Modeling the Combined Terrorist-Narcotics Trafficker Threat to National Security

1. Modeling the Combined Terrorist-Narcotics TraffickerThreat to National Security Alexander Woodcock and Samuel Musa National Defense University Woodcock and Musa 2012

2. Objectives Examine relationship between terrorism, drug trafficking and policy making through the development, implementation, and use of a series of systems dynamics-based models Provide the basis for future development of a decision aid to support policy-makers in combating the narco-terror threat Woodcock and Musa 2012

3. Models Narcotics, counter-narcotics, and trafficker double agent model Policy cycle model to manage the trafficker double agent conversion policies Prototype societal deprivation, affection, disaffection, and advanced terrorist recruitment, training, and narco-terrorist support model Entity security and terrorist activity models Violence generation model Policy cycle models to represent the management of social violence and entity security policies Woodcock and Musa 2012

4. Outcomes Relationships between deprivation of key resources to individuals and disaffection and ultimate terrorist activity Attack of notional targets by teams of terrorists Deprivation of individuals leading to violence which can lead to an increase in level of perceived deprivation Dynamics of policy- making in response to perceived needs Impact of corruption on policy- making Woodcock and Musa 2012

5. Global Threats Western Hemisphere Tri border area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina is key for converging threats TOC in Mexico makes US border vulnerable- Merida Initiative Columbia success against FARC but new groups are emerging Afghanistan/Southeast Asia Insurgency in some areas is criminally driven Taliban ties to Latin American DTOs and Hezbollah established Russia/Eurasia TOC networks establishing new ties to global DTOs The Balkans TOC groups seizing control of key DTO routes West Africa Major transit point for drug shipments to Europe and heroin to US Asia/Pacific Significant human trafficking, threat to intellectual property and Illicit drug production Woodcock and Musa 2012

6. Trends Crime-Terror –Insurgency Nexus 29 of 63 DoJ Priority Organization Targets list are associated with terrorist groups DEA claims that 19 foreign terrorist organizations have ties with Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) Expansion of Drug Trafficking Russia, China, Italy and Balkans are establishing ties to drug producers to develop own distribution networks & markets Latin American cartels are exploiting criminal organizations in West Africa to move cocaine to Western Europe and the Middle East. Also Afghan DTOs in collaboration with West African groups smuggle heroin to Europe and U.S. Woodcock and Musa 2012

7. U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime- July 2011 Protect Americans and partners from TCO Help partner countries strengthen means to combat TCO Break economic power of TCO and protect strategic markets and US financial system Defeat criminal networks that pose threat to national security through various means Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation and public private partnerships to defeat TCO Woodcock and Musa 2012

8. New capabilities to combat TOC New executive Order to establish sanctions program to block property and prohibit transactions Proposed legislative package to enhance authorities available to combat TOC Presidential proclamation to deny US entry by transnational criminal aliens Rewards program in obtaining TOC information Interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group to identify threat and coordination to combat TOC Woodcock and Musa 2012

9. Drug-Terrorism Alliances Drug trafficking organizations (DTO) in Colombia and Venezuela and terrorist organization FARC of Colombia were indicted for moving cocaine through Liberia to Europe There is evidence that the FARC operating on the Ecuadorian border has developed ties to the Sinaloa cartel, which operates inside the Ecuadorian border It is also well known that West African criminal syndicates cooperate in illicit smuggling operations with Al Qaeda operatives in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Woodcock and Musa 2012

10. Drug-Terrorism Alliances Drug trafficking organizations (DTO) in Colombia and Venezuela and terrorist organization FARC of Colombia were indicted for moving cocaine through Liberia to Europe There is evidence that the FARC operating on the Ecuadorian border has developed ties to the Sinaloa cartel, which operates inside the Ecuadorian border It is also well known that West African criminal syndicates cooperate in illicit smuggling operations with Al Qaeda operatives in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Woodcock and Musa 2012 10

11. Specific Cases Hezbollah group has been working with the Mexican drug cartels to use the existing drug pipelines to penetrate the U.S. homeland Two parallel terrorist networks growing in Latin America. One is operated by Hezbollah, and another is managed by Qods operatives. These networks cooperate to carry out various criminal activities including narcotics smuggling More than 80 operatives in at least 12 countries throughout the region with greatest concern are regions of Brazil, Venezuela, and the Southern Cone There have been several reports on Hezbollah’s financial ties to the contraband center of the Tri-Border region of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil, and the contributions of the Lebanese diaspora on Isle Margarita and other locations Operation Red Coalition began in May 2011 when an Iranian-American from Corpus Christi, Texas, approached a DEA informant seeking the help of a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador. The Iranian-American thought he was dealing with a member of the feared Zetas Mexican drug organization, according to agents. This led to the arrest of the suspect on October 11, 2011. Woodcock and Musa 2012 11

12. Model-Based Analyses of Counter-narcotics Activities Counter-Narcotics Disruption Model Double Agent Conversion Model Double Agent Policy Cycle Model Societal Deprivation, Disaffection, Recruitment, Advanced Terrorist Training, and Narco-Terrorist Support Model Security Policy Cycle Model Entity Security and Terrorist Activity Models Social Policy Cycle Model Violence Generation Model • Prototype model-based analyses of counter-narcotics activities involved studies of the impact of creating double agents and of the possible synergy of terrorist and trafficker activities. Woodcock and Musa 2012 12

13. The Impact of Double Agent Conversion Double Agent Conversion Effort Double Agent Conversion Narcotics Capture Narcotics Detection Effort Narcotics Detection A prototype model illustrates the processes involved in the conversion of traffickers to double agents and use of the information that they provide to identify and capture or disrupt illicit narcotics products Impact of narcotics trafficker conversion efforts on the creation of trafficker double agents Woodcock and Musa 2012 13

14. The Impact of Double Agent Conversion Number and size of narcotics disruptions without counter-narcotics intelligence efforts. Some 3376 tons are seized in 68 events during a notional 360-day time period. Modeling Actual Narcotics Capture Activities Estimated cocaine shipments and actual cocaine seizures or disruptions (NarcoSeized) can be used to set parameters for the random process model Woodcock and Musa 2012 14

15. Policy Cycle Models can represent the impact of Counter- narcotics policy-making A Problem for Government Stage I: Agenda Setting Stage VI: Policy Termination Stage II: Policy Formulation Stage V: Policy Change Stage III: Policy Implementation Stage IV: Policy Evaluation The Policy Cycle can involve actions that identify a problem for a government, setting an agenda, and formulating, implementing evaluating, changing and/or terminating a policy in order to address identified problems (Modified after Lester and Stewart, 2000). A modified Policy Cycle model provides a basis for assessing the impact of corruption on counter-narcotics activities Woodcock and Musa 2012 15

16. Assessing the impact of policy-making speed on counter-narcotics activities Increased rates of policy (PCM Param) information transfer from 0 to 0.1 (10% per time step) increase the amount of disturbed narcotics shipments and number of converted double agents (DoublAgnts) Assessing the impact of corruption on counter-narcotics activities Increased levels of corruption (Corrupt Lvl) can off-set the impact of increased policy information transfer rates, reducing the amount of disturbed narcotics shipments and the number of double agents (Doubl Agnts). Woodcock and Musa 2012 16

17. Building and using combined terrorist- narcotics trafficker Models Societal Deprivation, Disaffection, Recruitment, Advanced Terrorist Training, and Narco-Terrorist Support Model Security Policy Cycle Model Entity Security and Terrorist Activity Models Social Policy Cycle Model Violence Generation Model Insights gained from modeling the combined terrorist-narcotics trafficker threat to national security can provide guidance to policy- and decision-makers Woodcock and Musa 2012 17

18. Violence & Casualty Impact Casualties Affected Casualties Disaffected Policy Cycle Impact Recruitment of Disaffected Individuals Narco-Terrorist Corruption Impact Basic Terrorist Training Narco-Terrorist Personnel Narco-Terrorist Training Support Advanced Terrorist Training Available Trained Advanced Terrorists Key activities of the Societal Deprivation, Affection, Disaffection, Advanced Terrorist Recruitment, Training, and Narco-Terrorist Support Model generate notional trained terrorists who are available to undertake terrorist activities Woodcock and Musa 2012 18

19. Model-generated numbers of notional basic and advanced terrorists. In this particular case some 574 basic terrorists and 37 advanced terrorists were produced (a) Trafficker-supplied (Traff Staff) personnel can train to become terrorists with basic (Basic Terr) and advanced (Adv Terr) training; (b) Trafficker supplied personnel can be combined with disaffected individuals recruited from the general population (Recrt Rte) to provide terrorists with basic and advanced training Woodcock and Musa 2012 19

20. The Violence Generation Model Violence Sensitivity Affection/Disaffection Ratio Policy Concern Affected Affected/Disaffected Ratio Violence Warning Threshold Deprivation Satisfaction Disaffected Violent Social Activity Violence Multiplier Terrorist Casualty Events Enhanced Deprivation The Violence Generation Model calculates the level of violence based on notional levels of affection and disaffection caused by deprivation and satisfaction, social violence sensitivity, and the violence warning threshold. Enhanced deprivation can be caused by feelings of insecurity and threat due to violence and terrorist-generated casualties Woodcock and Musa 2012 20

21. Model-generated output shows the production of violent activity (Violence) and AD Concern outputwhen the ratio of affected to disaffected individuals rises above the AD POL Warn threshold. The AD Concern output triggers policy cycle-based activities that generate instructions for creating a new policy (Soc New Pol) Woodcock and Musa 2012 21

22. Terrorist Losses Available Trained Advanced Terrorists Potential Terrorist Events Risk and Security Assessments Advanced Terrorist Team Size Actual Terrorist Events Damage and Casualties Security Investment Security Level Security Losses Security Policy Actions Entity Security and Terrorist Activity models calculate the level of security based on security investment and losses. Security investment levels can be increased due to government policy actions. Terrorist events can take place when adequate advanced trained terrorists are available and the security level is sufficiently low Woodcock and Musa 2012 22

23. Impact of security investment and loss and terrorist availability on terrorist outcomes Selected output from the Entity Security and Terrorist Activity Models with a security investment rate of 0% per time step, an initial security level of 100, and a security loss rate of 0.0004 (0.04% per time step). Increasing the terrorist team size (Team Size) reduces the total number of actual terrorist events (TerrEvnts) due to staffing considerations. Smaller teams can become involved in a larger number of events and may generate more total casualties (Tot Casults) and fewer terrorist losses (Terrst Loss) Woodcock and Musa 2012 23

24. Formulate and Implement Social Policy Affection/Disaffection- Related Policy Concern Evaluate Social Policy Change Social Policy Corruption Losses New Social Policy Social Policy Termination A Social Policy Cycle Model for Violence Management Formulate and Implement Security Policy Security- Related Policy Concern Evaluate Security Policy Change Security Policy Corruption Losses New Security Policy Security Policy Termination A Security Policy Cycle Model for Entity Security Management Woodcock and Musa 2012 24

25. Violence Management Social Policy Cycle parameters set at 0.8 and corruption 0.0 generates a single burst of violent activity (Violence) when AF DF Ratio exceeds AD POL Warn threshold Setting the Social Policy Cycle parameters at 0.8 and corruption parameters at 0.04 generated bursts of violent activity followed by continuous violence due to an inability of a government entity to reduce disaffection to sufficiently low levels caused by corruption Woodcock and Musa 2012 25

26. Violence Management Social policy cycle parameters set at 0.1 and corruption 0.0 generate a longer period of violence compared with the situation involving parameter values of 0.8 when the AF DF Ratio exceeds the AD POL Warn threshold Social policy cycle parameter values 0.1 and corruption 0.04 generated a period of violent activity followed by continuous violence Woodcock and Musa 2012 26

27. Entity Security Management Impact of policy cycle parameter values (PCM parms) on security level (Fin Sec Lvl), potential (Tot Events) and actual (Act Evnts) terrorist events and total casualties (Tot Casult) with security political sensitivity (Sec Pol Sens) set at 0.2; security investment (Sec Invest) was set at 0.01; and corruption set at zero Impact of policy cycle corruption (Corruption) on security level (Fin Sec Lvl), potential (Tot Events) and actual (Act Evnts) events and total casualties (Tot Casult) with security political sensitivity (Sec Pol Sens) set at 0.2, the security investment (Sec Invest) set at 0.01, and the policy cycle parameters set at 0.1 Woodcock and Musa 2012 27

28. Toward an Integrated Model … Violence & Casualty Impact Affection Level of Violence Govt. Social Policy Cycle Impact Disaffection Govt. Counter-Narco Actions Recruitment Rate Recruited Terrorists Narco Support to Terrorist Training Narco-Supplied Terrorist Personnel Trained Terrorists Narco-Related Security Losses Available Terrorists Govt. Security Policy Cycle Impact Target Security Terrorist Losses Terrorist Event Narco-Related Corruption Impact Casualties Security Assessment Woodcock and Musa 2012 28

29. Looking forward, additional studies are needed to assess the narcotics trafficker involvement in at least the following activities Support to terrorist training; increased training capacity, increased rate of recruitment of disaffected individuals. Supply of trained terrorist personnel into the terrorist advanced training activities. Security reduction impact of narcotics traffickers and impact of corruption on security-related protective measures. Corruption impacts on policy implementation to prevent social deprivation and disaffection. Vulnerability generation and intelligence-related terrorist personnel deployment. The authors believe that modeling these activities can provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between drug trafficking and terrorist activities as well as the role of the policy-maker in countering these threats Woodcock and Musa 2012 29