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IAREP-SABE 08 Rome

Why do rational people vote in large elections with costs to vote ? Serge Blondel (GRANEM Univ. Angers & INH, CES) Louis Lévy-Garboua ( CES University Paris 1 ). IAREP-SABE 08 Rome. Voting dec° Non-EU Examples. American presidential election Bush-Gore: each vote in Florida has counted.

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IAREP-SABE 08 Rome

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  1. Why do rational people vote in large elections with costs to vote?Serge Blondel (GRANEM Univ. Angers & INH, CES)Louis Lévy-Garboua (CES University Paris 1) IAREP-SABE 08 Rome

  2. Voting dec° Non-EU Examples American presidential election Bush-Gore: each vote in Florida has counted. This issue is very rare, but this elcetion has recalled that it is possible. This result has not changed the behavior of people for who voting is a citizen obligation because this is the foundation of a democracy. We will study here the vote as a decision, as an alternative to abstention. 1

  3. Voting dec° Hyp. Decision Behaviour Non-EU Examples Hypotheses NOT considered: - Taste for voting - Game theory solution  Individual decision framework Hypotheses considered here: - Preference for one candidate - Cost of voting - Probability of being decisive ε = ε1 + ½ ε2 ε1 : equality if no vote ε2: equality if vote 2

  4. Voting dec° Hyp. Decision Behaviour Non-EU Examples Owen& Grofman (84): 3

  5. Voting dec° Hyp. Decision Behaviour Non-EU Examples EU : V  A  (1-ε).C < ε.(B-C)  ε.B >C Impossible since ε≈0 Paradox of not voting (PNV) Downs 57 4

  6. Voting dec° Hyp. Decision Behaviour Non-EU Examples Observed behaviours: - People do vote - The rate of participation increases with the stake of the election - The rate of participation increases with the uncertainty of the election 5

  7. Voting dec° Non-EU Regret th. Prospect th. CC th. Examples Paradoxes and anomalies of EU: - Gambling and insurance (Friedman & Savage, 1948) - Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) - Preference reversal phenomenon (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971) - Reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)... => non-EU theories (Starmer 2000): related to the previous results, not the PNV. 6

  8. Voting dec° Non-EU Regret th. Prospect th. CC th. Examples N= 30 millions and q=50% => ε = 0.03% We pose: - B = 10 - C = 1 Two hypotheses ignored by EU: H1: utility depends of the outcome and the outcome in the alternative decision H2: ε should be overestimated 7

  9. Voting dec° Non-EU Regret th. Prospect th. CC th. Examples Ferejohn & Fiorina (74) Loomes & Sudgen (82) Regret theory : EU + regret V  A  4.0015 + 0.9997R(-1) + 0.0003 R(9) > 4.9985 + 0.9997R(1) + 0.0003 R(-9) H1, not H2: impossible 8

  10. Voting dec° Non-EU Regret th. Prospect th. CC th. Examples w(p) 1 0 p 1 Kahneman & Tversky (79) Quiggin (82) Prospect theory : V  A  w(0.50015).9 - w(0.49985) > w(0.49985).10 H2, not H1: impossible 9

  11. Voting dec° Non-EU Regret th. Prospect th. CC th. Examples Cognitive consistency theory – Lévy-Garboua 99: decision in two steps 1/EU maximisation 2/ Focus on the objection to EU Weighted average of : EU + objection V  A  µ.4.0015 + (1-µ).9 > µ.4.9985 + (1-µ).0 , 0<µ≤1  µ<0.9003 H1 and H2: possible 10

  12. Voting dec° Non-EU Regret th. Prospect th. CC th. Examples General problem: V  A  µ.(εB-C)+ (1-µ).(B-C) > 0 Prob (V  A): - Increases with B - Decreases with C - Increases with ε - Decreases with µ An “objection” to this theory: ε has a negligeable influence on the criterion.  The impact of εis marginal in relation with B, C and µ.  The weight of the objection is independent from ε 11

  13. Voting dec° Non-EU Regret th. Prospect th. CC th. Examples V  A  µ.(εB-εC-(1-ε)C)+ (1-µ).(B-C) > 0  (1-µ(1-ε)).(B-C) + µ.(1-ε)(-C) > 0 “w(1-ε)”“w(ε)” The cognitive consistency theory explains the PNV and also the main paradoxes and anomalies of EU with only one extra parameter. 12

  14. Voting dec° Non-EU Examples 13

  15. Voting dec° Non-EU Examples THANK YOU for your attention ! Questions? 14

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