Honorable Congreso de la Nación Argentina

1. Honorable Congreso de la Nación Argentina Comisión Bicameral de Fiscalización de los Organismos y Actividades de Inteligencia

2. STRUCTURE AND MEMBERS OF THEJOINT COMMITTEE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OFINTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES Authorities: Chairman: National Senator Mario Domingo DANIELE (PJ - Tierra del Fuego Prov.) Vice-Chairman: National Representative (lower chamber) Oscar RODRIGUEZ (PJ - Buenos Aires Prov.) Deputy Vice-Chairman: National Representative (lower chamber) Fernando MONTOYA (UCR - Cordoba Prov.) Secretary: National Senator Alicia E. MASTANDREA (UCR - Chaco Prov.)

3. STRUCTURE AND MEMBERS OF THEJOINT COMMITTEE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OFINTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES Voting Members: National Senator: Miguel A. PICHETTO (PJ - Rio Negro Prov.) National Senator: Nicolás FERNANDEZ (PJ - Santa Cruz Prov.) National Senator: Guillermo JENEFES (PJ - Jujuy Prov.) National Senator: Norberto MASSONI (UCR - Chubut Prov.) National Senator: Oscar CASTILLO (Frente Cívico y Social - Catamarca Prov.) National Representative: José M. DIAZ BANCALARI (PJ - Buenos Aires Prov.) National Representative: Daniel VARIZAT (PJ - Santa Cruz Prov.) National Representative: Juan C. CORREA (PJ - Buenos Aires Prov.) National Representative: Nilda GARRÉ (FREPASO - Autonomous City of Buenos Aires) National Representative: Alberto BECCANI (UCR - Santa Fe Prov.) Technical/Administrative Secretary: Dr. Juan Carlos FRIAS

4. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE LAW N. 25.520 The National Intelligence Law N. 25.520 has set forth transparency guidelines aimed at allowing for a modern and appropriate control system, providing for such purpose the instruments necessary for its effective management and oversight, while not impeding or limiting the activity under regulation.

5. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE LAW N. 25.520 Argentina has been the first South American country to count with this valuable resource, only Brazil and Peru having followed the path set as of the enactment of law 25.520, even when in these countries parliamentary control has certain limitations as compared to the system implemented in our country.

6. ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM Law N. 25.520 currently in force sinceJune 6, 2002. The National Intelligence System is composed of the following Bodies: the Secretariat of Intelligence(SI) under the authority of the Presidency of the Nation, the National Directorate for Criminal Intelligence(DNIC) under the authority of the Secretariat of Security of the Ministry of the Interior, and the National Directorate for Military Strategic Intelligence under the authority of the Ministry of Defense.

7. ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

8. ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM • The SI has the mission to direct the National Intelligence System • The National Directorate for Military Strategic Intelligence is under the orbit of the Ministry of Defense and in an unprecedented situation it’s directed by a civilian, Mr. Sergio Mileo

9. LIMITS TO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITES Law N. 25.520 establishes rigorous competences for each of the three agencies of the National Intelligence System.

10. LIMITS TO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Law N. 25.520 provides in its article 4 that “… none of the intelligence agencies shall be entitled to: … obtain information, make intelligence or store data on persons, just on account of their race, religion, private actions or political opinion, or of their adherence to or membership in political, social, labor union or other organizations, nor on account of any lawful activity in which they may engage in whatever sphere of action…”.

11. LIMITS TO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The agencies composing the intelligence system are further banned from “…influencing in any manner in the institutional, political, military, police, social and economic situation of the country, or in the internal life of legally established political parties, in public opinion or in mass media…” (article 4).

12. LIMITS TO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Concomitant with the above, article 5 contains provisions on the inviolability of communications, which may only be intercepted if there were a judicial order or exemption, in which case the procedure to be followed is as stipulated in Title VI, articles 18 through 22, a procedure attempting to establish a fair balance between the enforcement of individual rights and the public interest.

13. PARLIAMENTARYOVERSIGHT As of the enactment of the National Intelligence Law, such control and oversight mechanism is fully established through the provisions contained in Title VIII, articles 31 through 41, wherein the bases for Parliamentary control are set for theJoint Committee for the Oversight ofIntelligence Agencies and Activities.

14. MISSION • Art. 32 The agencies belonging to the National Intelligence System will be supervised by the Joint Commission with the intention of assuring that its actions strictly adjust to the current constitutional, legal and statutory norms; verifying the observance and respect for the individual guarantees as stated in the National Constitution as well as the strategic directives and objectives of the National Intelligence Policy.

15. LIMITS TO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES • Art. 32 also states that: the Joint Commission will have broad competences for controlling and carrying out investigations. At its request and with the reservations presented in Art. 16 the agencies of the National Intelligence System shall submit the information or documentation solicited by the Commission.

16. LIMITS TO THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • In an unprecedented fact for the parliamentary oversight systems, Art. 33 establishes that the Joint Commission can receive complaints formulated by citizens against abuses or illegal acts committed by the intelligence agencies and can carry out investigations.

17. PRODUCTS OF THE JOINT COMMITEE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES The consideration and evaluation of the National Intelligence Plan. The consideration of the Annual Report on Intelligence Activities prepared by the Secretariat of Intelligence and the oversight and control on the proper assignment of the “Intelligence Secret Budget and Expenditures”.

18. ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Joint Committee for the Oversight of Intelligence Agencies and Activities must elaborate and submit, on an annual basis, a secret report which shall contain a thorough analysis of the National Intelligence System’s performance, as well as a list of relevant recommendations for the optimization thereof. The report is secret and it is presented to the President and the Chairmen of both Chambers.

19. OVERSIGHTSUBCOMMITTEES Subcommittee for Control of Secret Budget and Expenditures This committee is in charge of auditing the secret expenditures of the Agencies of the National Intelligence System. Subcommittee for Control of the Directorate of Judicial Observations Its function is to scrutinize the telephone hearings ordered by the Judiciary Power.

20. OVERSIGHTSUBCOMMITTEES Subcommittee for Follow-up of the National Intelligence Plan It assesses the meeting of ends and objectives as stated in the National Intelligence Plan. Subcommittee for Control of Training of the National Intelligence System Staff It controls the study plans used for training the intelligence personnel.