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EAP Channel Bindings. Charles Clancy Katrin Hoeper IETF 76 Hiroshima, Japan November 08-13, 2009. Document (Recent) History . <draft-ietf-emu-chbind-01>, March `09 consensus that draft is ready for WGLC at IETF 74 <draft-ietf-emu-chbind-02>, May `09
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EAP Channel Bindings Charles Clancy Katrin Hoeper IETF 76 Hiroshima, Japan November 08-13, 2009
Document (Recent) History • <draft-ietf-emu-chbind-01>, March `09 • consensus that draft is ready for WGLC at IETF 74 • <draft-ietf-emu-chbind-02>, May `09 • tried to address comments from Klaas detailed review • <draft-ietf-emu-chbind-03>, July `09 • added clarifying text to address more comments on list • more discussions about “authorization” capabilities of channel bindings and EAP in general • <draft-ietf-emu-chbind-04>, October `09 • narrowed scope to solving lying NAS/ lying provider problems, i.e. removed authorization capabilities • updated AAA attributes for channel binding TLVs
Change #1: “scope of draft” Section 1 • What aspect of channel bindings should and can be solved by the proposed protocol? • mitigate lying NAS problem • mitigate lying provider problem • Removed: • check whether peer is authorized to access requested services in manner described by NAS
Change #1: “scope of draft” (cont’d) • Solution: specify channel binding protocol • protocol includes verification of channel binding information • Removed: policy data base Local DB Authenticator i1 EAP server EAP peer i2 AAA i1 info CB_success/failure(i1, i2, info)
Why we still need a local database • AAA protocol not sufficient for comparing i1 and i2 • i1 and i2 may be both false • i2 likely not sufficient to detect lying providers due to “message laundering” by AAA intermediaries • i1 is not restricted to AAA attributes • not all information of interest can be encoded in AAA attributes and defining numerous new AAA attributes seems like a bad idea! • Using a local DB enables to check • against a trustworthy set of information • consistency of i1 and i2 rather than equality, e.g. do MAC and IP address belong to the same device ⇒ authentication & integrity of channel binding info (not authorization!)
Change #2: “what is verified”? Section 5.2 • Channel binding information • i1: any info part of the NAS beacon/EAP Identity request • i2: any AAA attribute exchanged between authenticator and AAA server as part of on-going EAP exchange • Channel binding verifications, check whether • the authenticator is lying to the peer (i1 false?) • the authenticator (or AAA intermediaries) is lying to the AAA server (i2 false?) • Removed: • rules derived from network policies & stored in local DB • check whether authenticator is violating any policies
Change #3: “set up local database” Section 10 • Simplified set up of local data base • only needs to contain known information about authenticators and roaming partners • e.g. MAC/IP addresses, roaming fees • used for consistency check of i1 and i2 • Removed: • policy engines • training phase to learn behavior that should be authorized • policy rules for home and service provider networks
Change #4: “attribute update” Section 7.3 • Removed outdated 802.11s attribute from list of channel binding TLVs
Conclusions • All open issues on the list have been addressed in the -04 draft • Request WG review of -04 version • Ready for WG last call?