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CRYPTOGRAPHY & NETWORK SECURITY

Explore the essentials of authentication requirements, functions, and message integrity with hashes in network security. Learn about different threats and measures to counter them.

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CRYPTOGRAPHY & NETWORK SECURITY

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  1. CRYPTOGRAPHY & NETWORK SECURITY II MSc(CS)(MCS30117), II MCA(MCA30217)

  2. Message Authentication and Hash Functions • Authentication Requirements • Authentication Functions • Message Authentication Codes • Hash Functions • Security of Hash Functions and MACs

  3. Authentication Requirements • Kind of attacks (threats) in the context of communications across a network • Disclosure • Traffic analysis • Masquerade • Content modification • Sequence modification • Timing modification • Repudiation • Measures to deal with first two attacks: • In the realm of message confidentiality, and are addressed with encryption • Measures to deal with items 3 thru 6 • Message authentication • Measures to deal with items 7 • Digital signature

  4. Authentication Requirements • Message authentication • A procedure to verify that messages come from the alleged source and have not been altered • Message authentication may also verify sequencing and timeliness • Digital signature • An authentication technique that also includes measures to counter repudiation by either source or destination

  5. Authentication Functions Authentication Functions • Message authentication or digital signature mechanism can be viewed as having two levels • At lower level: there must be some sort of functions producing an authenticator – a value to be used to authenticate a message • This lower level functions is used as primitive in a higher level authentication protocol

  6. Authentication Functions Authentication Functions • Three classes of functions that may be used to produce an authenticator • Message encryption • Ciphertext itself serves as authenticator • Message authentication code (MAC) • A public function of the message and a secret key that produces a fixed-length value that serves as the authenticator • Hash function • A public function that maps a message of any length into a fixed-length hash value, which serves as the authenticator

  7. Authentication Functions Message Encryption • Conventional encryption can serve as authenticator • Conventional encryption provides authentication as well as confidentiality • Requires recognizable plaintext or other structure to distinguish between well-formed legitimate plaintext and meaningless random bits • e.g., ASCII text, an appended checksum, or use of layered protocols

  8. Authentication Functions Basic Uses of Message Encryption

  9. Authentication Functions Ways of Providing Structure • Append an error-detecting code (frame check sequence (FCS)) to each message

  10. Authentication Functions Ways of Providing Structure - 2 • Suppose all the datagrams except the IP header is encrypted. • If an opponent substituted some arbitrary bit pattern for the encrypted TCP segment, the resulting plaintext would not include a meaningful header

  11. Authentication Functions Confidentiality and Authentication Implications of Message Encryption

  12. Authentication Functions Message Authentication Code • Uses a shared secret key to generate a fixed-size block of data (known as a cryptographic checksum or MAC) that is appended to the message • MAC = CK(M) • Assurances: • Message has not been altered • Message is from alleged sender • Message sequence is unaltered (requires internal sequencing) • Similar to encryption but MAC algorithm needs not be reversible

  13. Authentication Functions Basic Uses of MAC

  14. Authentication Functions Basic Uses of MAC

  15. Authentication Functions Why Use MACs? • i.e., why not just use encryption? • Cleartext stays clear • MAC might be cheaper • Broadcast • Authentication of executable codes • Architectural flexibility • Separation of authentication check from message use

  16. Authentication Functions Hash Function • Converts a variable size message M into fixed size hash code H(M) (Sometimes called a message digest) • Can be used with encryption for authentication • E(M || H) • M || E(H) • M || signed H • E( M || signed H ) gives confidentiality • M || H( M || K ) • E( M || H( M || K ) )

  17. Authentication Functions Basic Uses of Hash Function

  18. Authentication Functions Basic Uses of Hash Function

  19. Authentication Functions Basic Uses of Hash Function

  20. MACs Message Authentication Codes • MAC= C(K,M) a MAC is a cryptographic checksum MAC = CK(M) • M: a variable-length message • K :a secret key • C(K,M): fixed-sized authenticator • is a many-to-one function • potentially many messages have same MAC • but finding these needs to be very difficult

  21. Requirements for MACs • If an opponent observes M and C(K,M), it should be computationally infeasible to construct M’ such that C(K,M’) = C(K,M). • C(K,M) should be uniformly distributed in the sense that for randomly chosen messages, M and M’, the probability that C(K,M) = C(K,M’) is 2-n, where n is the number of bits in the MAC. • Let M’ be equal to some known transformation on M. That is, M’ = f(M). E.g. f may involve inverting one or more specific bits. In that case, Pr[C(K,M) = C(K,M’)] = 2-n.

  22. Using Symmetric Ciphers for MACs • can use any block cipher chaining mode and use final block as a MAC • Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA) is a widely used MAC based on DES-CBC • using IV=0 and zero-pad of final block • encrypt message using DES in CBC mode • and send just the final block as the MAC • or the leftmost M bits (16≤M≤64) of final block • but final MAC is now too small for security

  23. Data Authentication Algorithm

  24. Hash Functions Hash Functions • h = H(M) • M is a variable-length message, h is a fixed-length hash value, H is a hash function • The hash value is appended at the source • The receiver authenticates the message by recomputing the hash value • Because the hash function itself is not considered to be secret, some means is required to protect the hash value

  25. Hash Functions Hash Function Requirements • H can be applied to any size data block • H produces fixed-length output • H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x • H is one-way, i.e., given h, it is computationally infeasible to find any x s.t. h = H(x) • H is weakly collision resistant: given x, it is computationally infeasible to find any y  x s.t. H(x) = H(y) • H is strongly collision resistant: it is computationally infeasible to find any x and y s.t. H(x) = H(y)

  26. Hash Functions Hash Function Requirements • One-way property is essential for authentication • Weak collision resistance is necessary to prevent forgery • Strong collision resistance is important for resistance to birthday attack

  27. Hash Functions Simple Hash Functions • Operation of hash functions • The input is viewed as a sequence of n-bit blocks • The input is processed one block at a time in an iterative fashion to produce an n-bit hash function • Simplest hash function: Bitwise XOR of every block • Ci = bi1 bi2 …  bim • Ci = i-th bit of the hash code, 1  i  n • m = number of n-bit blocks in the input • bij = i-th bit in j-th block • Known as longitudinal redundancy check

  28. Hash Functions Simple Hash Functions • Improvement over the simple bitwise XOR • Initially set the n-bit hash value to zero • Process each successive n-bit block of data as follows • Rotate the current hash value to the left by one bit • XOR the block into the hash value

  29. Birthday Attack Birthday Attack • If the adversary can generate 2m/2 variants of a valid message and an equal number of fraudulent messages • The two sets are compared to find one message from each set with a common hash value • The valid message is offered for signature • The fraudulent message with the same hash value is inserted in its place • If a 64-bit hash code is used, the level of effort is only on the order of 232 • Conclusion: the length of the hash code must be substantial

  30. Birthday Attack Generating 2m/2 Variants of Valid Messages • Insert a number of • “space-backspace-space” • character pairs between • words throughout the • document. • Variations could then be • generated by substituting • “space-backspace-space” • in selected instances • Alternatively, simply • reword the message but • retain the meaning

  31. Security of Hash Functions and MACs Brute-Force Attack of Hash Functions • Three desirable properties of hash functions • One-way: For any given code h, it is computationally infeasible to find x s.t. H(x) = h • Weak collision resistance: For any given block x, it is computationally infeasible to find y  x s.t. H(y) = H(x) • Strong collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any pair (x, y) s.t. H(y) = H(x) • Brute-force attack on n-bit hash code • One-way and weak collision require 2n effort • Strong collision requires 2n/2 effort •  If strong collision resistance is required (and this is desirable for a general-purpose secure hash code), 2n/2 determines the strength of hash code against brute-force attack • Currently, two most popular hash codes, SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160, provide a 160-bit hash code length

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