The Impact of Logistics on War

1. The Impact of Logistics on War

2. Lesson Objectives •  Define "logistics” •  Begin to understand its importance in modern war.

3. Logistics Case Study The Russian Campaign of 1812

4. Napoleonic Empire 1812

5. Russian Campaign 1812 Why did Napoleon attack Russia?

6. Strategic Objectives "I have come to finish off, once and for all, the Colossus of Northern Barbarism. The sword is drawn. They must be thrust back into their snow and ice, so that for a quarter of a century at least they will not be able to interfere with civilied [sic] Europe." Napoleon I June 1812 With Napoleon in Russia: The Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza (From the original memoirs as edited by Jean Hanoteau. Abridged, edited, and with an introduction by George Libaire) (1935 William Morrow & Co. New York). Quoted in: Richard Orsinger “France During the French Revolution and Under Napoleon Bonaparte” http://www.txdirect.net/users/rrichard/napoleo1.htm

7. Operational Objective Engage and destroy the Russian army just inside the border • No intention to go on to Moscow (reported)

8. Chronology 1812 June 24 Crossed Nieman River into Russia

9. Napoleon Enters Russia June 24, 1812 Napoleon entered Russia with > 400,000 men * * Reports vary from 400,000 to 685,000

10. The Russian Campaign

11.   Konigsberg to Moscow ~ 680 miles (~ 1,100 Km)

12. The Russian Campaign Minard’s Graphic Charles Joseph Minard "It may well be the best statistical graphic ever drawn.“ Edward Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 1983

13. Minard’s Graphic Charles Joseph Minard

14. Minard’s Graphic Charles Joseph Minard "It may well be the best statistical graphic ever drawn.“ Edward Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 1983

15. Chronology 1812 June 24 Crossed Nieman River into Russia September 7 Battle of Borodino • Indecisive; enormous losses for both sides September 14 Entered Moscow

16. Battle of Borodino Napoleon I on the Borodino Heights September 7, 1812

17. Battle of Borodino September 7, 1812

18. Moscow Napoleon arrived September 15, 1812 with ~100,000 men

19. Chronology 1812 June 24 Crossed Nieman River into Russia September 7 Battle of Borodino • Indecisive; enormous losses for both sides September 14 Entered Moscow October 18 Began retreat from Moscow December 14 Remnants of Grand Armee left Russia

20. Retreat From Moscow Napoleon’s Retreat From Moscow Adolph Northern •

21. Retreat From Moscow "I have no army any more! For many days I have been marching in the midst of a mob of disbanded, disorganized men, who wander all over the countryside in search of food." Napoleon Bonaparte, 1812 • In 1812 Illarion Pryanishnikov

22. The Russian Campaign

23. Russian Campaign Napoleon entered Russia with > 400,000 men June 1812 Napoleon left Russia with 20,000 to 45,000 men December 1812 " ... the most conspicuous logistical failure in the history of warfare." Stanley L. Falk Introduction to Pure Logistics

24. What Went Wrong? The Magnitude of the Problem

25. Napoleon’s Challenge Entered Russia with over 400,000 men 150,000 “primary” horses 120,000 supply train horses Feed ration per horse: 8 lbs. oats + 12 lbs. hay = 20 lbs/horse/day Feed for 270,000 horses = 5,400,000 lbs. = 2,700 tons/day! For one week of travel (~100 miles), fodder requirement is 19,800 tons! … just for the horses!

26. Napoleon’s Challenge Put another way: Using this technology

27. Napoleon’s Challenge Accomplish this: Twice each week … for 100 miles

28. Napoleon’s Challenge More Assuming only half the 120,000 provision horses were used to draw wagons, At six horses per wagon, … that would be 10,000 wagons at ~2 tons each

29. Napoleon’s Challenge Allowing ~100 ft. per wagon, that’s about 50 wagons/mile so … 10,000 wagons single file would stretch 200 miles!

30. What Went Wrong? Plenty of food in the storehouses Food and fodder available in the countryside … if properly requisitioned Transportation resources poorly managed • Could not provide enough wagons • Wagons available not effectively used First echelons plundered as they went • Left nothing for those who followed Returned over much the same route as ingress

31. What Went Wrong? “ …the Grande Armee’s problems were at all times, including the retreat from Moscow, largely due to bad discipline. This, of course, was partly due to logistics shortages.” “It would, however, be unwise to attribute this solely to the problems of supply. The need to protect enormously long lines of communication and to leave garrisons behind and the effects of distance per se were also factors of major importance.” Martin van Creveld Supplying War

32. The Russian Campaign

33. Russian Campaign Consequences Europe realized that Napoleon was not invincible Reinforced the importance of logistics in war … one more time!

34. What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? • “Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of military operations, logistics the means therefore.” • George Thorpe • Pure Logistics

35. What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? “Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.” Baron de Jomini A

36. What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…” Sun Tzu

37. What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? strategy. Amateurs talk Professionals talk logistics tactics. Different Unknown Author Author Unknown

38. So what is Logistics?

39. So what is Logistics? “Logistics is the ‘practical art of moving armies.’” Baron de Jomini

40. Logistics The art and science of managing and controlling the flow of goods, energy and information • production and procurement (strategic) • transportation (operational) • distribution (tactical) • maintenance (all)

41. The Logistician Logisticians are a sad and embittered race of men who are very much in demand in war, and who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace. They deal only in facts, but must work for men who merchant in theories. They emerge during war because war is very much a fact. They disappear in peace because peace is mostly theory. The people who merchant in theories, and who employ logisticians in war and ignore them in peace, are generals. Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war and in peace, generals try to forget logisticians. Romping along beside generals are strategists and tacticians. Logisticians despise strategists and tacticians. Strategists and tacticians do not know about logisticians until they grow to become generals -- which they usually do. Sometimes a logistician becomes a general. If he does, he must associate with generals whom he hates; he has a retinue of strategists and tacticians whom he despises; and, on his back, is a logistician whom he fears. This is why logisticians who become generals always have ulcers and cannot eat their ambrosia. Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war, and in peace generals try to forget logisticians. Author Unknown http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.htm

42. Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war, and in peace generals try to forget logisticians. Author Unknown http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.htm

43. Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war, and in peace generals try to forget logisticians. Author Unknown http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.htm

44. Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war, and in peace generals try to forget logisticians. Author Unknown http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.htm

45. Definitions (review) Strategy A plan to match resources to objectives [basic definition] “Matching ends to means”

46. Definitions Strategy A plan to match resources to objectives Logistics Process of putting resources to work to achieve objectives

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