A trial of IP Traceback System in Interop Tokyo 2008

1. A trial of IP Traceback Systemin Interop Tokyo 2008 Hiroaki Hazeyama Nara Institute of Science and Tech. hiroa-ha@is.naist.jp

2. What is IP Traceback ? • Technique to track the true forwarding path of a packet • By querying packet capture agents • Even when the source IP address of the target packet is spoofed • IP Packet Traceback is expected to track attack packets • DDoS attack, UDP exploit, spoofed DNS queries : attack packet : traceback

3. IP traceback R&D Project IP traceback R&D project * A research project offered by NICT(*), started 2005 by the Consortium of six parties * Goal of the project is Demonstration Experiment of IP packet traceback (CY) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Consortium (five other parties) (*) NOTE: NICT stands for National Institute of Information and Communications Technology. Research and development： Telecom iSAC Japan Preliminary ISP field test From October to December 2008 Experiment preparations： Investigation / examination / document making Demonstration Experiment From July to December 2009

4. Outline of IP Traceback system Real attack path (AS map) Incident 1. Store suspicious information. Whenever IDS notify suspicious attacks, TB manager calculate the attack PKT’s HASH, and automatically recursive analyze it’s AS map with neighbor AS’s TB manager, and store it to TB-DB. TB Control Center 2. Detect the real attack path After an incident be recognized, TB-Operator analyze TB-DB by attack PKT’s HASH, and detect the real attack path. TB-DB TB Manager IDS Probe ISP(c) ISP(a) ISP(b) Attack from spoofed IP addresses Real attack 0. Store HASH data temporary. Each probe convert PKT to HASH, and store own cache automatically.

5. Toward the field test • We have to consider • A small set of the traceback system in an actual network environment • The operational flow with the actual traceback system • We tried to operate our traceback system in Interop Tokyo 2008

6. Interop Tokyo 2008 • One of the biggest exhibition/conference for network equipment / service vendors. • The Network Operation Center (NOC) team builds an experimental advanced network called "ShowNet" as a backbone of the event. • The experimental network was connected to several peering points (Internet Exchange Point) by more than 120G bps links in this year. • Our IP Traceback system was served as a part of "ShowNet".

7. Purpose of our trial in Interop • The preparations for the preliminary field testin2008 • Collect information necessary for One ISP environment in the field test • Data, problems, know-how to be collected with a long-time consecutive operation in One ISP • Set up actual machines at One ISP environment • Data, problems, know-how to be collected at ISP field trial • Define any function to be added or corrected

8. Auditing ShowNet External Links Mirroring All External I/Fs Gathering Mirrored Traffic RegeneratingMirrored Traffic Sink Hole routing Manual TCPDUMP / Traceback / 10G / 1G IDS

9. Rack Layout Traceback NICTER (Traffic Monitor developed by NICT)

10. Zoom-In to the Traceback System Snort on 4 embedded linux boxes All-In-One server SW-Probe (Chellsio 10G) SW-Probe (myri 10G) snort on linux TB-Manager TB-DB HW-Probe

11. Test Items on Interop • Test A • Setting up and operating the traceback system • Test B • Collaborating with traffic monitor tools • Test C • Visualizing trace log with random sampling based requests

12. Test A (Testing the field test set) mirrored traffic from exhibitors side Snort External Router (Alaxala) SW-Probe (chellsio 10G-LR) Request Search Packet Signature External Router (Huawei) SW-Probe (chellsio 10G-LR) TB-Manager Upload Summary SW-Probe (myri 10G-LR) External Router (NEC) HW-Probe (10G-LR) TB-DB External Router (Foundry)

13. Result of Test A (cont.) • The traceback system worked well in the conference and exhibition days • The alert signatures of snort contained well-known worm traffic, shell codes and DoS attack signatures • 669,810 alerts were received from 5 snorts on exhibitors’ side during 5 days (from 8th June to 13th June) • 169,843 alerts (25.35 %) were judged as “found in external links” • Other 74.65 % alerts were attacks derived from the internal of ShowNet

14. Test B (Tracing src spoofed packets) Sink hole routed packets Traffic Monitor internet Pseudo Attacker Request Core Routers (Juniper / CISCO) TCP SYN attack The source address was 45.x.x.x (ShowNet’s address) Mirrored external traffic All-in-One Server External Routers

15. Result of Test B • Traffic Monitor (NICTER) • Judged all pseudo attack packets came from the inside of ShowNet • Because the source address of attack packets are included in ShowNet address block • Traceback • Judged all pseudo attack packets came from the outside of ShowNet • Hash values of all pseudo attacks were cached in the SW/HW-probe

16. Result of Test B (cont.) the packet Hash was found in the External Traffic Request from NICTER (pseudo attack packet)

17. Test C (Visualization of Traffic) 10G tcpdump External Router (Alaxala) sampling External Router (Huawei) All-in-One Server L2 Switch (CISCO) Regeneration Tap(Net Optics) Summary External Router (NEC) Visualization External Router (Foundry)

18. Visualization on Test C

19. Summary • A trial of IP traeback system in Interop Tokyo 2008 • Success !!! • According to the result of Interop, we blush up our implementation and operational flow • Now, we are preparing the preliminary field test from this autumn in a Data Center environment

20. Future plans • Field tests in domestic • Preliminary field test with Japanese commercial ISPs will start from this autumn • The actual field test is planned from July to December, 2009 • Field tests in Internatinal • We are planning the international field test after the domestic filed test (2010 - ) • We are now looking for collaborators in research networks • If you are interested in our work, please mail to hiroa-ha at is.naist.jp

21. Thanks your attention http://iplab.naist.jp/research/traceback/

22. Any Questions ?

23. Appendix

24. Detail of Mirroring SW-probe 10G tcpdump External Router (Alaxala) SW-probe External Router (Huawei) L2 Switch (CISCO) All-in-One Server Regeneration Tap(Net Optics) External Router (NEC) SW-probe External Router (Foundry) HW-probe

25. Experiments in Lab • We had large scale experiments on NICT hokuriku research center in 2007 • With 200 physical servers • Mapping JP domain AS (eBGP) topology • Software traceback Implementation ran on each AS • DDoS from 3 attack ASes to 1 AS • Tracing the AS path of an attack packets from dest AS to src ASes

26. Hardware Spec. • Test A • NEC Express 5800 110R • XEON 2G x 2, 8GB memory, 250GB SATA Disk, IPMI enabled, four 1000TX I/F • Used for TB-Manager, TB-DB, snort • Also used for one SW-Probe with one myri 10G-LR card • Procide AmazeBlast Eco120 • Athlon 2G x 1, 8G memory, 200GB SATA Disk, two 1000TX I/F • Used for two SW-Probes with Chellsio 10G-LR card • OKI Electric HW-Probe box • One 10G-LR I/F and ten 1000T I/Fs, one 1000T I/F for control

27. Hardware Spec. • Test B, C • Procide AmazeBlast Eco120 • Athlong 2G x 1, 8G memory, 200GB SATA Disk, two 1000TX I/F • Two SW-Probe with Chellsio 10G-LR card • Used for All-In-One Server • MAC mini • Used for running a visualization tool

28. Software Spec. • OS • Debian 4.0 • Software Traceback Implementations • C++ • TB-Manager, SW-Probe • Developed by NAIST and Matsushita Electric Works • TB-DB • Developed by KDDI Lab. • HW friendly Packet Hash Algorithm Library • Developed by OKI Electric • Client Agent • Developed by NAIST • Visualization Tool • C++ with QT4 • Developed by NAIST