1 / 22

peer-to-peer (p2p) value & cost

Bob Briscoe, Chief Researcher at BT Group, discusses the value and cost implications in peer-to-peer networks, focusing on whether "Content is King" or the "Long Tail" effect prevails. Analyzing concepts like Metcalfe's Law and network connectivity, this study delves into the economic dynamics of interest groups and social communities within P2P frameworks. Addressing the interplay between competition, customer value, and network size, this study emphasizes the importance of cost accountability and fair distribution of network resources. Discover how congestion volume, not just traffic volume, impacts network performance and user experience in P2P file-sharing environments. Examining the cost shifts between service providers and ISPs, this research highlights the need for transparent cost structures in Internet protocols. Explore the evolution of Japanese ISP markets, technological shares, and the challenges posed by asymmetric traffic distribution. Find out why pinpointing congestion volume and implementing fair usage policies are critical for optimizing network efficiency and ensuring equitable access for all users.

averyr
Download Presentation

peer-to-peer (p2p) value & cost

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. peer-to-peer (p2p)value & cost Bob Briscoe Chief ResearcherBT Group Sep 2008

  2. Content is King or The Long Tail?community & social networking, interest groups Metcalfe's LawK N2 • the long tail effect eventually predominates • but not as strongly as Metcalfe's Law predicted Odlyzko, "Content is Not King" Briscoe, Odlyzko & Tilly, "Metcalfe's Law is Wrong" ? valueto all Nof mutualconnectivity Content is King no. of customers, N

  3. valueto all K NlogN cumulative value to all Nof connectivity to all N N k logN valueto one cumulative value to meof connectivity with all N value to meof connectivity to each of N Google close friends kN Amazon my Mum Internet shops acquaintances like-minded people Nindex of other customersranked by value to me of connectivity with them 2 potential peers: value in numbers

  4. growth in potential network valueby scaling & interconnect (1-λ)N λN N totalcustomers’value valuereleased byinterconnect λN (1-λ)N N no. of customers on network

  5. STOP THINK • that's all about value to customers • before we start dividing the spoils between us • remember... competition • drives revenue towards cost • ensures customers get the surplus value total customer value customersurplus internetworkrevenue providerprofit internetwork cost internetwork size N

  6. the cost of p2p file-sharing? source: Ellacoya 2007(now Arbor Networks)

  7. p2p quickly fills up fibre to the home Distribution of customers’ daily traffic into & out of a Japanese ISP (Feb 2005) (5GB/day equivalent to 0.46Mbps if continuous) (9%, 2.5GB) (4%, 5GB) digital subscriber line (DSL 53.6%) Changing technology sharesof Japanese access market 100Mbps fibre to the home (FTTH 46.4%) Courtesy of Kenjiro Cho et alThe Impact and Implications of the Growth in Residential User-to-User Traffic, SIGCOMM (Oct ’06)

  8. ISP service layer independent service datatrans-port cost-shifting between services • scenario • ISP also a higher level service provider (TV, video phone, etc) • competing with independent service providers (Skype, YouTube, etc) • capacity & QoS costs for high value services • ISP buys capacity & QoS internally • independent SP just takes as much best-efforts bandwidth as they need • because of how Internet sharing 'works' • cost of heavy usage service subsidised by ISP's lighter users • knee-jerk reaction of ISP • block p2p or independent services • No! don't blame your customers • fix the cost accountability foundations • separation between network & services is good • but need to add cost accountability to IP

  9. underlying problemsblame our choices, not p2p • commercial Q. what is cost of network usage? A. volume? NO; rate? NO A. 'congestion volume' • our own unforgivable sloppiness over what our costs are • technical • lack of cost accountability in the Internet protocol (IP) • p2p file-sharers exploiting loopholes in technology we've chosen • we haven't designed our contracts & technology for machine-powered customers

  10. note: diagram is conceptual congestion volume would be accumulated over time capital cost of equipment would be depreciated over time not volume, butcongestion volume: the missing metric • not ‘what you got’but ‘what you unsuccessfully tried to get’ • proportional to what you got • but also to congestion at the time • congestion volume: cost to other users • the marginal cost of upgrading equipment • so it wouldn’t have been congested • so your behaviour wouldn’t have affected others • competitive market matches 1 & 2 NOTE: congestion volume isn’t an extra cost • part of the flat charge we already pay • it's just the wrong people are paying it • if we could measure who to blame for itwe might see pricing like this...

  11. flow2 flow1 unresponsive flow3 how Internet sharing ‘works’endemic congestion& voluntary restraint • aka. those who take most, get most • technical consensus until Nov ‘06 wasvoluntarily polite algorithm in endpoints – ‘TCP-fairness’: • a game of chicken – taking all and holding your ground pays • or starting more ‘TCP-fair’ flows than anyone else (Web: x2, p2p: x5-100) • or for much much longer than anyone else (p2p file-sharing x200) • net effect of both (p2p: x1,000-20,000 higher traffic intensity) capacity bandwidth2 bandwidth1 time (VoIP, VoD Joost 700kbps)

  12. light light heavy heavy light heavy fairer is faster bit-rate 'unfair' TCP sharing throttling heavy usage • what's required: limit congestion, not volume • then heavy usage will back away whenever light usage appears • so light usage can go much faster • hardly affecting completion times of heavy usage time

  13. Acceptable Use Policy Your 'congestion volume' allowance: 1GB/month (= 3kb/s continuous)This only limits the traffic you can try to transfer above the maximum the Internet can take when it is congested. Under typical conditions this will allow you to transfer about 70GB per day. If you use software that seeks out uncongested times and routes, you will be able to transfer a lot more. Your bit-rate is otherwise unlimited limiting congestion? • only throttles traffic when contribution to congestion elsewhere exceeds allowance • otherwise free to go at any bit-rate congestion· bit-rate0%· 2 Mb/s = 0.0kb/s 0.3% · 0.3Mb/s = 0.9kb/s0.1% · 6 Mb/s = 6.0kb/s 6.9kb/s Internet 0% 0.3%congestion 2 Mb/s0.3Mb/s6 Mb/s bulkcongestionpolicer 0.1%

  14. problems using congestion in contracts • loss: used to signal congestion since the Internet's inception • computers detect congestion by detecting gaps in the sequence of packets • computers can hide these gaps from the network with encryption • explicit congestion notification (ECN): standardised into TCP/IP in 2001 • approaching congestion, a link marks an increasing fraction of packets • implemented in Windows Vista (but off by default) and Linux, and IP routers (off by default) • re-inserted ECN (re-ECN): standards proposal since 2005 • packet delivery conditional on sender declaring expected congestion • uses ECN equipment in the network unchanged

  15. legend: automaticusage cost allocation re-ECNdownstreamcongestion marking [%] sender marks 3%of packets lightly congested link marking 0.2%of packets NA highly congested link marking 2.8%of packets NB a single marking in 2.8%of packets crossing interconnect ND flow of packets receiver NC

  16. 0|0|2|7|6|0|5 legend: interconnect aggregation simple internalisation of all externalities'routing money' re-ECNdownstreamcongestion marking [%] area =instantaneous downstream congestion volume bit rate NA € NB € ND solution just two counters at border,one for each direction meter monthly bulk volumeof packet markings = aggregate downstreamcongestion volume in flows without measuring flows € NC

  17. example sustainable business modelfor basic data transport usage charge capacity charge data flow value-based session business models bulkcongestionpolicer bulk monthlyusagecharging $ $ £ NC NB NA S1 R2 ND monthlycapacitycharging ¥ € £ $ usage flat fee+ capacity flat feeflat monthly fee can then be built (and destroyed) over this bulkcongestionpolicer bulk monthly usagecharging $ $ £ NC NB NA R1 S2 ND monthlycapacitycharging ¥ € £ $

  18. revenue cost wrap up • expect consistent value growth from p2p • but don't just focus on value, cost as well • separation of service & network is excellent industrygoal • but how TCP/IP shares cost of transport needs serious attention • understanding of network economics is young, so is IP • not the fault of ISP's customers or of p2p • ISPs will need a mitigating strategy until it's fixed • please help us add cost accountability (re-ECN) to IP • please brief your technical & standards strategy people • a platform on which customer contracts can be built • for basic transport, then services on top • so billions of machines work together in everyone's best interests

  19. more info... • Growth in value of a network with size • Bob Briscoe, Andrew Odlyzko & Ben Tilly, "Metcalfe's Law is Wrong", IEEE Spectrum, Jul 2006 • Inevitability of policing • The Broadband Incentives Problem, Broadband Working Group, MIT, BT, Cisco, Comcast, Deutsche Telekom / T-Mobile, France Telecom, Intel, Motorola, Nokia, Nortel (May ’05 & follow-up Jul ’06) <cfp.mit.edu> • Stats on p2p usage across 7 Japanese ISPs with high FTTH penetration • Kenjiro Cho et al, "The Impact and Implications of the Growth in Residential User-to-User Traffic", In Proc ACM SIGCOMM (Oct ’06) • Slaying myths about fair sharing of capacity • Bob Briscoe, "Flow Rate Fairness: Dismantling a Religion"ACM Computer Communications Review 37(2) 63-74 (Apr 2007) • How wrong Internet capacity sharing is and why it's causing an arms race • Bob Briscoe et al, "Problem Statement: Transport Protocols Don't Have To Do Fairness", IETF Internet Draft (Jul 2008) • Understanding why QoS interconnect is better understood as a congestion issue • Bob Briscoe and Steve Rudkin "Commercial Models for IP Quality of Service Interconnect" BT Technology Journal 23 (2) pp. 171--195 (April, 2005) • Re-architecting the Future Internet: • The Trilogy project • Re-ECN & re-feedback project page: <http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/B.Briscoe/projects/refb/>

  20. p2pvalue & cost Q&A

  21. NB NA ND R1 NC ? S1 congestion competition – inter-domain routing • if congestion → profit for a network, why not fake it? • upstream networks will route round more highly congested paths • NA can see relative costs of paths to R1 thru NB & NC • the issue of monopoly paths • incentivise new provision • as long as competitive physical layer (access regulation), no problem in network layer down-stream routecost faked congestion ? resourcesequenceindex,i routingchoice

  22. main steps to deploy re-feedback / re-ECN • network • turn on explicit congestion notification in routers (already available) • deploy simple active policing functions at customer interfaces around participating networks • passive metering functions at inter-domain borders • terminal devices • (minor) addition to TCP/IP stack of sending device • or sender proxy in network • customer contracts • include congestion cap • oh, and first we have to update the IP standard • started process in Autumn 2005 • using last available bit in the IPv4 packet header • IETF recognises it has no process to change its own architecture • Apr’07: IETF supporting re-ECN with (unofficial) mailing list & co-located meetings

More Related