DEFINITION, DIMENSION & CATEGORIES OF TERRORISM CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

1. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismAssoc. Prof. MUSTAFA KİBAROĞLU Department of International RelationsBİLKENT UNIVERSITY27 January 2006 DEFINITION, DIMENSION & CATEGORIES OF TERRORISM CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM TURKISH GENERAL STAFF ANKARA - TURKEY 23 - 27 January 2006

2. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu “We stand on the threshold of a new era in which hundreds of millions of people will at least be safe from some form of the world’s most terrible diseases … We also stand on the brink of a global crisis in infectious diseases. No country is safe from them. No country can any longer afford to ignore their threat.” Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima Former Director General World Health Organization (WHO) “Biological warfare is the deliberate spreading of (infectious) diseases among humans, animals, andplants in order to cause incapacitation or death of the target population.” Hon. Prof. Graham S. Pearson CB Former Director General Chemical & Biological Defence Establishment Porton Down, Salisbury, England

3. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Topics of the Day: …Biological Agents of Military Significance; …Characteristics and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human Biological Agents; …Past Record of Uses of Biological Agents for Military Purposes; …Knowledge Required to Manufacture Biological Weapons; …Military-Strategic Advantages & Drawbacks of Biological Weapons; …An Emerging Threat: Bio-Terrorism; …Means of Protection: Active & Passive Defences; …International Efforts to Counter the Threat of Biological Weapons

4. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Biological Agents of Military Significance: Bacteria: Single-cell organisms that cause diseases as anthrax, plague, and tularemia. Although many pathogenic bacteria are susceptible to antibiotic drugs, strains can be selected that are resistant to antibiotic and occur naturally. Bacteria can be readily grown in artificial media using facilities similar to those found in the brewery industry; Virus: 100 times smaller than bacteria and occur in large numbers in nature. Among disease-producing viruses are smallpox, Ebola, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. Viruses must be grown on living tissue and they can mutate naturally or be genetically engineered to increase their effectiveness; Rickettsiae: Similar to bacteria in structure and form but must be grown on living tissue. Diseases caused by rickettsiae include Q-fever, typhus, and Rocky Mountain spotted fever; Fungi: Occur greatly in nature and could be used to destroy crops. Relatively few species appear to have potential for deliberate use against humans. The fungal pathogens that cause hardship and famine are potato blight and cereal rust; Toxins: Non-living products of micro-organisms, plants or living creatures such as botulinum toxin, ricin from castor beans, or saxitoxin from shellfish. Toxins can only affect those exposed to the toxin and cannot produce transmissible diseases.

5. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Characteristics and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human Biological Agents: Type of Name of IncubationLength of Effective Symptoms& AgentAgent Period Illness Dosage Effects Bacteria Bacillus Anthracis 1 to 6 day3 to 5 days 10,000 Fever and fatigue; often (anthrax)spores followed by improvement,then abruptonset ofsevere respiratoryproblems; shock; pneumoniaand deathwithin 2-3 days Yersinia pestis 2 to 10 day1 to 2 days100 to Malaise, high fever, can lead (bubonic plague)20,000 to hemorrhage(shedblood),organismscirculatory failure anddeath Brucella Suis 1 to 3 weekdays 1,300Fever and chills, headache, (brucellosis) organismsloss of appetite, mental depression, extreme fatigue Pasteurella 3 to 5 days half of 10 to 50 General pain, an irritant, tularensis victims die organisms cough, feeling of general (tularemia)in 30 days illness

6. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Characteristics and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human Biological Agents (continued): Type of Name of Incubation Length of Effective Symptoms & Agent Agent Period Illness Dosage Effects Viruses Venezulean 1 to 5 days days to 25 Fever, chills, gastro-equineweeksinfectious intestinalhemorrage, encephalitis units severe headache, nausea, vomiting, can lead to coma, shock and death Rickettsiae Coxiella burnetii 10 to 20 days 2 days to 10 or less Pneumonia, cough, chest (Q-fever) 2 weeksorganisms pain Toxins Saxitoxin minutes to fatal after 150 Dizziness, paralysis of hoursinhalation microgramsmuscles of respiration, and causes death in minutes Botulinum Toxin hours to days 1 to 3 days 70 Dizziness, dry throat & nanograms mouth, blurred vision abrupt respiratoryfailure, and causes death Ricin hours days 200 Rapid onset of nausea, microgramsvomiting, cramps, vascularcollapse, fever and cough

7. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Potential Effects of Biological Agents If Used for Military or Terrorist Purposes: Disseminating by airplane of 50 kg of anagent Along a 2 km line upwind of a population of 500,000.* Agent Downwind Reach (km) Dead Incapacitated Tick-Borne Encephalitis 1 9,500 35,000 Typhus 5 19,000 85,000 Brucellosis 10 500 100,000 Q-fever > 20 150 125,000 Tularemia > 20 30,000 125,000 Anthrax >> 20 95,000 125,000 *Presentation by David R. Franz (Southern Research Institute, Frederick, MD) during the NATO Advanced Research Workshop “The Role of Biotechnology in Countering BTW Agents,” 21-23 October 1998, Prague, Czech Republic.

8. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Past Record of Military Uses of Biological Warfare Agents: 1346-1347: Mongols catapult corpses contaminated with plague over the walls into Kaffa (in Crimea), forcing besieged Genovans to flee; 1710: Russian troops allegedly used plague-infected corpses against Swedes; 1767: During the French and Indian Wars, the British gave blankets used to wrap British smallpox victims to hostile Indian tribes; 1916-1918: German agents used anthrax and the equine disease glanders to infect livestock and feed for export to Allied forces. Incidents include the infection of Romanian sheep with anthrax and glanders for export to Russia, Argentinian mules with anthrax for export to Allied troops, and American horses fed with glanders for export to France; 1937: Japan began its offensive biological weapons program. Over the course of the program, at least 10,000 prisoners are killed in Japanese experiments; 1939: Nomonhan Incident - Japanese poisoned Soviet water supply with intestinal typhoid bacteria at former Mongolian border. First use of biological weapons by Japanese;

9. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Past Record of Military Uses of Biological Warfare Agents (continued): 1940: The Japanese dropped rice and wheat mixed with plague-carrying fleas over China and Manchuria; 1942-1943: Great Britain conducted trials on Gruinard Island off the northwest coast of Scotland to investigate the feasibility of biological warfare. The British government decontaminated the Gruinard Island in 1986 and returned the island to its original owners in 1990; June, 1966: The United States conducted a test of vulnerability to covert BW attack by releasing a harmless biological simulant into the New York City subway system; April 2, 1979: Outbreak of pulmonary anthrax in Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union. In 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin acknowledges that the outbreak was caused by an accidental release of anthrax spores from a Soviet military microbiological facility;

10. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Knowledge Required to Manufacture Biological Weapons: ...The most elemental step for the production of biological agents is acquisition of a seedstock of agent.This step is easy to accomplish. Biological agents can be isolated from their natural sources, or a seedstock can be requested from culture collections, or obtained from anyone who has micro-organisms for medical or research purposes. The next step is to grow the amount desired. Actual production of agent requires simple equipment such as fermenters and other containers and an understanding of microbiology and how growth media work. The scientific know-how and equipment to culture micro-organisms are essential capabilities pervasive in the biotechnology industry all over the world. …The infective dose of the potential biological agent; …The method of attack on the target population (e.g., inhalation, ingestion, or by an insect vector); …The means of dispersion of the biological agent; …The ability of the biological agent to survive until it reaches the target; …The time to effect or cause disease in the target population; … The biological agent needs to be producible.

11. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Military-Strategic Advantages & Drawbacks of Biological Weapons: Advantages: …Since biological agents (except toxins) multiply inside the host bodies, small amounts --just a few micro-organisms of a biological agent-- may be sufficient to devastate a crop, a herd of animals, and a city’s inhabitants; …Effects of biological agents take time to develop. A number of days or weeks must transpire, depending on the micro-organism and the rate at which it multiplies in the body; …Due to delayed effects of biological agents they can be used for attacking fixed targets such as airbases, ports, naval headquarters, troop assembly areas, and logistic concentrations; …The delayed effect of biological agents makes attribution difficult, especially when an endemic disease is used. Hence, it is plausible to both hide and deny biological weapons attack; …The cost of establishing a biological weapons program has steadily reduced with the advances in microbiology and biotechnology that make agent production much easier. The comparative cost of civilian casualties is $2,000/km2 with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, and $1 with biological weapons (“poor man’s atomic bomb”);

12. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Military-Strategic Advantages & Drawbacks of Biological Weapons (continued): Drawbacks: …Because of the delayed effects of biological agents they may not be effectively used in the battlefield; …The area that will be contaminated by biological weapons will have to be decontaminated by proper methods while the result may not be assuring. Hence, military victory over the combatant may not be coupled with territorial gain; …Effective dissemination of biological weapons is a challenging task because the biological agent is a fragile living organism that has to survive until it reaches the target. If bombs or rockets are employed to disseminate the agent, the heat and shock produced by the detonation of the explosive may kill the living micro-organisms; …Once living micro-organisms are dispersed into the atmosphere, the agents will then be exposed to environmental and climatic conditions. Hence, effectiveness of biological weapons will be determined, among others, by meteorological conditions. The distance downwind at which an effective dose will be delivered to the target population will be determined by local weather condition. For instance, under ideal conditions, such as calm night with steady wind, the agent will probably be disseminated over hundreds of kilometers, while under turbulent, sunny conditions the distance that the agent will be carried downwind will be greatly reduced, and a proportion of the agents may be killed before reaching the target population;

13. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu An Emerging Threat: Bio-Terrorism: …Since weaponization of biological agents does not require extremely demanding high technology and since biological agents are rather easily accessible, well organized terrorist groups including members from various scientific fields have the potential to produce biological weapons. For instance the Japanese cult “Aum Shinrikyo” which is responsible for the Sarin attack in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is known to have a cadre of thousands of scientists, engineers, technicians and experts in various disciplines; …Because of the low cost of producing biological weapons, terrorist groups can afford such a lethal weapon which may cause mass casualties; …Biological agents can be dispersed by simple non-military vehicles such as civilian aircraft, agricultural sprayers, a van equipped with a fan and specialized ventilators, or by simply choosing an upwind location close to population areas; …As rivalry between big country - small country sharpens, small countries may resort to “war by proxy” strategy by giving wide support to terrorist groups equipped with biological agents produced by the sponsor state; …For the time being the likelihood of a biological terrorist attack is not high. However, this is a typical “low probability high consequences” scenario. Thus, states need to take elaborate and costly counter-measures.

14. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Means of Protection: Active & Passive Defenses: Active Defense: …Preventing delivery systems by military means reaching the vicinity of the target population by intercepting and destroying incoming delivery vehicles; …Preemptive strike against the potential aggressor’s biological weapons facilities; Passive Defense: …Conducting hazard assessment by evaluating the area and the size of the population at risk in the event of the biological attack; …Increasing the detection capability by furnishing an alarm system alerting officials that a biological attack is imminent. Ideally, detection systems are situated a sufficient distance upwind of the asset being produced to enable sufficient warning before the agent cloud arrives over the target downwind;

15. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Means of Protection: Active & Passive Defenses (continued): …Increasing physical protection capability such as using physical barriers to protect the target population from exposure to a biological agent; …Since the risks of illness from skin exposure to biological agents are minimal, respirators and masks are the principal personal protective gear; …Medical counter-measures can negate or blunt the effects of some biological agents. Therefore, personnel can be vaccinated against some agents. Vaccinations are available to counteract against some biological agents such as anthrax, Plague, Q-fever, and tularemia; …Medical counter-measures can also be administered after exposure to a biological agent such as applying antibiotics; The effectiveness of medical treatment depends on the availability of advance knowledge of the specific biological agent involved.

16. Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu International Efforts to Counter the Threat of Biological Weapons: …Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975 prohibits countries from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling and retaining an entire class of biological and toxin weapons; …The major weakness of the BTWC is that it does not have a verification mechanism. Therefore, it is not possible to verify that no such an activity takes place in suspect countries some of which are in the Middle East; …Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in the United Nations Offices in Geneva resulted in a full-fledged and effective verification mechanism in the Spring of 2001, which was however objected by the United States in July the same year; …Informal cooperation and collaboration among states, especially in the field of intelligence, is probable. However, there is reluctance in most states in sharing sensitive national intelligence with other states unless there exists a common interest or there is a strategic partnership between the states.