1 / 19

A new environment for nuclear safety: Main challenges for the OECD/NEA

A new environment for nuclear safety: Main challenges for the OECD/NEA. Javier Reig Director Nuclear Safety OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. TSO Conference, Beijing , October 2014. Presentation Outline. Regulatory activities Safety review activities Safety research activities

bailey
Download Presentation

A new environment for nuclear safety: Main challenges for the OECD/NEA

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. A new environment for nuclear safety: Main challenges for the OECD/NEA Javier Reig Director Nuclear Safety OECD Nuclear Energy Agency TSO Conference, Beijing, October 2014

  2. Presentation Outline • Regulatory activities • Safety review activities • Safety research activities • Harmonization of regulatory approaches for new reactors • Summary 2

  3. Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Russia Slovak Republic OECD/NEA Membership (*) • Slovenia • Spain • Sweden • Switzerland • Turkey • United Kingdom • United States OECD and NEA memberOECD member, not NEA NEA member, not OECD (*) NNSA – OECD/NEA Memorandum of Understanding signed in April 2014 3

  4. NEA Committees 4

  5. The Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA NuclearSafetyResponseand LessonsLearnt • Assurance of safety • Shared responsibilities • Human and organisational factors • Defence-in-depth (DiD) • Stakeholder engagement • Crisis communication • International aspects of emergency preparedness • Trade and transportation issues • Research and development • International co-operation and NEA contribution 5

  6. Conclusions from the Report • After focused safety reviews, the current safety level is sufficient and no immediate shutdown is required,but need to increase robustness to face extreme situations beyond existing safety margins. • Operators have the prime responsibility for safety. Regulatory authorities play a fundamental role in ensuring such compliance. • Since a severe accident can never be completely ruled out, the necessary provisions for dealing with and managing an emergency situation (onsite and offsite) must be planned, tested and regularly reviewed. • The accident identified significant human, organisational and cultural challenges (including to ensure independence, technical capability and transparency of the regulatory authority). 6

  7. Regulatory Activities The CNRA Senior Task Group on Defence-in-Depth: • CNRA & CSNI Joint Workshop with industry participation – June 2013 (“Challenges and Enhancements to DiD in Light of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident”). • Concept of DiD is sound, even if improvements to be considered (balance between prevention and mitigation at all levels) • Further consideration: implementation of the DiD concept to rare external events, incl. in combination. • CNRA report on DiD challenges (2014-2015) • CNRA report on the characteristics of an effective regulator • CNRA report on the safety culture of the regulatory body (2015) 7

  8. Scope/Outline of the CNRA report on DiD(1/2) • INTRODUCTION • BACKGROUND • THE STRUCTURE AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE LEVELS • EXTERNAL HAZARDS AND OTHER COMMON CAUSE/MODE FAILURES 8

  9. Scope/Outline of the CNRA report on DiD(2/2) • PRACTICAL ELIMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT EARLY RELEASE • EMERGENCY ARRANGEMENTS AND POST-ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT OFF-SITE • IMPLEMENTATION OF DID • REGULATORY USE OF DID • WIDER USES OF THE DID CONCEPT TO SECURE NUCLEAR SAFETY • CONCLUSIONS 9

  10. Safety Activities (1/2) • Technical Opinion Paper on Filtered Containment Venting: • Output: a comprehensive summary of the current status of technology and venting strategies as well as developments required for possible improvements to filtration technologies. COMPLETED • Status Report on Hydrogen Generation, Transport and Management: • Output: a comprehensive summary of hydrogen risk management technology and strategies. COMPLETED • Status Report on Spent Fuel Pools under Loss-of-Cooling Accident Conditions: • Output: a summary of spent fuel pool accident phenomenology and mitigation measures, and a guide for further research activities. DEC 2014 • Metallic Component Margins under High Seismic Loads (MECOS) • Output: a report documenting best practices for the analysis of ageing of passive metallic components subjected to high seismic loads. DEC 2014 10

  11. Safety Activities (2/2) • Human Performance and Intervention under Extreme Conditions: • Output: a summary of human and organisational factors (HOF) challenges during extreme events, good HOF practices and knowledge gaps. DEC 2014 • Workshop on Natural External Events Including Earthquakes: • Output: a report on commendable practices and experience gathered on PSA methodologies for natural external events.COMPLETED • Workshop on the Robustness of Electrical Systems of NPPs in Light of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: • Output: a report describing the technical basis of the provisions already taken or planned in each country regarding the electrical sources, the distribution systems and the loads. DEC 2014 • International benchmarking project on fast-running software tools for the estimation of fission product releases during accidents at nuclear power plants: • Output: a state-of-the-art report for simple tools to estimate fission product releases, including areas for improvement.JUNE 2015 11

  12. Safety Research Activities (1/2) • Ongoing joint research projects addressing issues from the accident to varying degrees, plus creation of a seniorexpert group on severe accidents, materials and other disciplines, to identify what data could be obtained from the decommissioning process at Fukushima Daiichi of use for new safety research projects. • BSAF: Benchmark Study of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station • Proposed by Japan. • HYMERES: Hydrogen Mitigation Experiments for Reactor Safety • Hosted by Switzerland and France (PANDA/MISTRA). • ATLAS: Beyond-design-basis accidents • Hosted by the Republic of Korea. • PKL-3: Accident management for PWRs • Hosted by Germany. 12

  13. BSAF Project: Phase 1 objectives full-scope severe accident analysis for the first ~6 days to analyse the accident progression of the units 1 to 3; to improve the understanding of SA phenomena, through comparison of analytical results with measured plant data; to improve methods and models of the SA codes, by reducing uncertainties in SA analysis and validating the SA codes with measured plant data; to contribute to the planning of the future debris removal and decommissioning process.

  14. BSAF Project • Participants 15organizations from 8 countries (France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Russia, Spain, Switzerland and USA) • Duration: 2 years (Nov. 2012 - Nov. 2014) • Status:participants working on their analysis for common cases (set by Japan) and best estimate cases • Preliminary Observations: • generally consistent results where uncertainties in safety system performance are less • Where safety systems may have been able to function, although impaired (e.g. cooling systems in Unit 3), predictions of the core damage state have more variation 14

  15. Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) members Regulatory authorities of: • NEA Technical Secretariat IAEA participation in generic activities. 16

  16. Policy Group Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) Steering Technical Committee EPR Working Group Digital I&C Accidents & Transients Digital I&C Working Group AP1000 Working Group Mechanical Codes and Standards Working Group Probabilistic Safety Assessment Severe Accidents APR1400 Working Group + Ad hoc expert subgroups Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working Group VVER Working Group ABWR Working Group TECHNICAL EXPERTS SUBGROUPS DESIGN-SPECIFIC WORKING GROUPS: CO-OPERATION ISSUE-SPECIFIC WORKING GROUPS: CONVERGENCE MDEP Library 17

  17. Summary • The NEA continues to support its member countries in enhancing the technical basis for the safe and economic use of nuclear power. • The safety committees have initiated activities after the Fukushima Daiichi accident to further improve power plant safety and the regulatory framework. • The NEA committees continue to play a leading role in performing and further developing safety research projects. • The NEA safety committees provide a framework to assist member countries in the resolution of safety challenges related to the accident, and to strengthen confidence in the solutions and their implementation. • The NEA is interacting very closely with Japanese institutions to co-operate and benefit from the broad research programme related to the Fukushima Daiichi decommissioning plan. 18

  18. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency www.oecd-nea.org 19

More Related