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SeRLoc: Secure Range-Independent Localization for Wireless Sensor Networks. Presenter: Yawen Wei Author: Loukas Lazos and Radha Poovendran Network Security Lab, Dept. of EE, University of Washington, Seattle, WA. Problem:
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SeRLoc: Secure Range-Independent Localization forWireless Sensor Networks Presenter: Yawen Wei Author: Loukas Lazos and Radha Poovendran Network Security Lab, Dept. of EE, University of Washington, Seattle, WA
Problem: Enabling nodes of a wireless sensor network to determine their location even in the presence of malicious adversaries. Design Goal: • Decentralized implementation • Resource efficiency • Robustness against security threats
Outline • Overview • SeRloc Algorithm • Comparison & Simulation • Conclusion
Overview • What is Localization System? • How to determine position? (Schemes) 1.range-dependent GPS, Active Badge, Active Bat, Cricket 2.range-independent DV-hop, amorphous localization, APIT, Centroid • Why security?
Range-dependent Location System • Time of arrival (TOA) • Angle of arrival • Signal strength • RF, acoustic, infrared and ultrasound • Disadvantages (x1,y1); (x2,y2);(x3,y3)
SeRloc Algorithm • Network Model • Location Determination • Security Scheme • Threat Analysis
Network Model • N: unknown locations • L: known locations and orientations, “locators” • spatial homogeneous Poisson point process
SeRloc: Location Determination • Secure Range-Independent Localization a. the locator’s coordinates b. the angles of the antenna boundary lines c. R: the locator-sensor-communication range d. Overlapping region e. CoG (Center of Gravity)
Step 1: Locators heard • Step 2: Search area
Determination of the search area A rectangular area of size less than A rectangular area of size greater than
Step 3: Overlapping region-Majority vote • Step 4:Location estimation
SeRloc: Security Scheme • Encryption: • Global symmetric key • Sensor s & locator shares pairwise key • Locator ID authentication • Collision-resistant hash function (e.g. MD5) • Beacon of locator Li
SeRloc: Threat Analysis • Types: Wormhole / Sybil / Compromised nodes • Wormhole attack • Packet leshes: geographical / temporal • Time measuring in challenge-reply scheme
Wormholes 1. Sector uniqueness property : area of locators heard by origin point : area of locators heard by s
Wormholes 2. Communication range violation property A sensor cannot hear two locators that are more than 2R apart
the first message: q = k − 1 • the last message: q = 0 • All locators wait for a q ∗ Ts time
SeRloc: Threat Analysis • Sybil Attack and Compromised nodes • Multiple network entities • Assume sensor identities • Assume locators (Not directly heard)
Outline • Overview • SeRloc Algorithm • Comparison & Simulation • Conclusion
Comparison • Dv-hop and Amorphous localization
Comparison • APIT localization 5
Simulation • Localization Error vs. Locators heard • Localization Error vs. Antenna Sectors • Localization Error vs. Sector Error • Localization Error vs. GPS Error • Communication Cost vs. Locators Heard
Conclusion • Secure localization in WSN • Range independent • Decentralized • Security mechanisms • Threats • Higher accuracy and fewer locators