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Mr. Edward A. DeGregorio * Dr. Raymond A. Janssen ** Dr. Lee W. Wagenhals ***

GMU George Mason University. Integrated Defense Systems. *. **. ***. Integrating Effects-Based and Attrition-Base Modeling. Mr. Edward A. DeGregorio * Dr. Raymond A. Janssen ** Dr. Lee W. Wagenhals *** Dr. Richard Messier * 2004 CCRTS

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Mr. Edward A. DeGregorio * Dr. Raymond A. Janssen ** Dr. Lee W. Wagenhals ***

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  1. GMU George Mason University Integrated Defense Systems * ** *** Integrating Effects-Based and Attrition-Base Modeling Mr. Edward A. DeGregorio * Dr. Raymond A. Janssen ** Dr. Lee W. Wagenhals *** Dr. Richard Messier * 2004 CCRTS Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium June 15 -17, 2004 San Diego, CA

  2. OVERVIEW • Purpose: Examine process and methods of interfacing high-level probabilistic Effects-Based models with higher fidelity attrition-based models and performing evaluations of alternative Courses of Action using the combination of these modeling techniques • Outline: • Effects-Based Challenge • Case Study from Persian Gulf War • Conclusions

  3. Evolution of Warfare* and Modeling & Simulation Approaches* Measuring the Effects of Network Centric Warfare, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1999 Carthaginians Roman Legion Single Dimension Warfare  Ni PCW Force N on M (N)n NCW Paradigm Shift to EBO** requires modeling Physical + Belief + Reason Domains Physics-Based Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling (Campaign, Engagement) Lanchester’s Equations: Attrition Modeling ** BGEN Deptula, USAF, 2001, on “EBO: Change in the Nature of War”

  4. Network-Centric Effects-Based Operations (EBO) … Shaping the Adversary’s Behavior • JFCOM defines EBO as “a process for obtaining a strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels”. • Network-Centric Operations (NCO) enables EBO • NCW enabled by 4 technologies: • Sensors • IT and Network Architectures • Precision Weapons • Stealth Platforms EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO beyond Attrition Warfare

  5. Dimensions of Network Centric Warfare (NCW)* Information/Knowledge Grid (Nanoseconds) * Measuring the Effects of Network Centric Warfare, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1999 Network & Info Technology Time Engagement Grid (Weeks … Minutes) Force Space C2ISR Sensor Networks Stealth Platforms, Precision Weapons Sensor Grid (1000s - 1,000,000s m.)

  6. Effects-Based Operations (EBO) Models Reason, Belief • Perceptions (Red & Blue) • Cause-Effects Relationships • COA Selection Mapping Space Physical C2ISR, Comms Models • Sit Awareness • C2 • Speed of Command Physics-Based Attrition Models Force-on-Force • Move • Strike • Protect Integrate Physical & Cognitive Effects Modeling Time (Nanosec.) Space (Battlespace Vol.) Force

  7. Intel + Planning + Execution Assessment Intel & Planning Effects Kill Chain Access Locate ID Track Designate Comm Attack Assess Campaign Plan Lead to Blue Actions Blue and Red COA Analysis Analysts Analysts C C B B COA 1 COA 1 A A t t C C A A B B COA 2 COA 2 t t Cand Cand idate idate COAs COAs COA 1 COA 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 COA 2 COA 2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 Influence Net 0 0 0 0 10 10 20 20 30 30 Time Time Timed Probability Profile Timed Probability Profile EBO Modeling Linked to Attrition-Based Modeling & Simulation (Physical Dimension: Force, Space, Time Domain) EBO NCW Operational System + * EBO are coordinated sets of actions – including diplomatic, economic, information operations, psychological operations, and lethal/non-lethal warfare—directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes and neutrals in military operations (Reason & Belief Domain)

  8. CASE STUDY APPROACH • Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm) well documented; much unclassified information published. Many of the situations encountered there are still significant today. • We first used documentation* from Desert Storm to create a high level EBO model • Model behavior was “validated” using the Final Report • We attempted to discover how the higher level model can foster the development and analysis of the lower level model and how, in turn, the lower level model results can impact the higher level model. • By using a known situation it was possible to validate model results and to test the postulated interfaces between the models that were developed • Specific results then are generalized "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress" [DoD, 1992]

  9. National Policy Objectives (5)(6) CINCCENT’s Mission (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) CENTCOM’s Theater Military Objectives (7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12) Air Campaign Objectives (13)(14)(15)(16)(17) Maritime Campaign Objectives (30)(31)(32)(33)(34) Ground Campaign Objectives (44)(45) JFACC’s Tactical Components (18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26) (27)(28)(29) NAVCENT’s Tactical Components (35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40)(41) Joint Force Tactical Components (42)(43)(46)(47)(48) FLOW DOWN OF PERSIAN GULF WAR OBJECTIVES *(x) refer to event numbers in the report that were assigned the EB model

  10. Desert Storm War Scenario

  11. Fleet Command Naval Warfare Simulation…3D Real-Time Modeling, Simulation & Visualization • Adapted by Raytheon for use on DARPA / NAVSEA Submarine Payloads & Sensors Program. Developed HLA-compatible interface to Raytheon Hi-Fi Missile Server. Can be run in Monte Carlo mode (turn off graphics). • Tested sensitivity to various Mission / System Concepts within context of Scenarios • Conducted Operational Utility Analysis to Quantify Military Value: • Notional Korea-China Scenario, (UNCLASS ver.) • Persian Gulf Scenario (UNLCASS ver.) Features: • Geographically accurate 3D environment • Bathymetric Data (display depth with mouse) • 1000 meter resolution Terrain (Standard) • Integrated DTED Level 1 (100 m resolution) • Complete Jane’s Order Of Battle for 16 countries; countries can be added • Sim Objects include Submarines, UUVs, Surface Ships, Aircraft, UAVs, Missiles, Tanks, TELs, Land Vehicles, undersea mines and some ground installations; can customize sim objects • Multiple views of unfolding scenario • Fleet Command functionality: • Set up Geo-scenario using Mission Editor GUI • Modify Platform/Sensor/Weapon Parameters with Database GUI • “Drag and Drop”: Lay-down Red/Blue Forces (Lat/Long) on Geographic Map Window • Simulation can be run in different ways: • Computer (Blue) vs Computer (Red) • Human (Blue) vs. Computer (Red) • Human (Blue) vs Human (Red)

  12. HLA Architecture Supports Distributed Scenario Generation, Req’mnts Analysis & Concept Development Raytheon Mission Analysis & Simulation Technology Threats & • (RMAST) Interceptors Standard Missile • Aircraft TBMs Dedicated • Server Projectiles • UNIX Server RMAST FOM RMAST FOM (AGS, Comms RTI RTI ERGM, Network Excalibur) Modeling Tool Cruise Missiles • Vis Scenario VIS ESSMs • Link Processor Net Others • NCS, Fullerton RMS - Tucson (2001 - 2003) (Dec 04) Raytheon ORION Network IDS - Portsmouth Net VIS (Dec 03) (Manual Link) RMAST: Comms Federates Fleet Scenario Missile Functions Command Processor Model Create Scenario x Send Scenario x Receive Scenario x x Convert Scenario x x Effects - Based Models* Execute Scenario x x Send Results x *George Mason Univ Tools installed at Real- Time Naval IDS/Portsmouth Warfare Sim

  13. COURSES OF ACTION FOR EBO • An effects-based way of thinking has been evolving for some time. Objectives can be obtained by achieving effects. Effects can be achieved by actions that comprise COAs • Needed is an approach that captures the rationale for COAs that explain how actions can achieve effects • Different levels of detail impact the type of analysis that can be done • Detailed Engineering and physics knowledge can allow engineering models to show the behavior of systems to actions • How to disrupt electric power, POL, an IADS are examples • If we have the knowledge and the models they can give very precise results • Qualitative knowledge about system or the reasoning belief and decision make aspects require a more abstract approach • Probabilistic modeling techniques may be helpful

  14. Command Intent Effects Actions Model Construction Desired End States Set of Desired and Undesired Effects on Red Set of Desired Blue End States Effects Based Modeling for COA Development

  15. Command Intent Actions Effects Model Construction Desired End States Probabilistic model relating actionable events to effects through a network of influencing relationships: Influence Net model Set of Desired and Undesired Effects Set of Desired Blue End States May include Red’s COAs From Red’s Point of View Effects Based Modeling for COA Development

  16. Command Intent Actions Effects Model Construction Time-phased broad actions Desired End States Probabilistic model relating actionable events to effects through a network of influencing relationships: Influence Net model Set of Blue’s potential Actions that will affect Red. Set of Desired and Undesired Effects Set of Desired Blue End States May include Red’s COAs From Red’s Point of View Effects Based Modeling for COA Development

  17. Command Intent Actions Effects Model Construction Time-phased broad actions Desired End States Probabilistic model relating actionable events to effects through a network of influencing relationships: Influence Net model Set of Blue’s potential Actions that will affect Red. Set of Desired and Undesired Effects Set of Desired Blue End States May include Red’s COAs Fin Trans Rel Ops From Red’s Point of View Pol IO Effects Based Modeling for COA Development

  18. Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners Additional Red WMD activity observed Blue takes unilateral action Blue coalition formed +S, -W .05 .50 0.0 .05 Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity .05 .50 0.0 .50 +M, -S +S,-W Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners Additional Red WMD activity observed Additional Red WMD activity observed -S, +W Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners Additional Red WMD activity observed Blue takes unilateral action Blue takes unilateral action Blue takes unilateral action +S,-W Blue initiates efforts for coalition force Blue coalition formed +M, -S Blue coalition formed +M, -S .05 .50 0.0 0.0 .05 .05 .05 .50 0.0 .05 Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity Int’l inspections show WMD exists .05 .50 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 .05 .50 0.0 .50 +M, -W +S, -W +S, -S Blue initiates efforts for coalition force Blue initiates efforts for coalition force Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues sanctions Blue initiates efforts for coalition force 0.0 .50 .07 .50 Int’l inspections show WMD exists Int’l inspections show WMD exists Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues sanctions Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues sanctions +M, -S 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 .07 .07 .07 .07 .50 .50 .50 .50 0.0 .50 .07 .50 -S, +S +M, -M .05 .50 .05 .50 .05 .50 Red initiates UN support important Red initiates UN support important Red initiates UN support important Red initiates UN support important +W, -S Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites Blue attacks first WMD Blue attacks first WMD Blue attacks first WMD .01 .50 .01 .50 Blue believes assured success is achievable Blue believes assured success is achievable Blue believes assured success is achievable +W, -M Blue believes assured success is achievable 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 0.0 .50 +W, -S Blue attacks first WMD Forces invade Red and change regime Forces invade Red and change regime Forces invade Red and change regime Forces invade Red and change regime +M, -S +W, -S Forces invade Red and change regime .01 .50 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 .01 .50 0.0 .50 .01 .50 Red initiated anti-access measures Red initiated anti-access measures Blue believes assured success is achievable 0.0 .50 +M, -S Additional forces flow into area Additional forces flow into area Forces invade Red and change regime +M, -M +S, -M .82 .82 .82 .50 .50 .50 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 .50 .50 .82 .50 Red believes additional attacks imminent Red believes additional attacks imminent Red believes additional attacks imminent 0.0 .50 +M, -W Red believes additional attacks imminent 0.0 .50 .01 .50 .05 .50 Red initiated anti-access measures .05 .50 Blue publishes Red WMD evidence .010 .50 +S, -S Blue publishes Red WMD evidence .010 .50 Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater +M, -S Blue initiates covert ISR Additional forces flow into area Blue initiates covert ISR 0.0 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 .50 0.0 .50 +S, -M +S, -W +M, -S -W,+S Brown places its military on heightened alert Brown places its military on heightened alert +S, -M .010 .50 .010 .50 Blue attacks Red military infrastructure Blue attacks Red military infrastructure .82 .50 Blue attacks Red military infrastructure 0.0 .50 Red believes additional attacks imminent 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 .05 .50 0.0 .50 .05 .50 .05 .50 N, -S +M, -S Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable evidence Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable evidence .15 .50 .15 .50 +S, -S Blue publishes Red WMD evidence +S, -M .010 .50 +S, -S Red initiates WMD activities Red initiates WMD activities Red initiates WMD activities 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 0.0 .50 Red believes Blue using covert sensing Red believes Blue using covert sensing Red believes Blue using covert sensing Red believes Blue using covert sensing Red uses WMD takes military action Red uses WMD takes military action Red uses WMD takes military action Red uses WMD takes military action Red uses WMD takes military action Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater +S,-W +S, -S +W, -S Blue initiates covert ISR Red believes Blue will attack Red believes Blue will attack Red believes Blue will attack Red believes Blue will attack 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 0.0 .50 0.0 .50 +S, -M +S, -W +S, -S .0.0 .0.0 .0.0 .0.0 .50 .50 .50 .50 .0.0 .50 +M, -S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 .50 .50 .01 .01 .50 .50 Brown places its military on heightened alert Red leadership takes aggressive posture Red leadership takes aggressive posture Red leadership takes aggressive posture .010 .50 .05 .05 .05 .05 .50 .50 .50 .50 Blue attacks Red military infrastructure +S,-S Red captures part of SOF Red captures part of SOF Red captures part of SOF +M, N 0.0 .50 .05 .50 +S, -S Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded Red postures for attack on Brown Red postures for attack on Brown Red believes its sovereignty has been threatened Red believes its sovereignty has been threatened Red believes its sovereignty has been threatened Red believes its sovereignty has been threatened 0.0 .50 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 0.0 .50 0.0 0.0 .50 .50 +S, -S Red civilian collateral damage occurs Red civilian collateral damage occurs +S, -S Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable evidence Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated .14 .50 .14 .50 -W, +W .15 .50 +W, N +S, -S N, N Red initiates WMD activities Red preemptively invades Brown uses WMD Red preemptively invades Brown uses WMD .01 .50 .01 .01 .01 .50 .50 .50 -M, +W 0.0 .50 .05 .50 Red achieves Brown annexation .05 .50 Red achieves Brown annexation Red achieves Brown annexation Red achieves Brown annexation Red achieves Brown annexation Red believes Blue using covert sensing .05 .50 0.0 .50 .05 .50 0.0 .50 Red uses WMD takes military action +S,-W +M, -S .13 .50 .13 .13 .13 .13 .50 .50 .50 .50 .05 .50 Red believes Blue will attack .05 .50 0.0 .50 -S, +W +M, -S +M, -M .0.0 .50 0.0 .50 .01 .50 +M, -W +M,-M Red leadership takes aggressive posture .05 .50 +S, -S +M, -W +S, -S +M, -M -M, N Red captures part of SOF -S,+M +M, -M -M,+M +S, -S +S,-S Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded Red postures for attack on Brown Red believes its sovereignty has been threatened +W ,-S -S, +W 0.0 .50 +S, -S +M,-S +S, -S 0.0 .50 +S, -S +S, -S Red civilian collateral damage occurs +S,-W Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated .14 .50 +S, -S +S, N -M, +W Red preemptively invades Brown uses WMD .01 .50 .05 .50 Red achieves Brown annexation .05 .50 0.0 .50 +M, -S .13 .50 .05 .50 AN INTEGRATE MODELING APPROACH Effects-Based Modeling Objective: Codify belief structure of Adversary to establish cause and effect relations and impact of actions Identify - Intent/outcome - Beliefs - Initial events - Actions Establish - Cause and effect relationships - Probability estimates - Times (when, how long) Link with Engagement Models - Quantity appropriate action for increased fidelity Strategic Model Campaign Engagement Model Engagement System Engineering/Integr Subsystem/Product Performance Detailed Component Modeling & Sim

  19. HYPOTHESES • Use of more detailed modeling improves the derivation of the elements of the higher-level EBO model • High fidelity simulations can provide more accurate values for the conditional probability values and the time delay information that the higher-level models use as input. • High fidelity simulations can be useful in providing a more detailed look at actionable events that are created in the high level EBO model

  20. Gulf War Model Rev 16b (21) Attack strategic IADS 01 0 0 (18) Attack leadership command facilities Influence Key: h(%) g(%) strong 90 -90 moderate 66 -66 light 33 -33 other other 0 0 (22) Attack air forces and fields (13) Air supremacy gained 02 03 n (20) Attack Telecomm. and C3 nodes 0 0 10 (15) Iraqi NBC delivery capability neutralized n (23) Attack NBC research, production and storage facilities 35 0 0 04 09 CAMPAIGN n 43 (19) Attack electrical production facilities 36 0 0 (16) Iraqi offensive capability neutralized 0 0 05 n 43 (24) Attack military storage and production sites 43 AIR 06 (17) Iraqi mechanized equipment in KTO rendered ineffective 0 0 37 (25) Attack Scud missiles, launchers, prod and storage facilities 07 40 34 39 0 0 (14) Iraqi regime isolated 38 (28) Attack railroads and bridges 08 37 (26) Attack oil refining and distribution facilities 0 0 42 0 0 (2) Iraqi armed forces ejected from Kuwait 10 41 (27) Attack naval forces and port facilities 74 0 0 0 11 (5) Legitimate government restored in Kuwait 60 83 (3) RGF neutralized (29) Attack army and RGF in KTO 76 0 84 (8) Air superiority achieved 9 0 0 61 13 0 62 (9) Iraqi supply lines severed 77 82 48 0 14 65 (35) Prepare AAW operations 64 (6) Iraqi military capabilities reduced 81 0 0 (1) Iraqi National Command Authority neutralized (11) RGF in KTO neutralized 49 78 (36) Prepare Naval forces and port logistics 0 16 17 0 MARITIME CAMPAIGN 47 63 0 0 0 15 44 (12) Kuwait City liberated (31) Iraqi shipping neutralized 45 (37) Prepare ASUW Operations 18 0 6 46 0 3 19 (10a) NBC production capability neutralized (30) Naval support conducted 79 (38) Prepare submarine TLAM launches 67 40 72 (4a) Ballistic missile capability neutralized 50 (32a) Naval tactical aircraft strikes conducted 20 0 0 66 0 51 0 CAMPAIGN (10b) NBC storage capability neutralized 80 (39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault 21 73 69 40 68 54 GROUND 22 52 (34) Coalition coastline defended (4b) NBC capability neutralized 0 0 3 70 53 12 23 (40) Prepare naval gunfire support (7a) Political & military leadership attacked 0 (32b) TLAM strikes conducted 55 0 3 40 0 56 (41) Decide not to do amphibious assault 57 71 24 (33) Amphibious assault feint conducted 38 0 (7b) C2 neutralized 0 3 59 (42) Position Coalition forces West of Kuwait 26 Event Nomenclature Key (45) RGF attacked from West 10 28 25 4 (43) Draw Iraqi reserve forces away from main attack Shorthand for the Event Name 28 27 58 10 28 (#) Event Name (46) Conduct Psychological operations to degrade morale 30 (44) Supporting attack conducted from South # # 29 COA start time (in days) for Actionable Events only Delay time (in days) of the event 5 32 STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 10 28 31 (47) Conduct SOF 5 33 34 33 (48) Use electronic warfare to disrupt comms. CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES THEATER MILITARY OBJECTIVES MISSION & NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES 38 0 TACTICAL COMPONENTS

  21. HIGH LEVEL MODEL VALIDATION • Concentrated on the overall behavior given the choice of values for the influence strength parameters, since the structure and timing more were directly derived from the Final Report to Congress. • Examined static behavior by examining how changes in input actionable events result in reasonable changes throughout the net as well as changes at the overall effect nodes (Mission and National Policy Objectives). • Compared dynamic behavior with timelines in Final Report.

  22. (04a) Ballistic missile capability neutralized (01) Iraqi National Command Authority neutralized (04b) NBC capability neutralized (03) RGF neutralized (02) Iraqi armed forces ejected from Kuwait (05) Legitimate government in Kuwait restored (06) Iraqi military capabilities reduced Model = Gulf_War_Model_Rev_16bCOA = COA_Set_02 DELAY = Delay_Set_05 DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR - INITIAL HI LEVEL MODEL

  23. (35) Prepare AAW operations (36) Prepare Naval forces and port logistics (31) Iraqi shipping neutralized (37) Prepare ASUW Operations Iraqi Airfields 60% destroyed (30) Naval support conducted (38) Prepare submarine TLAM launches Iraqi air forces rendered 90% ineffective (32a) Naval tactical aircraft strikes conducted (35) Prepare AAW operations (39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault Bubiyan Engagement Prepared (36) Prepare Naval forces and port logistics (34) Coalition coastline defended MARITIME MARITIME CAMPAIGN CAMPAIGN Iraqi Radar sites 50% destroyed (40) Prepare naval gunfire support (31) Iraqi shipping neutralized (32b) TLAM strikes conducted Iraqi SAM sites 40% destroyed (37) Prepare ASUW Operations (41) Decide not to do amphibious assault (30) Naval support conducted (33) Amphibious assault feint conducted (38) Prepare submarine TLAM launches Iraqi Navy 80% destroyed (32a) Naval tactical aircraft strikes conducted Iraqi Port facilities 70% destroyed (39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault (34) Coalition coastline defended (40) Prepare naval gunfire support (32b) TLAM strikes conducted (41) Decide not to do amphibious assault (33) Amphibious assault feint conducted INTEGRATING ATTRITION MODEL • Identified specific tactical engagements within the campaigns (from the Final Report to Congress) for modeling with physics-based simulations • Used a modified version of Jane's® Fleet Command™ [modified by Raytheon]

  24. INTEGRATING ATTRITION MODEL • The attrition-based model provides quantitative measures of effectiveness (% killed) of the engagement participants versus time. • Thus, the effect(s) of the attrition model are events that reflect achievement in progress for the neutralization of adversarial participants. • Such events became the vehicle for interfacing information from the lower level to the Hi Level EB model • Several engagements were run in the attrition-based model and used to enhance the Hi Level EB Model • Additional structure added • Time delays refined • The enhancements to the Hi Level model did not effect its basic behavior, but provided a more detailed description of intermediate events that could be examined

  25. (21) Attack strategic IADS 01 0 0 (18) Attack leadership command facilities Influence Key: h(%) g(%) strong 90 -90 moderate 66 -66 light 33 -33 other other 0 0 (22) Attack air forces and fields (13) Air supremacy gained 02 03 n (20) Attack Telecomm. and C3 nodes 0 0 10 (15) Iraqi NBC delivery capability neutralized n (23) Attack NBC research, production and storage facilities 35 0 0 04 09 CAMPAIGN n 43 (19) Attack electrical production facilities 36 0 0 (16) Iraqi offensive capability neutralized 0 0 05 n 43 (24) Attack military storage and production sites 43 AIR 06 (17) Iraqi mechanized equipment in KTO rendered ineffective 0 0 37 (25) Attack Scud missiles, launchers, prod and storage facilities 07 40 34 39 0 0 (14) Iraqi regime isolated 38 (28) Attack railroads and bridges 08 37 (26) Attack oil refining and distribution facilities 0 0 42 0 0 (2) Iraqi armed forces ejected from Kuwait 10 41 (27) Attack naval forces and port facilities 74 0 Attrition Engagements 0 0 11 (5) Legitimate government restored in Kuwait 60 83 (3) RGF neutralized (29) Attack army and RGF in KTO 76 0 84 Bubiyan Island (8) Air superiority achieved 0 0 0 61 13 0 93 Iraqi Airfields 60% destroyed 62 1 94 (9) Iraqi supply lines severed 77 85 95 96 82 48 0 Iraqi air forces rendered 90% ineffective 14 65 86 (35) Prepare AAW operations 64 (6) Iraqi military capabilities reduced 97 91 81 0 0 (1) Iraqi National Command Authority neutralized Bubiyan Engagement Prepared 99 1 101 (11) RGF in KTO neutralized 49 98 78 87 (36) Prepare Naval forces and port logistics 92 0 0 MARITIME CAMPAIGN Iraqi Radar sites 50% destroyed 8 47 88 1 63 0 15 100 0 0 108 44 (12) Kuwait City liberated (31) Iraqi shipping neutralized 45 Iraqi SAM sites 40% destroyed (37) Prepare ASUW Operations 18 0 6 105 1 46 89 0 3 19 (10a) NBC production capability neutralized (30) Naval support conducted 102 79 (38) Prepare submarine TLAM launches Iraqi Navy 80% destroyed 67 29 72 (4a) Ballistic missile capability neutralized 50 1 90 (32a) Naval tactical aircraft strikes conducted 20 0 0 66 0 103 Iraqi Port facilities 70% destroyed 51 0 CAMPAIGN (10b) NBC storage capability neutralized 80 (39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault 21 1 73 69 106 28 NGFS (Ras Al-Khafji) 68 54 GROUND 22 113 52 (34) Coalition coastline defended (4b) NBC capability neutralized 0 0 0 104 Gun positions 80% destroyed 70 53 12 (40) Prepare naval gunfire support 3 110 (7a) Political & military leadership attacked 114 0 (32b) TLAM strikes conducted 55 109 Operation Centers 100% destroyed 0 3 107 Ras Al-Khafji Prepared 111 40 0 3 56 8 (41) Decide not to do amphibious assault 112 57 71 115 24 (33) Amphibious assault feint conducted Combat Unit HQs 60% destroyed 38 0 (7b) C2 neutralized 3 0 3 Battle at Al Khafji 59 (42) Position Coalition forces West of Kuwait 26 Troop transports 80% destroyed Event Nomenclature Key 1 (45) RGF attacked from West 10 28 25 118 4 (43) Draw Iraqi reserve forces away from main attack Shorthand for the Event Name Armored vehicles 80% destroyed 28 Battle of Al Khafji Prepared 119 117 121 1 58 10 0 1 120 122 (#) Event Name Small vehicles 60% destroyed (46) Conduct Psychological operations to degrade morale 30 123 (44) Supporting attack conducted from South 1 # # 29 COA start time (in days) for Actionable Events only Delay time (in days) of the event 5 32 STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 10 28 31 (47) Conduct SOF 5 33 34 33 (48) Use electronic warfare to disrupt comms. CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES THEATER MILITARY OBJECTIVES MISSION & NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES 38 0 TACTICAL COMPONENTS ENHANCED HI LEVEL MODEL

  26. (04a) Ballistic missile capability neutralized (01) Iraqi National Command Authority neutralized (04b) NBC capability neutralized (02) Iraqi armed forces ejected from Kuwait (03) RGF neutralized (05) Legitimate government in Kuwait restored (06) Iraqi military capabilities reduced Model = Gulf_War_Model_Rev21cCOA = COA_Set_04 DELAY = Delay_Set_03 Refined Results

  27. CONCLUSIONS • Using a case study approach we explored a process for relating a high- level effects-based model with detailed attrition-based models • Attrition models can provide a more detailed look at actionable events that are created in the high-level EBO model and can help planners refine the courses of action selected from analysis of the EBO model • Attrition models can help refine the structure and the conditional probability and time parameters EB model (increases the confidence in the EB model) • Creating the interfaces was labor intensive; no “automated” technique for linking the two types of models was discovered • Some preliminary “rules of thumb” were postulated for creating new structure in the EB model as a result of the analysis of the attrition model • More research should yield a more efficient approach to establishing the ties between hi level effects based models and the higher fidelity attrition models

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