Online Voting Opportunities and Risks

1. Online VotingOpportunities and Risks STOA Workshop at the European Parliament Brussels, 17 March 2011 Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Grimm IT Risk Management Universität Koblenz-Landau

2. Agenda • How it is today • Security concern • Trust challenge • Solution Grimm 2011: Online Voting

3. Legally Binding Internet Elections in Europe in 2011 • Switzerland • Legally binding internet electionsin February 2011 for all cantons • since 2002, pilots in Zürich, Neuenburg and Geneva • Norway • legally binding municipal elections in 2011 • Internet voting and paper-ballot voting • voter can recast his/her electronic vote multiple times • terminal voting overrides Internet voting • paper votes override electronic votes • open source system (ErgoGroup & Scytl) • cryptographic protocol integrated into high school maths Grimm 2011: Online Voting

4. Legally Binding Internet Elections in Europe in 2011 • Estonia • legally binding Internet elections since 2005 • Internet voting and paper-ballot voting • voter can recast his/her electronic vote multiple times • newer electronic vote overrides older vote • paper vote overrides electronic vote • new for elections in March 2011: mobile authentication Grimm 2011: Online Voting

5. Estonia [http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics, 04.03.2011] Grimm 2011: Online Voting

6. Online voting out there in the world • … • France, French citizens abroad, 2003 tests • The Netherlands, citizens abroad • Germany, more than 30 real voting in private area • UK, tests 2002, 2003, 2007 • Portugal, 2004 EU and 2005 Parliament Tests • Austria, since 2003, voting in academic area and for citizens abroad • … and a lot more in the USA Grimm 2011: Online Voting

7. Online voting systems in use • Polyas, Germany • Association of Computer Science (GI) Bodies • Research Funding Association (DFG) Bodies • Helios, USA/Belgium • Undergraduate Student Government at Princeton in Spring 2011 • Student elections at the Université catholique de Louvain in 2010 • International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR) in 2010 • voter turnout ~30% (compared to ~20% with paper-based elections) • Presidential election at the Université catholique de Louvain in 2009 • Many more for research and demonstration • Bingo, ThreeBallot, Prêt à Voter, Punchscan, … Grimm 2011: Online Voting

8. Classical advantage • Ubiquity and 24-7 • Seamless integration in everyday communication,esp. of Internet generation • Easy-to-use, also for complex applications  Increase of participation Grimm 2011: Online Voting

9. Online 24,1% Participation 16,9% 20,5% 17,5% 13,7% Online Participation in GI Board Elections Registered Voters Casted Votes Grimm 2011: Online Voting

10. Agenda • How it is today • Security Concern • Trust Challenge • Solution Grimm 2011: Online Voting

11. Correctness and Anonymity • Do machines • Does network • Are our votes • Will our votes remain • Are there hidden access points for manipulation ?? work as we expect ?? secret ?? Grimm 2011: Online Voting

12. Security can be provided, technically • Several solutions for anonymity, e.g., blind signatures and separation of duty • Organizational approach of protection profile and system security evaluation by Common Criteria • See BSI basic protection profile and Polyas evaluation  Security is manageable But How do people KNOW that these security features work? Grimm 2011: Online Voting

13. Security can be provided, technically • But how do people KNOW that these security features work? • Cars work safely, if they do not crash • Voting systems work safely, if … they do not crash?? • Public relies on experts certification • Is trust in experts’ statement sufficient? • Are there better procedures to feel (see, touch, experience…) security… and to check correctness? Grimm 2011: Online Voting

14. Agenda • How it is today • Security Concern • Trust Challenge • Solution Grimm 2011: Online Voting

15. Verifiability • March 2009, German Constitutional Law has stated as basic requirement: • Verifiability of voting process by everyone • Even without deeper knowledge of technology • What is verifiability? • Cast as intended (individually) • Stored as cast (individually, universally) • Tallied as stored (universally) Grimm 2011: Online Voting

16. Verification encrypt cast-as-intended cast ballot recorded-as-cast decrypt counted-as-recorded Grimm 2011: Online Voting

17. Verification by Bulletin Board recorded-as-cast encrypt encrypted-as-intended cast ballot cast-as-intended publish ballots decrypt decrypted-as-recorded publish votes counted-as-recorded Bräunlich/Grimm, 25.2.2011 Grimm 2011: Online Voting

18. Agenda • How it is today • Security Concern • Trust Challenge • Solution Grimm 2011: Online Voting

19. Solution • Internet Voting can provide better functionality than paper voting • Ubiquity and 24-7 • Seamless integration in everyday communication,esp. of Internet generation • Easy-to-use, also for complex applications • Universal and individual verification • Multiple voting (recast) • Multiple media (paper, terminal, Internet) • Integration with eParticipation Grimm 2011: Online Voting

20. References Johannes Pichler (Hrsg.): Überlegungen zur Hebung demokratischer Partizipation – Provokationen und Optionen. Schriften zur Rechtspolitik, Band 31, Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Wien, Graz 2010. Krimmer, Robert; and Grimm, Rüdiger (Eds.): Electronic Voting 2010, 2008, and 2006. Lecture Notes in Informatics, Bonn 2010, 2008, and 2006, resp. Volkamer, M., Vogt, R.: Common Criteria Protection Profile For Basic Set of Security Requirements for Online Voting Products. BSI-CC-PP-0037, Version 1.0, 18. April 2008. http://www.bsi.bund.de/ Estonia: http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics Helios: http://heliosvoting.org/about-us/ Polyas: http://www.polyas.de/ Grimm 2011: Online Voting