Chapter 17. Deposit Insurance, Bank Failures, and the Savings-And-Loan Mess

1. Chapter 17. Deposit Insurance, Bank Failures, and the Savings-And-Loan Mess • Learning Objectives: To understand … • 1. Moral hazard and the cost of government guarantees • 2. Alternative models of deposit insurance • 3. How the FDIC resolves and handles failed banks • 4. Causes of bank failure • 5. Economic insolvency vs. bank closure • 6. Causes and costs of the S&L mess Chapter 17

2. CHAPTER THEME • For almost 50 years, federal deposit insurance worked too well in the United States. The financial devastation of the 1980s and early 1990s, however, got everyone's attention. While the FDIC was able to survive, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) went bankrupt. Although the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 and the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 revamped federal deposit insurance, a lot of unfinished work remains (e.g., pricing deposit insurance, failure-resolution policies and procedures, and resolving incentive conflicts) Chapter 17

3. “You can pay me now or you can pay me later” • Forbearance and “Zombies” • A $150-billion S&L bailout • Responsibility for the mess • Taxpayers • Congress • Regulators • Managers Chapter 17

4. Models of Deposit Insurance • Passive model of casualty insurance • Treats bank capital as a deductible • Option-pricing model • Treats bank capital as an inverse proxy for insurer loss exposure • Trilateral performance bond (surety or guarantee) • Incorporates agency costs into the bundle of contracts that makes up deposit insurance Chapter 17

5. Trilateral Performance Bond(Surety) • Parties • 1. Insured depository (receives benefit of the surety or guarantee) • 2. Insured depositor (receives contingent protection) • Uninsured creditor receives protection because of the way failed banks are typically handled • 3. FDIC (guarantor or surety with backing of the U.S. Treasury) Chapter 17

6. Understanding Deposit Insurance • Moral hazard • Agency costs • Marginal net benefit or burden of deposit insurance Chapter 17

7. Modeling the FDIC’s Cash Flows (Table 17-1, p. 599) • Components: F = P +rpR – CM – CL • Loss-control instruments • Linking the loss-control instruments to cash flow • Goal function: W = f(F, D, J, B) • F = cash flow (from above), D = distortions, J = job performance, B = bribes/tribute Chapter 17

8. FDIC Bad Times, Good Times • Bad times • 1988: 221 failures @ cost of $6 billion • 1991: 122 failures @ cost of $6.2 billion • Good times • 1995-1999: 22 failures @ cost of $1.2B • 2000-2001 (August): 8 failures (cost NA) Chapter 17

9. Techniques for Managing a Guarantee Business • Monitoring the value of collateral • Restricting the kinds of assets available for collateral • Charging risk-based premiums Chapter 17

10. Don’t Judge the FDIC by its Initials • Entry regulation • On- and Off-site bank examination and supervision • Disposition of failed and failing banks Chapter 17

11. Failure-Resolution Considerations • Cost • Public confidence and stability (contagion and TBTF) • Fairness of treatment (uninsured creditors) • Market discipline Chapter 17

12. FDIC Failure-Resolution Methods(Box 17-1, p. 608) • Deposit payoff • Purchase-and-Assumption(P&A) transaction • Other methods • Insured deposit transfer • Open-bank assistance • Bridge bank and DINB Chapter 17

13. Essential Functions of a Salvage Operation • Rescue or peril reduction • Appraisal or damage evaluation • Efficient asset or property management • Sales • How do these functions apply to FDIC operations? Chapter 17

14. Risk-Based Pricing • Supervisory group: A, B, or C • Capital adequacy • Well capitalized (10%, 6%, 5%) • Adequately capitalized (8%, 4%, 4%) • Inadequately capitalized (below the above) Chapter 17

15. The Credit-Union Model and Private Insurance • Idea: Two-way principal-agent relation • Components • Risk-based pricing • Loss sharing • Better supervision? Chapter 17

16. Keeping the Promise (Box 17-2, p. 616) • The FDIC recommends • Merging BIF and SAIF • Charge risk-based premiums regardless of the level of the fund • Eliminate volatility of premium income based on the designated reserve ratio (DRR) Chapter 17

17. Bank Failures: Hidden Action and Hidden Information • Economic insolvency and bank closure • In a time line, EI precedes BC • The gap is the forbearance period • Early-warning signals • Causes of bank failures • Fraud, abuse, and misconduct Chapter 17

18. The S&L Mess • Three underlying causes • 1. Mismanagement of interest-rate risk • 2. Mispriced deposit insurance and regulatory shortcomings • Legislative and political causes associated with subsidies without concern for proper pricing and incentives Chapter 17

19. CHAPTER SUMMARY • FDIC insurance is best viewed as a surety or trilateral performance bond. This approach, which incorporates agency costs into the nexus of contracts that makes up deposit insurance, endogenizes risk, highlights incentive conflict, and focuses on optimal loss-control activity. Since the FDIC resolves and handles failed banks and regulates and examines insured nonmember banks, one can't judge the FDIC by its initials. Chapter 17