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AMS-02 Permanent Magnet. Safety Impact. General Safety Approach. Building on Existing AMS-02 Safety Analysis and documentation Following Order of Precedence of Hazard Control in New Hazard Analysis Remove Hazards Eliminated by design change. Establish if New Hazards Created
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AMS-02 Permanent Magnet • Safety Impact AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
General Safety Approach • Building on Existing AMS-02 Safety Analysis and documentation • Following Order of Precedence of Hazard Control in New Hazard Analysis • Remove Hazards Eliminated by design change. • Establish if New Hazards Created • Examine Rationale for Design for Minimizing Risk • New and altered DFMR • Examine Active/Automatic Control Methodologies for Hazards for Impact • Examine use of Procedural Controls/Warnings AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
General Safety Approach • Update to Hazards • Review Validity of Existing Causes • Look for New/Changed Causes • Review Validity of Existing Controls • Look for New/Changed Controls • Review Validity of Existing Verifications • Look for New/Changed Verifications AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F01 – Structures • New/Changed Structures and Loading Conditions • Control 1.1 may require update • VC becomes Vented Structure • Control 1.5 may require update • New Materials • New Composite Structural Elements • Control 10.1 may need updating to reflect protection methodology of new carbon fiber planes/containment • Plane 1N to use heaters in conjunction with composite structures. • Add Control 1.7 for heater control methodology. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F01 (cont) • New Fasteners/Heritage Fasteners • Control 4.1 may require update (Quality) • Control 5.1 may require update (Backoff) • No Welding of Structures with PM • Change Controls of Cause 6 (Welding) to address heritage welded structure of permanent Magnet • Removal of Non-linear Straps • Remove Control 1.2 • Remove Cause 8 AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F02 – Offgassing • No changes made to DDRS-02 in Orbiter • DDRS ISS will be documented separated from AMS-02 AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F03 – Cryogenic System • Cryomagnet System Removed • Withdraw Hazard Report AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F04 – Over P Payload Bay • Super Fluid Helium Tank Removed • Remove Cause 1 • Remove Cause 2 • Warm Helium Gas Supply Removed • Remove Cause 3 • TTCS fill quantity may change • Control 5.1 will require modification to reflect change. • TTCS will have new components and unwelded connections. • Cryocoolers and Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed • Remove Control 5.2, 5.6 • Cryomagnet Avionics Box (CAB) Loop Heat Pipe Removed • Remove Control 5.5 • Alterations in Blanket/MLI Usage • Reopen review of applications for blockage issues. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F05 – Pressurized Systems • Warm Helium Gas Supply Removed • Remove Control 1.3, 5.2, 7.3, 8.2, 9.2 • Update Control 10.1 to remove Warm Helium Gas Supply • Cryocoolers/Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed • Remove Control 1.10, 1.11, 5.8, 8.8, 8.9 • CAB Heat Pipe/ Loop Heat Pipe Removed • Update Control 1.8, 8.6 to delete CAB HP. • Remove Control 1.9, 5.7, 8.7 • TTCS Modified • Update Control 1.4, 5.3, 8.4, 8.11 for fill quantity change and any impact to MDP • New loop and components, non-welded connections to be used. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F06 – Thrust/Overturning Moments • All Cryosystem Sources Removed • Remove Control 1.1, 1.3, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5 • Update 2.1 for removal of cryosystem vents • Update 2.3 for the removal of Warm Helium Supply and it’s fill caps • Remove Cause 5, Sloshing of Superfluid Helium • All Warm Helium Sources Removed • Remove Source of Thrust Potential • Magnetic Field has new characteristics • Update Control 4.1 to reflect lower magnetic field intensity and its resulting torque difference. • Magnetic Field can not be shut off • Control 4.2 needs to be changed to address compatibility of AMS-02 PM field with the Orbiter, SRMS and SSRMS • Magnetic Field is no longer variable • Remove Control 4.3 (Quench) AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F07 – Radiated Fields, EMI, Magnetic • Magnetic Field is less strong, nonvarying • Substantial rewrite of Controls 1.1 reflect Permanent Magnet design. • Control 1.2,review to confirm TIA-310 valid as it envelopes the reduced magnetic field. • Sub. rewrite of Control 1.3 to reflect Permanent Magnet does not interfere with Robotic Operations on ISS, Remove required to dissipate field Control 1.11. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F07 – Radiated Fields, EMI, Magnetic (Cont) • Magnetic Field is less strong, nonvarying (Cont) • Sub. rewrite of Control 1.4 to address compatibility with Orbiter Operations. • Remove Control 1.5 ,1.7, 1.8, 1.9 addressing charging/discharging controls • Sub. rewrite of Control 1.4 to address EVA compatibility of new field • Remove Cause 3 for charging/discharging effects of magnetic fields on other systems/structures • EMI sources from CAB will have to be accounted for in EMI testing results. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Report • AMS-02-F08 – Electric Shock/Discharge • Remove CAB/Cryocoolers • Revise Control 2.7 to remove Cryocoolers and CAB heaters • Removed Uninterruptible Power Supply • Remove Control 1.2 • New Structure Inside open VC • Revisit Bonding Implementation in Control 2.2 • No Helium Source • Revise Control 4.1 to remove helium as a released neutrally charged gas AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F10 – Flammable Materials • Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed • Remove Control 2.3 to reflect removal of propylene • CAB Heat Pipe/Loop Heat Pipe Removed • Remove Control 2.4 • AMS-02 requires no Power on for Ascent • Update Control 3.1 to reflect no power during ascent AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F11 – Mechanism Failure • No Mechanisms Add, Removed or Altered • No changes to Causes or Control required AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F12 – Mate/Demate of Connectors • Remove UPS • Remove Control 1.4 • EVA Connector Swap to allow for magnet charging after power loss no longer required • Still a viable opportunity for the AMS-02 as a contingency EVA action, Control 1.1 must be rewritten to accurately reflect the new configuration. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F13 – Battery Failure • UPS Removed • Withdraw hazard report AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Report • AMS-02-F14 – EVA Operations Hazard • New Hardware • Review of new hardware/modified hardware for possible sharp edges/ corners/ entrapment • Potential impact to Control 3.1 • New Heaters • Need to review for EVA accessibility/thermal control • Potential impact to Control 4.2 • Cryogenic System Removed • Control 4.3 rewritten to remove references to extreme cold impingement potential • Fixed Magnetic Field • Control 8.2 updated to new field strength (entrapment of crew) AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Report • AMS-02-F16 – Shatterable Material Release • New Tracker Planes Added • New Tracker enclosure Plane • New Design of Tracker planes and replacement plane for plane number 1 must be designed and build in the spirit of Control 1.6 and Control 1.6 updated to reflect details of implementation and new verifications. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F17 – EPDS Damage • UPS Removed • Remove Control 2.2 AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F18 – Rapid Safing/Payload Reconfig. • Cryomagnet replaced with Fixed Magnet that can not be switched on and off. • Control 2.2 rewritten to reflect the lower intensity and lack of charging/discharging • Removal of Cryosystem, Opening of VC • Control 3.2 Revised to remove VC and Helium tank from Control parenthetical note AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F20 – Lasers • Removal of Plane Number 1 LBBXs • Half of LFCR outputs will no longer be utilized, ports will be blocked. • Update Control 1.1 to clarify use of laser output • Update Control 1.1 or add Control 2.7 to address use of blocking connectors to close off unused laser ports. • Update Control 2.6 to remove reference to “top” tracker plane (Plane number 1.) • Possible reconfiguration of thermal blankets • Control 2.6 references that the fiber optics are routed exclusively under MLI/blankets. In reconfiguration of AMS-02 Thermal Management, all blankets may not required and installed. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Hazard Reports • STD-AMS-02-F02 – 1230 DDRS-02 • No Changes AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Verifications • Previous pages did not highlight verifications that have already been identified as potentially being impacted by this redesign. • Verifications that are no longer relevant • Verifications that have to be reexamined for applicability • Verifications that must be reopened and closured activities redone • New Verifications • The plan is to review all Verifications that move forward in the safety process to confirm their status. • A new SVTL will be developed in conjunction with a new Verification Tracking Tool. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
Safety Review • All updated safety documentation will be processed through the Payload Safety Review Panel in accordance with NSTS/ISS 13830. • DDRS ISS will be processed separately through the applicable safety processes AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010