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Manipulating Encrypted Data

Manipulating Encrypted Data. You store your data in the cloud, encrypted of course. You want to use the computing power of the cloud to analyze your data. But you want to keep the data encrypted. Basic Question : Is it possible to compute with

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Manipulating Encrypted Data

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  1. Manipulating Encrypted Data

  2. You store your data in the cloud, encrypted of course. You want to use the computing power of the cloud to analyze your data. But you want to keep the data encrypted. Basic Question: Is it possible to compute with encrypted data without first decrypting?

  3. One Goal: Design an encryption method EK and a decryption method DK (K is the key) with the following property: If f is some function (algorithm), then we can find a function F, independent of K, such that for every message m : f(m) = DK( F(EK(m))) This means that if we want to compute f(m), we can encrypt m, then F is applied to the encrypted message, then we decrypt. This has been done, in theory, by Gentry (homomorphic encryption)

  4. M=message f=function E=encryption D=decryption E(M) F(E(M)) E D f M f(M)

  5. Cheating the IRS Search About 1,330,000 results (0.28 seconds) Cheating on Your Taxes www.thecheatfactory.com/taxes.html Read these tips to find some smart, under the radar, and legal ways to cheat on your taxes. The IRS has been screwing you for long enough. It's time to turn the … Tax Fraud Penalties - Cheating On Taxes - Esquire www.esquire.com/the-side/feature/tax-deductions-032009 Apr 18, 2011 – ... in on five ways to hypothetically bend the law and cheat on your taxes. ... When the IRS comes a-knocking you're guilty until you can prove ...

  6. Cheating the IRS Encrypt Fhrah$5&&$$$$$123mNmErTIoppYtEQCCV9&T

  7. Fhrah$5&&$$$$$123mNmErTIoppYtEQCCV9&T Nxvs$%432MnUiiOPlTRttyR^%$^&IHKVGRYGKNjkjkJ 6T%%$3CvDrk$65IhkU%eksaggYGFMVKHFkhvyrkGKJk HcjgkllJkknlkGKknljlJllniy89^y;jTYNffsd9u123npih;xkn;k gihHIH:KH;khj;;J;J;LSJRKN;N;KNHJSJ;;l;vrjpsihtihlhlkjU dhstuhgerkekfklxkgh;knklHOlkn^(*^&$&%$OIHpj45ihkh gfklxkgh;knklHOlkn^(*&885^%$OIHpj45ihkh;d;knfae,npih;x kn;kgihHIH:KH;khj;;J;J;LSJRKN;N;KNHJSJ;;l;vrjpsihtihlh gkfdhstuhgerkekgeksaggYGFMVKHFkhvyrkGKJkg, gfklxkgh;knklHOlkn^(*^&$&%$OIHTYVbnmT**7%nBBnnHtFr …… ……

  8. DECRYPT

  9. Cheating the IRS Search About 1,330,000 results (0.28 seconds) Cheating on Your Taxes www.thecheatfactory.com/taxes.html Read these tips to find some smart, under the radar, and legal ways to cheat on your taxes. The IRS has been screwing you for long enough. It's time to turn the … Tax Fraud Penalties - Cheating On Taxes - Esquire www.esquire.com/the-side/feature/tax-deductions-032009 Apr 18, 2011 – ... in on five ways to hypothetically bend the law and cheat on your taxes. ... When the IRS comes a-knocking you're guilty until you can prove ...

  10. Cheating hte IRS Encrypt h&&$%#@$123mNmrah$5ErTIoppYtEQMMYfr

  11. h&&$%#@$123mNmrah$5ErTIoppYtEQMMYfr W#$RrDqPlOiuYuIgn^Tpihk;k^%$^&IHKVGRYGKNjkjkJ Fjklk$65IhkU%eksaggYGFMVKHFkhvyrkGKJkg,nvkvtbvv HcjgkllJkknlkGKknljlJllniy89^y;jTYNffsd9u123npih;xkn;k gihHIH:KH;khj;;J;J;LSJRKN;N;KNHJSJ;;l;vrjpsihtihlhgkf dhstuhgerkekfklxkgh;knklHOlkn^(*^&$&%$OIHpj45ihkh gfklxkgh;knklHOlkn^(*^&$&%$OIHpj45ihkh;d;knfae,npih;x kn;kgihHIH:KH;khj;;J;J;LSJRKN;N;KNHJSJ;;l;vrjpsihtihlh gkfdhstuhgerkekgeksaggYGFMVKHFkhvyrkGKJkg, nvkvtbvvgfklxkgh;knklHOlkn^(*^&$&%$OIHTYVbnmTbCfT$#w …… ……

  12. Cheating hte IRS Search About 1,330,000 results (0.28 seconds) Did you mean cheating the IRSSearch instead for cheating hte IRS Cheating on Your Taxes www.thecheatfactory.com/taxes.html Read these tips to find some smart, under the radar, and legal ways to cheat on your taxes. The IRS has been screwing you for long enough. It's time to turn the … Tax Fraud Penalties - Cheating On Taxes - Esquire www.esquire.com/the-side/feature/tax-deductions-032009 Apr 18, 2011 – ... in on five ways to hypothetically bend the law and cheat on your taxes. ... When the IRS comes a-knocking you're guilty until you can prove ...

  13. Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE) This will allow several additions and subtractions but only a few multiplications. Secret key is a large odd integer p. We want to encrypt a bit m, where m = 0 or 1. Choose a random integer r (much smaller than p) and another integer s and let the ciphertext be c = m + 2r + ps To decrypt (i.e., recover m), compute m = c (mod p) (mod 2)

  14. We can add ciphertexts: c1 = m1 + 2r1 + ps1 c2 = m2 + 2r2 + ps2 Then c1 + c2 decrypts to m1 + m2 Products: c1c2 = m1m2 + 2(m1r2+m2r1+r1r2) + p(- - - - - - ) This decrypts to m1m2 if r1r2 is not too big. Think of this as the encryption of m1m2 plus some noise. If we do too many multiplications, the noise increases enough that decryption fails.

  15. If we compute by a series of bit operations f1, f2, f3 : E(M) E(f1(M))+noise E(f2f1(M))+NOISE E(f3f2f1(M))+NOISE M f1(M) f2f1(M) f3f2f1(M)

  16. Bootstrapping (Craig Gentry, 2008) E(M)||E(K)E(f(M))+noise||E(K)E(E(f(M))+noise ||E(K)) M||K f(M)||K E(E(f(M))+noise ||E(K)) E(f(M)) + noise D E(f(M))+noise||E(K) f(M) The noise has been reduced, so we can continue.

  17. Bootstrapping can sometimes change a Somewhat Homomorphic system into a Fully Homomorphic system. Are Fully Homomorphic Sytems practical? Not yet.

  18. A similar idea that is practical is Secure Multiparty Computation But first, a digression . . .

  19. Secret Sharing

  20. You are the manager of a bank. You want to allow your employees to open the safe. Requirements: • 1. One person alone cannot open the safe. • 2. Any two people can open the safe.

  21. Two People determine a Secret

  22. Two Points determine a Line

  23. The secret combination to the lock is ab cd ef For example, the combination could be 14 15 03

  24. Let B = abcdef mod p where p is prime. Choose a random M We now have a line y = Mx + B (mod p)

  25. For example, if the combination is 14 – 15 – 03, then B = 141503. We could randomly choose M = 3456789. The line is y = 141503 + 3456789 x

  26. If there are 30 people, compute 30 points on the line y = Mx + B : (1, M+B), (2, 2M+B), (3, 3M+B), . . . (30, 30M+B) Give each person one point.

  27. Summary: Someone shares a secret B by choosing a random integer m and forming the linear function f(x) = B+mx. f(1)=B+m is given to person 1 f(2)=B+2m is given to person 2 f(3)=B+3m is given to person 3 These numbers are their “shares” of the secret. Any two people can determine B.

  28. Arithmetic Operations on Secrets We can add secrets: P1, P2, P3 have shares of f(0) and of g(0). P1 adds f(1) + g(1), P2 adds f(2) + g(2), P3 adds f(3) + g(3) They now share f(0) + g(0)

  29. Can We Multiply Secrets? P1, P2, P3 share f(0) and share g(0). They want to share f(0) g(0). Problem: f(x) g(x) is a quadratic polynomial, so it takes three values to reconstruct it: f(0) g(0) = 3f(1)g(1) – 3 f(2)g(2) + f(3)g(3) So all three can recover the secret. But “Sharing” requires that 2 people can reconstruct the secret.

  30. How to Share Products: (Gennaro, Rabin, Rabin) Person 1 shares f(1)g(1) (i.e., gives shares to 1, 2, 3) Person 2 shares f(2)g(2) Person 3 shares f(3)g(3) Each person computes Shareprod =3(Share received from 1) – 3(Share from 2) + (Share from 3) This is a share of f(0)g(0). Why? The numbers Shareprod are the values at x=1, 2, 3 of a linear function whose y-intercept is 3f(1)g(1) – 3f(2)g(2) + f(3)g(3) = f(0)g(0)

  31. Bit operations Let a and b be bits (0 or 1). Then a b = a + b – 2ab ( denotes addition mod 2) If P1, P2, P3 share a and b, then they can share a b

  32. Suppose a = a0 + 2a1 + 4a2 + … and b = b0 + 2b1 + 4b2 + … A bit of a + b can be calculated via bit operations such as and multiplication (“and”) If the bits of a and b are shared, then the value of this bit is shared

  33. Is d < s ? s and d are shared numbers between 0 and 2n Nobody knows s and d but we want to determine which is larger. Key idea: d < s if and only if the n-th bit of 2n + d –s is 0

  34. SUGAR BEETS

  35. Participants: 1200 Danish farmers Danisco : the (only) Danish sugar beet processor Danish cryptographers Parameters There are 4000 possible prices : Price1 < Price2 < . . . < Price4000 Farmeri is willing to sell si,k sugar beets at Pricek Let sk = s1k + s2,k + . . . + s1200,k Then sk is the supply at Pricek : s1 < s2 < . . . < s4000 Let dk be the amount Danisco is willing to buy at Pricek d1 > d2 > . . . > d4000

  36. Problem: Find k so that sk = dk Constraint: No one wants to reveal their strategy • Solution: • There are three participants: • The farmers’ union • Danisco • The Danish cryptography group For each Pricek, the Farmeri chooses a linear function fik(x) = sik + aikx and sends fik(1) to P1, fik(2) to P2, fik(3) to P3. That is, the farmer shares sik P1 adds up the numbers it receives. Similarly for P2 and P3. They now have shares of each supply number s1, . . . , s4000

  37. For Pricek, Danisco chooses a linear function gk(x) = dk + ckx and gives gk(1) to P1, gk(2) to P2, gk(3) to P3 Therefore, d1, d2, . . . , d4000 are shared The 3 Participants determine whether s2000 < d2000. No: Is s1000 < d1000 ? Yes: Is s3000 < d3000 ? Etc. Etc.

  38. They determine k such that sk = dk. The 3 participants together reveal each farmer’s supply amount sk for this price (and only for this price). This concludes the auction.

  39. The End

  40. Number theory Interlude: Let p be a prime and assume that p = 3 (mod 4). Let x be a square mod p and let y = x(p+1)/4 (mod p). Then y2 = x (mod p). Example: Let p = 19. Let x = 17 = -2 (mod 19). Compute x(19+1)/4 = (-2)5 = -32 = 6 (mod 19). Check: 62 = 17 (mod 19)

  41. Flipping a Coin without Knowing the Result (Sharing a Random Bit) P1 chooses a random number b1 and shares b1 P2 chooses a random number b2 and shares b2 P3 chooses a random number b3 and shares b3 Each person adds together the shares received. Let b = b1 + b2 + b3 They now have shares of b (but they do not know b ) This means: there is a linear function f(x) = b + ax and P1 knows f(1), P2 knows f(2), P3 knows f(3)

  42. Construct shared random bits b0, b1, . . . , bn+k Share R = b0 + 2b1 + . . . + 2n+kbn+k Compute A = 2n+k+1 – R + 2n + d – s = a0 + 2a1 + . . . + 2n+k+1an+k+1 A is originally shared, but it can revealed since s and d are masked by R. This allows us to compute the binary expansion of A. Compute the shares of the nth bit of A + R = 2n+k+1 + 2n + d – s This can be done by a series of shared bit operations. P1, P2, P3 together reveal this bit. If the bit is 0 then s>d. If the bit is 1 then s < d.

  43. Flipping a Coin without Knowing the Result (Continued) Recall: f(x) = b + ax and b = b1 + b2 + b3 P1 computes f(1)2 and tells P2 and P3 the result, P2 computes f(2)2 and tells P1 and P3 the result, P3 computes f(3)2 and tells P1 and P2 the result, They compute 3f(1)2 – 3f(2)2 + f(3)2 = b2 They compute v = (b2) (p+1)/4 = +b or –b (mod p) v-1 b = +1 or -1 (mod p) The shares of b are v-1f(1), v-1f(2), v-1f(3)

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