1 / 21

Antibiotic Incentives For Global Health WHO CEWG 2011

Antibiotic Incentives For Global Health WHO CEWG 2011. Kevin Outterson Boston University Schools of Law & Public Health Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics Papers at www.ssrn.com. Public Health Implications of Antimicrobial Drug Regulation.

avian
Download Presentation

Antibiotic Incentives For Global Health WHO CEWG 2011

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Antibiotic Incentives For Global HealthWHO CEWG 2011 Kevin Outterson Boston University Schools of Law & Public Health Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics Papers at www.ssrn.com

  2. Public Health Implications of Antimicrobial Drug Regulation Kevin Outterson, JD, LLM (Project Co-Director) Boston University School of Law Rosa Rodriguez-Monguio, PhD (Project Co-Director)University of Massachusetts, School of Public Health Enrique Seoane-Vazquez, PhDMassachusetts College of Pharmacy Aaron S. Kesselheim, MD, JD, MPH, Brigham & Women’s Hospital, Harvard Medical School Marc Lipsitch, PhD Harvard School of Public Health John H. Powers, MD George Washington University School of Medicine Funded by the Boston University School of Law & the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

  3. World Health Day 7 April 2011

  4. Coordination Abx = common pool resource No real global coordination on new production or use (withdrawals) Hospitals, physicians, patients, payors, drug companies & drug sellers all lack financial incentives to conserve See R. Laxminarayan; K. Outterson; E. Kades; A.S. Kesselheim; A. Malani; R. Saver; S. Mechoulan; Sage & Hyman

  5. Patent Holder Waste Sub-therapeutic animal uses Label extensions to CAP/cSSSI/AOM Narrow v. broad spectrum Dx Resistance within & across classes Outterson K, et al., LID 2007; 7:559-566; Outterson K, Cardozo L Rev 2010; Kesselheim AS, Outterson K, Health Affairs 2010; 29(9):1689-96.

  6. Conservation Commercial incentives undermine conservation Poor incentives at patient, provider & industry levels Complex delivery, cultural & infrastructure issues, esp. globally Kesselheim AS, Outterson K, 11 YJHPLE 2011

  7. Production New molecules are needed, else class and sector exhaustion Stewardship and infection control diminish market incentives Declining returns to R&D observed Kesselheim AS, Outterson K, 11 YJHPLE 2011

  8. Systemic Antibacterial NMEs Approved by the FDA (1980-2009) NMEs Approved Marketed Priority Review Marketed = Products still in the market in August 1, 2010.

  9. Discontinued NMEs and BLAs.Approved by the FDA (1980-1999) % NMEs & BLAs Discontinued from Market

  10. Systemic Antibacterials Approved by the FDA (1980-2009).Marketed Drugs, Linear Trend CUSFTA TRIPS Bioshield CAFC Sec.505 ODA Ped Excl. OB TRIPS India + AUSFTA Bayh-Dole Act

  11. Marketed NMEs and BLAs Approved by the FDA by Selected Therapeutic Classesas a % Total Approvals (1980-2009) 1980s 1990s 2000s % Total NMEs & BLAs

  12. Cardiovascular System Drugs Approved by the FDA (1980-2009). Marketed Drugs, Linear Trend & 5 Year Moving Average

  13. Antineoplastic & Immunomodulating Agents Approved by the FDA (1980-2009). Marketed Drugs, Linear Trend & 5 Year Moving Average

  14. Proposal 1 Value-based rbx for social value of abx Financing mechanism is OECD health system rbx Contingent on meeting global conservation & health targets Scalable globally Contingent P4P Kesselheim AS & Outterson K, Improving Antibiotic Markets, 11 YJHPLE (2011); Kesselheim AS & Outterson K, Health Affairs Sept. 8, 2010.

  15. Current metric: Ability to pay With de-linkage: Cost of resistant infections? Cost of current ID burden? Cost of avoided infections? Room for adjustment if SV>PV by an order of magnitude Contingent P4P

  16. Social Value of the ABX gap In billions of US Dollars at various DALY value levels. Underlying data on burden of disease from WHO 2008. Estimates by Outterson (2009)

  17. Further Issues OECD willingness to rbx Setting & measuring realistic global conservation targets Industry capture Top down bias Voluntary contracts with companies (no change to IP rules)

  18. Strategic ABX Reserve Proposal 2 • $$ for conservation, not use • Voluntary, science-driven • Significant $$ demonstration • Complete de-linkage for 1-2 especially valuable molecules Kesselheim AS & Outterson K, Improving Antibiotic Markets,11 YJHPLE (2011); Kesselheim AS, Outterson K, Health Affairs 2010; 29(9):1689-96; Love J, Prizes, not patents, to stimulate antibiotic R&D, SciDev.Net (26 March 2008); So AS, et al. Drug Resistance Updates 2011

  19. Further Issues Funding Access/price to patients Industry capture/targets Informational problems with value & efficacy) IP coordination

  20. Invitation Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics Conference, Boston Oct. 3-4, 2011 2.5 hour program on abx incentives on Oct. 4

  21. Antibiotic Incentives For Global HealthWHO CEWG 2011 Kevin Outterson Boston University Schools of Law & Public Health Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics Papers at www.ssrn.com

More Related