EFCOG Board of Directors Meeting Board Recommendation 2004-1 Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations Augus

1. EFCOG Board of Directors Meeting Board Recommendation 2004-1 Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations August 4, 2004 Ted Sherry Deputy Manager, Y-12 Site Office

2. Background for Board Recommendation 2004-1 • NASA Columbia Accident • NRC/Davis-Besse Pressure Vessel Degradation • Increased Decentralization of DOE Organization • Reductions in HQ Technical Expertise • Proposed Changes to Oversight • Proposed Changes to Contractor Management • Proposed Changes to Directives • Board Public Hearings

3. Background for Board Recommendation 2004-1 • May 21, 2004 – Recommendation sent by Board Chairman to Secretary of Energy • Mid June - Response Team established • June 18, 2004 – Response Team Meet with Board to further Discuss • July 21, 2004 – Secretary responds to Board accepting Recommendation

4. Elements of Recommendation 2004-1 1. DOE Delegations of Authority for safety responsibilities need to be in accordance with defined criteria and processes, such that: a. Oversight is provided at all levels b. Oversight is conducted by technically competent individuals. 1c. Corrective Action Plans from NASA Columbia and Davis Besse events need to be issued.

5. Elements of Recommendation 2004-1 2a. Establish a Central, Technical Safety Authority responsible for safety goals, requirements, and waivers. 2b. Support and integrate safety research, analysis, and testing. 2c. Sustain Integrated Safety Management (ISM) as foundation of safety management implementation.

6. Elements of Recommendation 2004-1 3. Direct and unbroken line of safety roles and responsibilities need to be reflected in Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities (FRA) documents, and in Quality Assurance Plans (QAPs). 4. Validation reports need to be provided to the Secretary before DOE approves delegations of authority.

7. DOE 2004-1 Core Team Ted Sherry (Lead/YSO), Mark Whitaker (DR-1), Ines Triay (EM-3)

8. Objectives/Potential Actions • Clarify/Establish formal Delegation of Authority expectations (capabilities, processes, validation) • Implement CAIB/DB Lessons • Include DOE-wide evaluation • Use corrective action system • Establish a central authority or authorities with core safety responsibilities • Evaluating 3 models – IP to establish approach • Revise Oversight/ISM Policy and Implement • Strengthen Oversight expectations (plans, procedures, validations) • Clarify/establish ISM periodic evaluations • Establish Self-assessment requirements

9. Objectives/Potential Actions • Establish Core Requirement/Oversight Expectations • Core set of requirements to apply to defense nuclear facilities • Core set of oversight requirements to be implemented • Exceptions to core set to be approved by central authority • Institute a program to integrate and execute safety R&D program • Prioritization • Decision-making • Funding • Strengthen and maintain Technical Capability (at all levels) • Revitalize ISM • Improve safety attitude/culture • Validation reviews to be conducted

10. Schedule for Department Implementation Plan Development • July 22-23 – IP Team Kick-Off Workshop • August 24 – First IP Draft • September 10 - Complete Presentation to Senior Leadership/DNFSB • October 1 – Final Draft IP in Concurrence Process • November 5 – IP Approval by Secretary of Energy

11. Request for EFCOG Assistance • Revitalize ISM • Initiatives/approaches to improve safety attitude/culture • Support “Red Team” review of IP