A brief history of flight and airplane development & Future possibilities

1. A brief history of flight and airplane development& Future possibilities Affiliate Professor Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics University of Washington Seattle, WA John H. McMasters Technical Fellow The Boeing Company john.h.mcmasters@boeing.com and April 2007 Ed Wells Partnership Short Course Based on: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) & Sigma Xi Distinguished Lectures & Von Kármán Institute for Fluid Dynamics Lecture Series: “Innovative Configurations for Future Civil Transports”, Brussels, Belgium June 6-10, 2005

2. A Area (ft.2, m2) a Speed of sound (ft./sec., m/s) AR Aspect ratio, b/č = b2/S b Wing span (ft., m) č Average wing chord (ft.,m) CF Force coefficients (lift, drag, etc.) = F/qS Cℓ Section (2D) lift coefficient CM Moment coefficient = M/qSĉ Cp Pressure coefficient = Δp/q D Drag force (lb., N) E Energy (Ft.-lbs., N-m) e “Oswald efficency factor” ew Wing span efficiency factor (= 1/kw ) F Force (lift, drag, etc.) (lbs., N) H Total head (reservoir pressure) I Moment of inertia kw Wing span efficiency factor (= 1/ew) L Lift force (lb., N) ℓ Length (ft., m) M Mach number (V/a) M Mass (kg) M Moment (ft. lbs., N m) P Power (ft.-lbs./sec., N-m/sec.) p Static pressure (lbs./ft.2) q Dynamic pressure (lbs./ft.2) = ½ρV2 R Range (mi., km) Rn Reynolds number (ρVℓ / μ) S Wing area (ft.2, m2) T Thrust (lb., N) T Temperature (oF) u Local x-direction velocity component V Velocity, Speed (ft./sec., m/s, mph, km/h) v Local y-direction velocity component w Downwash velocity (ft./sec., m/s) ż Sink rate (vertical velocity) (ft./sec., m/s) Greek: α Angle of attack (deg.) Γ Circulation γ Climb or glide angle (deg., rad.) γ Ratio of specific heats in a fluid ε Wing twist angle (deg.) θ Downwash angle (deg.) φ Velocity potential Λ Wing sweep angle (deg.) μ Dynamic viscosity ν Kinematic viscosity (μ/ρ) ρ Fluid mass density (kg/m3) Notation and Symbols Used

3. Presentation Overview A brief history of flight and airplane development & Future possibilities

4. Notes on the First 100 Years of Technical Progress in Aeronautics The previous figure was originally created about 25 years ago as part of an explanation to Boeing management of the reasons why the then-new Boeing 757 carried no more passengers any farther or faster than its predecessor Boeing 707 after the expenditure of very substantial research and development money over the intervening 20 year time period. The conceptual diagram thus created is still as relevant today as it was then in the authors’ opinion, and shows where we now stand in our putative “mature” technology. As shown notionally on the chart of “progress” versus time, three lines can be drawn. • The first is a “theoretical upper bound” established by the basic law of physics (and economics). These limits are imposed by factors such as the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics, the fact that generation of lift with a wing of finite span produces (induced) drag even when “optimally loaded”, etc. • The second line represents what could be accomplished with the extant technology available to us at a given date IF we had a perfect knowledge and understanding of our art (and no significant economic limits on what we were/are allowed to do). It is shown as a sort of stair-step progression based on significant technological breakthroughs that periodically occur. • The third line on the figure is the measure of actual progress made over the course of over a hundred years of dedicated progress (not forgetting that much of the basic ground work that led to the Wright brothers success [which “initializes” the figure shown] had been laid by the advances made by the theoreticians and “failed” experimentation in previous centuries). This progress has been truly dramatic - particularly in the time period from approximately 1920 through the 1960s. However, as the gap between theoretical limits, possible achievement and actual realization shrink,

5. Notes on the First 100 Years of Technical Progress in Aeronautics (cont’d) the opportunities for further gain in traditional measures of performance become increasingly difficult (and expensive) to achieve. This is the hallmark of a “mature” technology, and is exacerbated by the fact that not only are designers getting smarter over time, their customers, governmentregulators and the public at large are getting more demanding and sophisticated as well. In the face of increasing demands for improved safety, reduced noise, increased fuel efficiency, etc., etc., the designers have to run harder and harder to make increasingly small gains. Indeed, if research and development did not continue at a healthy pace, progress would be retrograde at some point under the weight of these external pressures. [With regard to the to the Boeing 757 vis-à-vis the 707, the 757 turns out to a very significantly better airplane than its predecessor in all regards - except speed, range and passenger count. Indeed, had the team developing the 707 been faced with the same circa 1975 design requirements and objectives that the 757 had to deal with, and were still limited by the circa 1954 knowledge and technology available to them, it is arguable whether the original design could ever have flown - and helped change the world as it did.] The question is thus: Where do we go from here in the next 100 years of an endeavor that has a potential multi-trillion dollar market for its products and services in its first two decades alone? Further ruminations along the same lines may be found in the following references: McMasters, J.H., “Reflections of a Paleoaerodynamicist”, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, University of Chicago, Spring, 1986, pp. 3-70 _____________ , “The Flight of the Bumblebee and Related Myths of Entomological Engineering”, American Scientist, Vol. 77, March-April 1989, pp. 164-9

6. Options and Opportunities • Continue evolving current lines of development – as long as a market exists for the results • Schedule a breakthrough or an invention – expand the range of the “possible” • Start a whole new game – where the gap between “possible” and “actual” is again very large • All of the above !

7. Progress Boeing 787 “Dreamliner”

8. A COMPARISON OF RISKAccidental Deaths - United States - 1999-2003 A COMPARISON OF RISKAccidental Deaths - United States - 1999-2003 Fewer people have died in commercial airplane accidents in America over the past 60 years than are killed in U.S. auto accidents in a typical three-month period. 2001 Data

9. http://www.boeing.com/commercial/cmo/ Boeing (BCA) 2006 Market Forecast Randy Baseler http://www.boeing.com/randy/

10. Confronting Sacred Cows Thanks to Richard Aboulafia – The Teal Group

15. The Military MarketMisplaced Pessimism

16. Whoops!

18. What Do Analysts Like?Two Dots They Can Draw A Line Between • ACS, VXX…a clear trend. • Add MMA, and there’s a clearer trend. • Platforms less important than systems of systems. • Since they matter less, they’re out-sourceable. • Optimization matters less too. • The tanker question. • Buy American -- Law of Unintended Consequences. Does it really save U.S. jobs?

19. Net-Centric Warfare: Implications • Military aircraft eclipsed by electronics, “systems of systems.” • Planes as lower-margin, slower-growth components that plug into higher value networks (FCS, Deepwater). • Net-centric strategy/spending is real long-term market threat for fighters. • Hurts the fighter budget. • Forces multiplied (numbers subtracted). • Enables UAVs to play a useful role.

20. FY 2005 Aircraft/Strike Actions

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26. The Civil MarketMisplaced Optimism

27. Jetliner Market Issues Traditional airlines are in trouble • This isn’t like the last downturn. • Very serious structural changes are underway. • Discount carriers and the private aviation/bus- travel-with-wings schism. • That backlog is not completely real. • Orders are completely irrelevant. So are cancellations. • Much value locked in zombie airlines. • And those discount carrier orders are fratricidal. • Can deliveries growth be maintained?

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32. The Big Competition • Airbus’s shotgun approach might be the right one--who can really tell what the industry will look like? • But as a concept, 787 beats A350. The A380 is a niche player, and the A350 might evolve. • If 787/777 can clobber A330/340/350, Boeing can get to 55%, and be more profitable too.

38. Big Economic Question #1: With Elasticity/Price Sensitivity and Wealth, What Does The Market (and Society) Look Like? ? Or • This question affects: • Efforts to expand the market with jet cards, private airlines, etc. • Microjets (air taxis). • The High End, and SSBJs. Low sonic boom SSBJ ? 10-12 passengers, Length ~ 170 ft.