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Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action? John T. Scholz Florida State University

Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action? John T. Scholz Florida State University. Collective Action Problems: Great Cities from Dismal Swamps. Collective Action Cures: Authority. Collective Action Cures: Enlightened Self-Interest. Collective Action Cures: Collaborative Institutions.

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Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action? John T. Scholz Florida State University

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  1. Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action?John T. ScholzFlorida State University

  2. Collective Action Problems:Great Cities from Dismal Swamps

  3. Collective Action Cures:Authority

  4. Collective Action Cures:Enlightened Self-Interest

  5. Collective Action Cures:Collaborative Institutions

  6. Collective Action Cures:Self-Organizing FederalismFeiock and Scholz, eds., Cambridge Press, 2010 Mill Hobbes Ostrom

  7. Networks as CuresBonding Bridging Relationships Relationships COOPERATION: Trust and commitment Strong ties Reciprocity, transitivity COORDINATION: Information Weak ties Centrality, closeness, brokerage

  8. Field Study EvidenceBerardo and Scholz 2010Stakeholders seek Bridging Capital

  9. Field Study Evidence • Bridging, Not Bonding, Increases Level of Collaboration Scholz,Berardo and Kile 2008 • Degree (log) .36** (.06) • Betweenness Centrality .22** (.04) • Egonet Density -.06* (.03)

  10. Agent-Based Modeling EvidenceScholz and Wang 2006 Bridging increases the evolution of cooperation

  11. Experimental Evidence • VOLUNTARY DILEMMA- • Subjects play repeated prisoners dilemma, but with a choice of partners • 14 subjects per session • Subjects propose to any number of potential partners, and play PD if both partners propose in the period. • Repeat for 20 rounds (known in advance).

  12. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 1

  13. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 2

  14. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 3

  15. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 4

  16. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 5

  17. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 6

  18. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 7

  19. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 8

  20. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 9

  21. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 10

  22. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 11

  23. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 12

  24. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 13

  25. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 14

  26. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 15

  27. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 16

  28. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 17

  29. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 18

  30. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 19

  31. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 20

  32. The Network Century for Collective Action??? • Utilize multiple research methods and designs • Develop additional methods of field observation • Email and agency contact lists • Media Archives and issue networks • Internet Crawlers and social media • Utilize Measures directly related to concepts • Nature of the problem (credibility vs resource flows) • Extent of effects (ego network, alter network, full network)

  33. The Network Century for Collective Action John T. Scholz FSU

  34. Cooperation is favored when b/c>kOhtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman and Nowak, Nature 441: 502 (May 2006)

  35. Bonding Relationships • Cooperation games with risk of defection • Bonding relationships enhance commitment, trust, norms, providing social capital to resolve Collective Action Problems as represented by prisoners’ dilemma, public goods, common-pool resources • Tie Strength => Strong, frequent, intense, multidimensial interactions with strong affinity for partner • Network Structures => Reciprocity, transitivity, redundant, overlapping ties.

  36. Bridging Relationships • Coordination games with low risk of defection • Matching, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt • Tie Strength => Weak, infrequent as needed, unidimensional, with many partners and little affinity • Network Structures, flows => Degree, Reach, Closeness, non-redundant, overlapping ties. • Network Structures, Brokerage => Betweenness, structural holes, brokerage

  37. Experimental Evidence • Cooperative communities emerge when cooperators successfully find each other • Clusters do not change behavior, at least in the short run. • Remaining challenge: Can clustering enhance long-term cooperation when none exists???

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