260 likes | 628 Views
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Ethics July 30, 2012. Preface. “If there is a philosophy . . . on any subject, then there also must be for this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, which are independent of all intuition, i.e., there must be a metaphysics” ( MM Ak . 375).
E N D
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals Ethics July 30, 2012
Preface • “If there is a philosophy . . . on any subject, then there also must be for this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, which are independent of all intuition, i.e., there must be a metaphysics” (MMAk. 375). • “[N]o moral principle is founded upon any feeling, whatever one may think; a moral principle is really nothing but a dimly conceived metaphysics, which is inherent in every man’s (sic.) rational constition” (MMAk. 376).
I • Freedom is an internal constraint. • Negative freedom • Positive freedom • “I can never be forced by others to have an end; I alone can make something an end for myself” (MM, Ak. 381). • “[E]thics is a doctrine of ends” (MM, Ak. 381).
II • “Virtue is not to be defined and esteemed merely as a skill and . . . as a habit acquired by the long practice of morally good actions” (MM, Ak. 383). • How, then, should virtue be defined? • As a kind of rational power • As a (rational) willingness to tend to moral principles and ends
III • Anthropology vs. Ethics • Empirical • A priori rationality • “[E]thical duties are estimated not according to the empirical knowledge that we have of men (sic.) as they are, but according to rational knowledge of how, in conformity with the idea of humanity, they ought to be” (MM, Ak. 404-405). • Nature/Determinism vs. Reason/Freedom
IV • My Two Ends: • My own perfection • The happiness of others • Why can it not be the other way around? • Why do I not have my own happiness as an end? • Why do I not have the perfection of others as an end?
V • Perfection for me . . . • The cultivation of capacities (physical and rational) • The cultivation of moral will • Move beyond animality • Develop a virtuous disposition • . . . happiness for thee • Not their idea of happiness, but mine • Unhappiness leads to vice.
VI • Once again, the moral law is “the law of one’s own will and not of the will in general” (MM, Ak. 389). • Autonomy vs. Heteronomy Revisited • “Now, since no free action is possible unless the agent at the same time thereby aims at some end . . . it follows that if there is an end which is at the same time a duty, then the maxim of actions . . . must contain only the condition of qualifying for possible universal legislation” (MM, Ak. 389).
VII • Perfect vs. Imperfect Duties • Perfect duties can also be duties of right. • Imperfect duties are “merely duties of virtue” (MM, Ak. 390). • Failure to do imperfect duties are not automatically an offense, but they do lack moral worth. • The offense is to have decided “not to conform to [imperfect] duties” (MM, Ak. 390). • Duties of Right have no moral worth, but “the conformity to right of the maxim of such actions regarded as duties, i.e., respect for right, is meritorious” (MM, Ak. 390).
VIII • Duties of Virtue towards One’s Own Perfection • Physical Perfection • Moral Perfection • Duties of Virtue towards the Happiness of Others • Physical Welfare • Moral Well-Being
IX • Virtue Defined: “the strength of man’s (sic.) maxim in obeying his duty” (MM, Ak. 394). • The Categorical Imperative defined in terms of virtue: “Act according to a maxim whose ends are such that there can be a universal law that everyone have these ends” (MM, Ak. 395).
XI Material Element • Internal External Formal Element
XII • Moral Feeling • Conscience • Philanthropy (Love of Humanity) • Respect
XIII • Aristotle’s account of virtue is incorrect. • “[E]thical duties must not be estimated according to the capacity attributed to man (sic.) of fulfilling the law; but, conversely, the moral capacity must be estimated according to the law, which commands categorically” (MM, Ak. 404).
XIV • Virtue is not a duty, nor is it a duty to be virtuous. • To the contrary, virtue is a kind of moral strength or fortitude one has to do one’s duty.
XV, XVI, and XVII • Two things required for internal freedom: • Mastery of Oneself • Lordship over One’s Emotions and Inclinations • Reason must command the whole. • Apathy as a Virtue • We must not allow morally to be emotionally compromised. • Morality is a rational affair.