the JSC Challenger Case Study module, course no. BA-602, developed under the JSC S&MA Organization's Safety and Mission Assurance Qualification Training Program. [New Level 1 Curriculum Map]. Introduction.

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Challenger Case Study ( ver 2.0)

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  1. Challenger Case Study (ver 2.0) This course is based on the JSC Challenger Case Study module, course no. BA-602, developed under the JSC S&MA Organization's Safety and Mission Assurance Qualification Training Program

  2. [New Level 1 Curriculum Map]

  3. Introduction This course provides a brief overview of the Apollo 13 accident. Specifically this course covers: Events leading up to the accident The root cause and contributing factors of the accident The role of Safety and Mission Assurance in the accident Click on the icons below for more information. This course was developed based on information compiled from these and other sources. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Selected Congressional Hearings and Reports from the Challenger Space Shuttle Accident

  4. Lesson Objectives After completing this course, you will be able to: Discuss the cause. Discuss contributing factors. Discuss the process dealing with the flight "problem” assessment and closure. Discuss the launch decision process. Describe the role of Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) in the Challenger accident.

  5. NASA Kennedy Space Center – Launch Information

  6. NASA Kennedy Space Center – Launch Information

  7. NASA Kennedy Space Center – Launch Information

  8. NASA Kennedy Space Center – Launch Information

  9. The Crew Ellison S. Onizuka

  10. The Crew Sharon Christa McAuliffe

  11. The Crew Greg Jarvis

  12. The Crew Judy Resnik

  13. The Crew Mike Smith

  14. The Crew Dick Scobee

  15. The Crew Ron McNair

  16. The Crew Ellison S. Onizuka Sharon Christa McAuliffe Greg Jarvis Judy Resnik Mike Smith Dick Scobee Ron McNair

  17. Ellison S. Onizuka (Lt. Col. USAF) • Mission Specialist • Ellison Onizuka was born June 24, 1946, in Kealakekua, Kona, Hawaii. Onizuka joined the Air Force in 1970 and served as a test pilot, eventually joining the staff of the Air Force’s Test Pilot School. • He joined NASA’s astronaut corps in January 1978 and worked on launch support teams for the first two Space Shuttle flights. He first flew as a mission specialist on STS 51-C, the first Space Shuttle Department of Defense mission, which launched on January 24, 1985.

  18. S. Christa Corrigan McAuliffe • Teacher in Space • Christa McAuliffe was born September 2, 1948 in Boston. Mc Auliffe made history when she was selected as the primary candidate for NASA’s Teacher in Space Project on July 19, 1985. • She had 15 years of experience teaching junior high and high school students at schools in Maryland and New Hampshire. She taught English, American history, civics, economics and law; and she developed her own course entitled “The American Woman” at Concord High School in Concord New Hampshire.

  19. Gregory B. Jarvis • Payload Specialist • Greg Jarvis was born August 24, 1944, in Detroit. He was an avid squash player and bicycle rider and played classical guitar. Jarvis joined the Air Force in 1969 and was assigned to the Space Division, where he worked on advanced tactical communications satellites. • He left the Air Force in 1973 and joined Hughes Aircraft, where he worked on communications and satellite designs. He was selected as a payload specialist candidate in 1984.

  20. Judith A. Resnik, Ph.D Mission Specialist Judith Resnik was born April 5, 1949, in Akron Ohio. She was a classical pianist and also enjoyed bicycling, running, and flying during her free time. Before joining NASA, Resnik worked on circuit design and was a biomedical engineer. She joined NASA in January 1978 and first flew as a mission specialist on STS 41-D in August 1984, on the maiden flight of the orbiter Discovery. The crew earned the name “Icebusters” for successfully removing hazardous ice particles from the orbiter using the robot arm. Judith A. Resnik, Ph.D Mission Specialist Judith Resnik was born April 5, 1949, in Akron Ohio. She was a classical pianist and also enjoyed bicycling, running, and flying during her free time. Before joining NASA, Resnik worked on circuit design and was a biomedical engineer. She joined NASA in January 1978 and first flew as a mission specialist on STS 41-D in August 1984, on the maiden flight of the orbiter Discovery. The crew earned the name “Icebusters” for successfully removing hazardous ice particles from the orbiter using the robot arm. • Judith A. Resnik, Ph.D • Mission Specialist • Judith Resnik was born April 5, 1949, in Akron Ohio. She was a classical pianist and also enjoyed bicycling, running, and flying during her free time. Before joining NASA, Resnik worked on circuit design and was a biomedical engineer. • She joined NASA in January 1978 and first flew as a mission specialist on STS 41-D in August 1984, on the maiden flight of the orbiter Discovery. The crew earned the name “Icebusters” for successfully removing hazardous ice particles from the orbiter using the robot arm.

  21. Pilot Michael J. Smith (Captain, USN) • Michael Smith was born April 30, 1945, in Beaufort, North Carolina. A graduate of the United States Naval Academy, Smith served in Vietnam before becoming a test pilot. • He joined NASA’s Astronaut corps in 1980 and served as a commander in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory. Challenger was his first space flight.

  22. Commander Francis R. Scobee • Dick Scobee was born May 19, 1939, in Cle Elum, Washington. Scobee joined the Air Force in 1957, served a combat tour in Vietnam and flew as a test pilot before joining NASA in 1978. • His first flight came in 1984, as pilot on the STS 41-C mission. During this seven-day flight the crew retrieved the ailing Solar Maximum Satellite, repaired it and replaced it in orbit. The mission also included flight tests of the Manned Maneuvering Unit backpack in two spacewalks.

  23. Ronald E. McNair, Ph.D • Mission Specialist • Ron McNair was born October 21, 1950, in Lake City, South Carolina. He was a 5th degree black belt Karate instructor and a performing jazz saxophonist. After earning a doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1976, McNair worked as a physicist with Hughes Research Laboratories, developing lasers for space communications and other uses. • McNair joined NASA in January 1978 and first flew as a mission specialist on STS 41-B in 1984. The crew deployed two communications satellites, made the first flight test of the Manned Maneuvering Unit backpack and used the Canadian robot arm – operated by McNair – to position spacewalking astronauts in the payload bay for the first time.

  24. The Weather “….something out of Dr. Zhivago.” - Rockwell Personnel

  25. The Weather Sheets of ice covered the gantry platforms, including the platform across which the crew would have to run if it became necessary to use the pad escape system.

  26. The Weather • The ice team leader indicated that he felt the situation was a distinct hazard to the Orbiter • thermal protection system, since Main Engine ignition would likely release a great deal of ice debris.

  27. The Weather - Excerpt from the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident • The ice team leader indicated that he felt the situation was a distinct hazard to the Orbiter • thermal protection system, since Main Engine ignition would likely release a great deal of ice debris.

  28. Statistical Analysis of O-ring Failure Data Available Prior to Challenger “…with the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that the Challenger disaster was not at all surprising, given data that were available at the time of the flight. As a result of its investigations, one of the recommendations of the commission was that a statistician be part of the ground control team from that time on.”

  29. Statistical Analysis of O-ring Failure Data Available Prior to Challenger The Flight of the Space Shuttle Challenger: http://www.stanford.edu/class/stat201/reading/challlog.pdf The Flight of the Space Shuttle Challenger,” Jeffrey S. Simonoff, 1999. http://www.stanford.edu/class/stat201/reading/challlog.pdf

  30. Dark Smoke

  31. Smoke Puffs Multiple smoke puffs began at .836 seconds and continued through 2.500 seconds, occurring about 4 times a second.

  32. Smoke Puffs Multiple smoke puffs began at .836 seconds and continued through 2.500 seconds, occurring about 4 times a second. Upward motion of the vehicle caused the smoke to drift downward and blur into a single cloud.

  33. Smoke Puffs Photograph of the 51-L launch at approximately 58.82 seconds after launch shows an unusual plume in the lower part of the right hand SRB.

  34. Sequence of Events Approximately 37 seconds - Challenger encountered the first of several high-altitude wind shear conditions. The wind shear created forces on the vehicle with relatively large fluctuations. These were immediately sensed and countered by the guidance, navigation and control system.

  35. Sequence of Events Approximately 37 seconds - Challenger encountered the first of several high-altitude wind shear conditions. The wind shear created forces on the vehicle with relatively large fluctuations. These were immediately sensed and countered by the guidance, navigation and control system. The steering system (thrust vector control) of the Solid Rocket Booster responded to all commands and wind shear effects. The wind shear caused the steering system to be more active than on any previous flight.

  36. Sequence of Events Approximately 37 seconds - Challenger encountered the first of several high-altitude wind shear conditions. The wind shear created forces on the vehicle with relatively large fluctuations. These were immediately sensed and countered by the guidance, navigation and control system. The steering system (thrust vector control) of the Solid Rocket Booster responded to all commands and wind shear effects. The wind shear caused the steering system to be more active than on any previous flight. Main engines had been throttled up to 104 % thrust and the Solid Rocket Boosters were increasing their thrust when the first flickering flame appeared on the right Solid Rocket Booster in the area of the aft field joint.

  37. Sequence of Events This first very small flame was detected on image enhanced film at 58.788 seconds into the flight. It appeared to originate at about 305 degrees around the booster circumference at or near the aft field joint.

  38. Sequence of Events - Continued The flame grew into a continuous, well-defined plume at 59.262 seconds. At about 60 seconds, telemetry showed a pressure differential between the chamber pressures in the right and left boosters. The right booster chamber pressure was lower, confirming the growing leak in the area of the field joint.

  39. Sequence of Events - Continued As the flame plume increased in size, it was deflected rearward by the aerodynamic slipstream and circumferentially by the protruding structure of the upper ring attaching the booster to the External Tank. These deflections directed the flame plume onto the surface of the External Tank.

  40. Sequence of Events - Continued At 64.660 seconds there was an abrupt change in the shape and color of the plume. This indicated that it was mixing with leaking hydrogen from the External Tank. Telemetered changes in the hydrogen tank pressurization confirmed the leak. Within 45 milliseconds of the breach of the External Tank, a bright sustained glow developed on the black-tiled underside of the Challenger between it and the External Tank.

  41. Sequence of Events - Continued At about 72 seconds, a series of events occurred extremely rapidly that terminated the flight. Telemetered data indicate a wide variety of flight system actions that support the visual evidence of the photos as the Shuttle struggled futilely against the forces that were destroying it.

  42. Sequence of Events - Continued At about 72.20 seconds the lower strut linking the Solid Rocket Booster and the External Tank was severed or pulled away from the weakened hydrogen tank permitting the right Solid Rocket Booster to rotate around the upper attachment strut. This rotation is indicated by divergent yaw and pitch rates between the left and right Solid Rocket Boosters.

  43. Sequence of Events - Continued At 73.124 seconds, a circumferential white vapor pattern was observed blooming from the side of the External Tank bottom dome. This released massive amounts of liquid hydrogen from the tank and created a sudden forward thrust of about 2.8 million pounds, pushing the hydrogen tank upward into the intertank structure. The rotating right Solid Rocket Booster impacted the intertank structure and the lower part of the liquid oxygen tank. These structures failed at 73.137 seconds as evidenced by the white vapors appearing in the intertank region. Within milliseconds there was massive, almost explosive, burning of the hydrogen streaming from the failed tank bottom and the liquid oxygen breach in the area of the intertank.

  44. Sequence of Events - Continued At this point in its trajectory, while traveling at a Mach number of 1.92 at an altitude of 46,000 feet, the Challenger was totally enveloped in the explosive burn. The Challenger's reaction control system ruptured and a hypergolic burn of its propellants occurred as it exited. The reddish brown colors of the hypergolic fuel burn are visible on the edge of the main oxygen/hydrogen fireball.

  45. Senate Hearings “At this particular juncture the shuttle disaster seems like an avoidable accident rather than an unavoidable one. The only way that we can support the space program, if we are ever going to maintain any credibility and support for it, is to make absolutely sure that no accident like this will ever occur again and that the circumstances that could cause it never again be allowed to develop.” Source: Opening Remarks by Senator Hollings, FEBRUARY 18, 1986, U.S. Senate, Committee On Commerce, Science, And Transportation, Subcommittee On Science, Technology, And Space, Washington, D.C.

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