El Problema de la Creación de Hipótesis en el Método Científico-Experimental Hipotético-Deductivo

1. El Problema de la Creación de Hipótesis en el Método Científico-Experimental Hipotético-Deductivo Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia Antonio Núñez, ULPGC

2. Newton • Hactenus phænomena cælorum & maris nostri per vim gravitatis exposui, sed causam gravitatis nonum assignavi... • Rationem vero harum gravitatis proprietatum ex phænomenis nondum potui deducere, & hypotheses non fingo. • Quicquid enim ex phænomenis non deducitur, hypothesis vocanda est; & hypotheses seu metaphysicæ, seu physicæ, seu qualitatum occultarum, seu mechanicæ, in philosophia experimentali locum non habent.

3. Einstein • These thoughts did not come in any verbal formulation. I rarely think in words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express it in words afterward. Most of the fundamental ideas of science are essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language comprehensible to everyone. • All these constructions and the laws connecting them can be arrived at by the principle of looking for the mathematically simplest concepts and the link between them. • The human mind has first to construct forms, independently, before we can find them in things

4. Dirac • En estos momentos existen problemas fundamentales en la física teórica cuya solución requerirá una revisión de nuestras ideas más drástica que cualquier otra precedente. Es muy probable que estos cambios sean tan grandes que esté más allá de la capacidad humana tener las necesarias nuevas ideas intentando formular directamente los resultados experimentales en forma matemática. • Por ello, el físico teórico deberá proceder en el futuro de un modo más indirecto. El método más potente de progreso que se puede sugerir es el uso de todos los recursos de la matemática pura para intentar perfeccionar y generalizar el formalismo matemático que configura la base actual de la física teórica y, tras cada éxito en esa dirección, tratar de interpretar los nuevos aspectos matemáticos en términos de entidades físicas.

5. Feynman • In general we look for a new law by the following process. First we guess it. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then we compare the result of the computation to nature, with experiment or experience, compare it directly with observation, to see if it works. If it disagrees with experiment it is wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is. It does not make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is – if it disagrees with experiment it is wrong.

6. Hawking • In the classical theory of gravity, either the universe has existed for an infinite time, or else it had a beginning at a singularity at some finite time in the past. In the quantum theory of gravity, a third possibility arises. Because one is using Euclidean space-times, in which the time direction is on the same footing as directions in space, it is possible for space-time to be finite in extent and yet to have no singularities that formed a boundary or edge • I’d like to emphasize that this idea that time and space should be finite “without boundary” is just a proposal: it cannot be deduced from some other principle. Like any other scientific theory, it may initially be put forward for aesthetic or metaphysical reasons, but the real test is whether it makes predictions that agree with observation. This, how-ever, is difficult to determine in the case of quantum gravity, for several reasons..

7. Stravinsky • “Sí, es cuestión de inspiración, pero cuando llegue la inspiración es mejor que te pille trabajando”. • Que a todos nos pille trabajando :-)

8. El Problema de la Creación de Hipótesis en el Método Científico-Experimental Hipotético-Deductivo Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia Antonio Núñez, ULPGC