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Classification des barrières douanières. Trade barriers. Barrières dissipatives. Barrières à capture étrangère. Barrières à capture nationale. Product standards. Sanitary & Phytosanitary standards. Restrictions volontaires aux exportations. Quotas. Droits de douane.
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Classification des barrières douanières Trade barriers Barrières dissipatives Barrières à capture étrangère Barrières à capture nationale Product standards Sanitary & Phytosanitary standards Restrictions volontaires aux exportations Quotas Droits de douane Non-tariff barriers (NTB)
Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs • Perfect competition • Tariff under competition Prices Demande nationale Offre domestique World price plus tariff Tarif (droit de douane) D A B C Prix mondial Quantities Quantity imported
Tariff Augmentation du prix intérieur L’effet d’un tarif pour un grand pays Prices Domestic demand Domestic supply curve World supply plus tariff Offre mondiale D B C A Quantities Quantity imported
Residual (after-quota) demand Quota • Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs • Perfect competition • Quota under competition Prices Domestic demand Marginal cost D Prix intérieur A C B World price Quantities
Prix mondial plus tarif Tariff A B C D Prix mondial Quantity imported Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs 2. Monopoly Tariff under monopoly Prices Domestic demand Recette marginale Marginal cost Quantities
C D A Quota B Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs 2. Monopoly Quota under monopoly Prices Domestic demand Demande “résiduelle” (diminuée des importations) Marginal cost Domestic price World price Quantities
Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs 2. Monopoly Quota under monopoly Prices Domestic demand Residual (after-quota) domestic demand Marginal cost Domestic price C D A World price Quantities Quota B
Use of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) (a) Ad-valorem equivalent of core NTBs, by GDP/capita of using country (b) AVE of agricultural price-support measures Source: Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga 2006a
OTRI and MA-OTRI by level of income (a) OTRI (b) MA-OTRI
Competing “principals” Import-competing lobby 1 (intermediate) Import-competing lobby 2 (final good) Export lobby Consumers sell to What they want Protection of sector 1 Protection of sector 2 but not 1 Market access Free imports Common “agent” Government authorities • Campaign contributions • Welfare • Information What it is interested in Special-interest groups: The common-agency model
Social welfare More access to policy “First best” (free trade for a small economy) “pessimum” Proportion of population organized politically Unbalanced lobbying 100% (everyone organized) 0% (no special-interest interference) Transparency & access Why more lobbying may be good in the common-agency model