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The Moral Status of the Non-Human World: Singer and Cohen. Philosophy 220. Animals and Moral Standing.
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The Moral Status of the Non-Human World: Singer and Cohen Philosophy 220
Animals and Moral Standing • As we saw in our discussion of abortion, the question of the possible Direct Moral Standing of the fetus has a number of implications for the attempt to specify the moral status/standing of non-human animals. • Issue tends to resolve into two questions: • Do any non-human animals have DMS? • If so, what does this mean for the wide-spread use of animals (or other natural kinds) in a way dominated by human interests?
The Traditional Answer • The traditional answer, rooted in among other places the revealed texts of the traditional monotheisms, is dominion. • In other words, non-human animals do not have DMS. • One response to this line of reasoning is to employ a label like those familiar to us. • Speciesism: "the systematic discrimination against the members of some species by members of another species" (475).
What do the MTs Say? • Consequentialism: according to traditional utilitarianism, the value to be maximized is pleasure (the absence of pain). Inasmuch as many or our uses of non-human animals or other natural kinds come at the cost of significant pain or degradation, this approach would find those uses to be immoral. • Rights: the issue here is whether non-human animals or other natural kinds have rights morally equivalent to those of humans. It is not a question of political rights, but moral rights. • Virtue Ethics: as always, the question concerns whether our use of animals or the natural world as a whole accords with human flourishing and the virtues necessary for it. One common focus is the virtue of humility.
Singer and Animal Liberation • Peter Singer is one of the most consistent and persuasive defenders of consequentialist ethics, as well as being the author of perhaps the most influential work devoted to the question of the moral standing of non-human animals, Animal Liberation. • The essay we are considering is a summary of the positions he develops there.
Animal Rights? • Singer begins with a Critical/Historical examination of the concept of equality. • Question of equality of animals is historically entangled with that of equality of women. • Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication parodied by Thomas Talyor's. • Taylor parody amounts to an absurdum argument. Wollstonecraft's arguments could also be used to demonstrate the equality/rights of non-human animals. • Singer’s question is, “Is that conclusion absurd?”
Specifying the Concept of Equality • One thing to note in connection with the question of the equality of women is that their equality is not predicated on identical treatment. • The significant differences between men and women are important for understanding the mechanics of how the equal consideration of men and women is expressed in often different treatment. • Thus, Singer insists we should understand equality to require not equal treatment but equal consideration.
Equality and Consequentialism • Focus on equality of consideration is necessary because any attempt to define equality/inequality according to some factual quality (Race/IQ/Gender) mistakenly locates the question of equality in the descriptive realm ('fact'/'nature'). • Equality is a prescriptive (moral) category (479c2). • Singer then connects equal consideration to utilitarianism. • "Each to count for one and none for more than one" (Jeremy Bentham).
What About Animals? • Singer uses this account of equality to consider the moral standing of animals. • What universally acknowledged quality that humans possess could be used to rule out animals from equality of consideration that wouldn't also rule out many humans (young, old, disabled)? • Singer doesn't think there are any.
Sentience and Speciesism • Singer seems to recognize no such quality. He concludes that the only basis of any question of equality is sentience: capacity for sensation or feeling. • As the condition of the possibility of any interest what so ever, sentience is the only criterion that avoids speciesism: bias in favor of the interests of member's of one's own species and against those of another's.
Consequentialist Implications • We have to ask then: "On what grounds is it justifiable to refuse to consider the suffering of sentient beings, of whatever species?" • Singer insists none: sentience is the condition of possibility of all interests, both those of humans and animals.
The Problem of Animal Research • A possible counter-argument that Singer considers and rejects is animal research. • The extent of animal use for research is large. Suffering/being affected is unavoidable (it is the very premise of testing--they are enough like us). • Singer notes that only a few instances of this research are critically important. • Even for those that are, we have to seriously consider whether we would substitute a human being in their place. • If the answer is no, then we are being speciesists.
Cohen, "In Defense of Speciesism" • Cohen takes up Singer's argument, but offers a much different account of Moral Standing. • From his account, talk of animal rights is mistaken, as is Singer's characterization of a Cohen-type position as morally equivalent to racism or sexism. • He also disputes Singer's consequentialist analysis of the moral status of the use of non-human animals.
Moral Standing and Rights • Acknowledging the complexity of rights talk, Cohen offers an account of DMS which rules out the claim that animals (or other natural kinds) have rights. • "Rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended, only among beings who actually do, or can, make moral claims against one another" (486c1). • He ultimately grounds the capacity here indicated in a Kantian notion of autonomy. • There is, Cohen makes clear, no CI for non-human animals.
What about Speciesism? • Here too, the question of DMS looms large. • Without arguing directly against Singer's use of sentience as the defining quality of DMS, Cohen denies that, "…all sentient animals have equal moral standing" (487c1). • While racism has, "no rational grounds," insists Cohen, preferring humans to other animals does. They have rights after all?
What are the Consequences? • It's easy to guess how Cohen is going to address questions concerning possible consequentialist analyses addressing, for example, animal experimentation. • Any such analysis is going to have to provide a weighing mechanism by which we can compare the various utilities and dis-utilities involved. Cohen insists that the only appropriate mechanism should privilege human value over that of non-human animals.
