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CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 5

CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 5. Jonathan Katz. Announcements. Midterm on March 15. Modes of encryption. Used for encrypting a long message m 1 , …, m n ECB C i = F K (m i ); the ciphertext is (C 1 , …, C n ) CBC

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CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 5

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  1. CMSC 414Computer and Network SecurityLecture 5 Jonathan Katz

  2. Announcements • Midterm on March 15

  3. Modes of encryption • Used for encrypting a long message m1, …, mn • ECB • Ci = FK(mi); the ciphertext is (C1, …, Cn) • CBC • IV; Ci = FK(mi Ci-1); the ciphertext is (IV, C1, …, Cn) • OFB (stream cipher mode) • IV; zi = FK(zi-1); Ci = zi mi; the ciphertext is (IV, C1, …, Cn) • CTR (stream cipher mode) • IV; zi = FK(IV+i); Ci = zi mi; the ciphertext is (IV, C1, .., Cn) • Others…

  4. Security? • ECB should not be used • Why? • Not even secure against ciphertext-only attacks

  5. The effect of ECB mode original encrypted using ECB mode *Images from Wikipedia

  6. Other modes • CBC, OFB, and CTR modes are secure against chosen-plaintext attacks • CBC, OFB, and CTR modes are not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks *Images from Wikipedia

  7. Message integrity

  8. Message integrity m m’

  9. Encryption does not provide integrity • “Since encryption garbles the message, decryption of a ciphertext generated by an adversary must be unpredictable” • WRONG • E.g., one-time pad, CBC-/CTR-mode encryption • Why is this a concern? • Almost always, integrity is needed in addition to secrecy • Lack of integrity can lead to lack of secrecy • Use message authentication codes (MACs)

  10. Message authentication code (MAC) • In the private-key setting, the tool for achieving message integrity is a MAC • Functionality: • MACK(m) = t (we call t the “tag”) • VrfyK(m, t) = 0/1 (“1” = “accept” / ”0”=“reject”) • Correctness…

  11. Bob Alice MAC usage m, t k k Vrfyk(m’,t’) ?? t = Mack(m) • Shared key k • Sender computes a tag t on the message m using k • Receiver verifies the message/tag pair using k

  12. Bob Bob K K MAC usage

  13. Defining security • Attack model: • A random key k is chosen • Attacker is allowed to obtain t1 = MACk(m1), …, tq = MACk(mq) for any messages m1, …, mq of its choice • Attacker is successful if it outputs a forgery; i.e., (m, t) with: • m ≠ mi for all i • VrfyK(m, t) = 1 • For any time-bounded adversary, the probability of a successful attack should be small

  14. Defining security • Is the definition too strong? • When would an attacker be able to obtain tags on any messages of its choice? • Why do we count it as a break if the adversary outputs a forgery on a “meaningless” message? • Main point: we want a secure MAC to be usable in any setting where message integrity is needed

  15. Replay attacks • A MAC inherently cannot prevent replay attacks • Replay attacks must be prevented at a higher level of the protocol! • (Note that whether a replay is ok is application-dependent) • Replay attacks can be prevented using nonces, timestamps, etc. • Will discuss more later

  16. A MAC for short messages • Let F be a block cipher with n-bit output • To authenticate m using key k, compute t = Fk(m) • Vrfyk(m, t): output 1 iff t = Fk(m) • Why is this secure?

  17. (Informal) sketch of security • Replace Fk with a random permutation f • Can do this since F is a block cipher • Seeing f(m1), …, f(mq) does not help to predict f(m) for any m{m1,…,mq} • If adversary outputs (m, t), the probability that t is correct is roughly 2-n • For n large enough, the probability of forgery is small

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