40 likes | 226 Views
CURTIS BROS. . Difference between 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) Tension between 8(b)(1)(A) prohibition on restraint, coercion Legitimate union activities designed to persuade ees no prohibition on union “interference” in 8(b)(1)(A) 8(b)(1)(A) aimed at
E N D
CURTIS BROS. • Difference between 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) • Tension between • 8(b)(1)(A) prohibition on restraint, coercion • Legitimate union activities designed to persuade ees • no prohibition on union “interference” in 8(b)(1)(A) • 8(b)(1)(A) aimed at • violence, duress, reprisal, threats (leg. history) • Union use of persuasion, propaganda not a UFLP • Generalized peaceful picketing not prohibited by 8(b)(1)(A) • Picketing under specific circumstances may be prohibited by other provisions • 8(b)(4), 8(b)(7) • Broad scope given to Sec. 13 right to strike
U.S. v. Enmons410 U.S. 396, 1973 • “The Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal crime to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery or extortion, does not reach the use of violence (which is readily punishable under state law) to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher wages in return for genuine services that the employer seeks” (from summary of decision). • Based on legislative history, which indicated purpose of statute was to prevent use of violence or extortion for wrongful purposes,and increases in wages not “wrongful.”
“The Government's broad concept of extortion - the ‘wrongful’ use of force to obtain even the legitimate union demands of higher wages - is not easily restricted. It would cover all overtly coercive conduct in the course of an economic strike, obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce. The worker who threw a punch on a picket line, or the striker who deflated the tires on his employer's truck would be subject to a Hobbs Act prosecution and the possibility of 20 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. . . . • Even if the language and history of the Act were less clear than we have found them to be, the Act could not properly be expanded as the Government suggests - for two related reasons. First, this being a criminal statute, it must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity. (cites omitted) . . . Secondly, it would require statutory language much more explicit than that before us here to lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to put the Federal Government in the business of policing the orderly conduct of strikes. Neither the language of the Hobbs Act nor its legislative history can justify the conclusion that Congress intended to work such an extraordinary change in federal labor law or such an unprecedented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of the States.” (cites omitted) [410 U.S. 396, 410-11]