“What Have the Japanese Learned from the Kobe Earthquake Experience”

1. “What Have the Japanese Learned from the Kobe Earthquake Experience” David W. Edgington (Geography, UBC)

2. “What Have the Japanese Learned from the Kobe Earthquake Experience” 1. Crisis management in Kobe – what went wrong? 2. Lessons Learned from Kobe 3. The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake 4. March 11 Great Eastern Earthquake and Tsunami 5. Conclusions

4. Crisis management in Kobe – what went wrong? • Dimensions of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster (January 1995) • Magnitude 7 earthquake • 6,308 deaths – almost half the victims were aged 60 years or older • Over 100,000 buildings damaged or destroyed • Road and rail networks were cut • $100 billion damage

5. Crisis management in Kobe – what went wrong? (2) Crisis Management Problems/Inadequate Government Response • Information delay: the quake took place at 5.47am, but there was no system to inform the Prime Minister in Tokyo –he learned about the quake from the 6.00am news! • Delay in sending in the troops: protocols demanded the governor of Hyogo prefecture request the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) to enter the disaster area, and this did not take place until 10.00am; and only 150 SDF members began official operations in Kobe on day 1 • Inadequate controls over traffic: may local city officials did not turn up for work • Local ambulance, fire and police services were overwhelmed. • No system to engage in the thousands of volunteers who arrived in Kobe

6. Crisis management in Kobe – what went wrong? (3) Post-Kobe Reforms in Japanese Crisis Management System • Revised Anti-Disaster Basic Law in December 1995 changed many structural and legal problems attached to dispatching troops for disaster relief and rescue work • National government instituted an Office of Crisis Management in 1998 under the direct control of the Prime Minister • Many local governments upgraded their disaster management systems, incorporating new information technologies • 1999 Natural Disaster Victims Relief Law • `Kaigo Hoken’ long-term care for seniors program commenced in 1999

8. The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake • Dimensions of the October 2004 earthquake • Magnitude 6.9 earthquake in the mountainous rural area of Niigata prefecture (northwest Japan) • 59 lives lost, 4,805 injured • 61 villages isolated due to the collapse of mountain roads; problems of heavy snowfalls • Due to many aftershocks more than 100,000 residents came to shelters • Large elderly population was a challenge regarding rapid response, health care in shelters and management of populations who were unable to return to their previous homes

9. The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake • Comparison with Kobe • Communication with Tokyo, and the immediate response, was much quicker thanks to the post-1995 changes in the way in which governments responded to natural disasters • SDF moved into Ojiya township (popl. 20,000) and a coordination centre was set up on the day following the quake. • Helicopters used to fly in food and to rescue villagers, and to help in the repair of roads. • 300 personnel, 21 helicopters and 65 vehicles used to transport food and water to evacuation sites • Many injured patients evacuated from small area hospitals to alternative hospitals in Niigata and Nagaoka cities.

12. March 11 Great Eastern Earthquake and Tsunami • Dimensions of the Disaster • Magnitude 9 quake and tsunami; 27,600 people are dead or missing, mainly along the 300 kmsSanriku coast (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima) • Previous history of tsunami in 1896, 1933 and 1960 • Some communities had up to 50% of their land destroyed • destruction of 1,500 roads, 48 bridges, 15 railways, ports, sewage treatment plans and schools is estimated at $200-$300 billion • In the first week, a total of about 387,000 evacuees form the disaster at 2,200 shelters without water and heating, and low supplies of food and medicines • Disappearance of food from supermarket shelves

13. March 11 Great Eastern Earthquake and Tsunami (2) Direct Lessons from Kobe? • Rapid deployment of 100,00 SDF forces to Sendai; 120,000 blankets, 120,000 bottles of water;100,000 liters of gasoline, plus food • Quick acceptance by Japan of international assistance, and better efforts for getting overseas teams on-site rapidly • US military assistance from Okinawa and Yotsuka • Many other local governments sent aid in the form of food, medicine and emergency personnel

14. March 11 Great Eastern Earthquake and Tsunami • Crisis Management Problems • Nuclear power plant drama distracting the national government from the humanitarian crisis in the Sanriku coast - mandatory/voluntary evacuation orders, joint govt/Tepco task force • Tohoku (northern) region has plenty of food, but no means of distributing it due to a shortage of petrol, and supplies unable to travel on roads reserved for `emergency’ vehicles • METI has to `ask’ companies to release more fuel from their long-term reserves (`70 days’ rule relaxed to `45 days’) • Smaller communities (less than 100,000 popl.) have no dedicated emergency personnel • Downsides of `just-in-time’ inventory systems

16. Conclusions 1. Geography and context is important 2. Some components of the current crisis cannot be learned from Kobe, e.g. the Tepco rolling blackouts, which are having an impact on industry 3. Long-term structural problems, including no provisions in Japan to call a state of full emergency so that a single organization can take over responsibilities usually reserved for ministries, local governments (e.g. such as FEMA in the USA)

17. Thank You