Cases, Numbers, Models – by Sprinz & Wolinsky Chapters 10-12

1. Cases, Numbers, Models – by Sprinz & WolinskyChapters 10-12 Three bullet points: • Formal models are increasingly useful in developing theory in international politics • These include logical, mathematical, and simulation approaches, with borrowing from microeconomics and other quantitative fields • Remember that models are never “true” but can be useful.

2. Who are the writers? Who is the audience?(a recap) • DetlefSprinz • Professor, Department of Economic and Social Sciences, The University of Potsdam • Senior Research Fellow I, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo • Previously Chairman/Member, Scientific Committee, European Environment Agency (2004-2012) • Ph.D./M.A (Political Science), University of Michigan. Dissertation: “Why Countries Support International Environmental Agreements: The Regulation of Acid Rain in Europe” • M.A. (Economics), University of the Saarland • Journals: • Global Environmental Politics (Editorial Board) • Journal of Environment & Development (Editorial Board) • Weather, Climate, and Society (Associate Editor for Political Science) • Self-description: “His areas of research and publications encompass long-term policy, inter/national institutions & the evaluation of their performance, European & international environmental policy, and modeling political decisions.” • Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University • Co-director, Northwestern Environmental Field School • Director, Program In Environmental Policy and Culture • Ph.D. Political Science, University of Chicago • M.A. Political Science, University of Pennsylvania • B.A. International Relations and East Asian Studies, Cum Laude, Hebrew University of Jerusalem • Field of active study appears to be environmental policy and its international relations aspects. • Intended Audience: Practitioners of Research in International Relations

3. Formal Models of International Politics • Duncan Snidal (Prof. of IR at Oxford; Assoc. Prof. of Int’l Politics, Econ., and Security at U Chicago) • Formal/Mathematical models are useful because they enhance precision and can aid in use of deductive reasoning. • Models create shorthand which combines description and conclusions • This shorthand is part of an iterative process within the field, which is linked with the development of theory

4. Formal Models of International Politics(cont.) • Models are always abstractions. Do we know enough to simplify? • Types: physical representations, computer simulations, causal maps, game theory cases. • Physical: immediacy, viscerality, useful in teaching. • Simulation: handles many/complex assumptions easily; can be altered quickly • Mathematical: symbolic manipulation increases power of deductive logic • Game theory: easily incorporates changing motivations and multi-period analysis of multiple actors.

5. Formal Models of International Politics(cont.) • Remember, we are using “stylized facts” and not “fact facts” • Test of a model is a joint test of predictions and assumptions • Tension between looking for face validity, and also looking to see if we can produce “surprising” predictions.

6. International Political Economy and Formal Models of Political Economy • Helen Milner • Stanford u/g; Harvard Ph.D • Prof. of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton • Director of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance; President of the International Political Science Association. • What is International Political Economy (IPE)? • Issues related to the intersection of politics and economics • “seems to have appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s” • IPE research must have an independent or dependent economic variable

7. IPE and formal models (cont.) • Rational choice theory • Individuals are not random, they have clear preferences which they pursue consistently • Generally assumes perfect information • Focused on efficiency • Rational choice models can be informal, but increasingly they are formal and mathematical—this has been much more true of security studies and is now becoming true of IPE • Does this produce obscure models with little added advantage? • Are results unoriginal and untestable?

8. IPE and formal models (cont.) Key examples within the field: • Hegemonic stability theory (HST) • Do hegemons prefer free trade? (maybe) Are there even hegemons at all (Pahre)? • Explanations of foreign economic policy • Driven by trade and monetary policies • International institutions and cooperation • How does cooperation emerge and evolve?

9. Consumption, Production and Markets: Applications of Microeconomics to International Politics • John A.C. Conybeare • Chair/Prof. of Political Science, University of Iowa, 1988-present • BA (Econ. + Poli. Sci.), Australian Nat’l Univ.; MA, Ph.D(Gov’t), Harvard • Microeconomics • Rational choice for individuals • Application in IR is to make analogy from individuals or firms to states or blocs

10. Applications of Microeconomics to IPE (cont.) • Utility functions and risk aversion • Apply to both supply and demand • Dependent on inputs or factors • Greater (but uncertain) consumption is not always preferred to lesser (but certain) consumption • Can microeconomics explain governmental and IR choices? • Feudalism replaced by markets • Mercantilism and isolation replaced by modern international system of trade • Microeconomics appears to be good at explaining sectoral demands for certain government policies