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3GPP requirements to SIP draft-garcia-sipping-3gpp-reqs-02.txt

3GPP requirements to SIP draft-garcia-sipping-3gpp-reqs-02.txt. Miguel A. Garcia mailto:miguel.a.garcia@ericsson.com. Background information.

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3GPP requirements to SIP draft-garcia-sipping-3gpp-reqs-02.txt

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  1. 3GPP requirements to SIPdraft-garcia-sipping-3gpp-reqs-02.txt Miguel A. Garcia mailto:miguel.a.garcia@ericsson.com

  2. Background information • 3GPP IP Multimedia Subsystem architecture and issues, presentation in IETF 51st in London, http://www.softarmor.com/sipping/meets/ietf51/slides/pres-drage-3gpp-arch3-sipping-ietf51.ppt • 3GPP dependencies on IETF (living document), http://www.3gpp.org/TB/Other/IETF.htm

  3. Session release (6.14) • Problem: phone dies or administrative disconnection • Must release network resources, stop billing • Network layer 2 can detect and report a dead phone • How to use this information at application layer? • Requires fine granularity (not session timer) • Requires feature transparency (not B2BUA) • Proposals: • Use SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFY (complex solution) • Use another protocol (why) • A proxy sends BYEs (preferred by 3GPP)

  4. Inbound scenario (MT) • Initial message reaches home proxy • Home proxy retargets to registered contact • Message must visit specific remote proxies before reaching the phone • topology hiding • compression, etc • Proposal • Home proxy stores path and appends it as a service route on initial message

  5. Outbound scenario (MO) • Phone uses outbound proxy rule to send message to visited proxy • Message must visit a set of proxies before reaching final destination • Services provided by home proxy • Services are independent of roaming • Proposal • Visited proxy stores path on registration, appends as service route on initial message

  6. Remote proxy service (6.15) • Initial requests must visit dynamically assigned service proxies that can be more than one proxy hop away • How to discover the set of hops (vector) • How to traverse the vector • Proposals: • 3GPP Path header (solves 1) • Preloaded route header (solves 2) • Loose routing parameter in Route header (solves 2) • Service-Route header (solves 2)

  7. Additional signaling information • Need to transport (in existing messages) additional signaling information between the mobile and the proxies or between proxies • Examples: Cell-ID (6.13), Visited network name (6.3.5), Charging-IDs (6.18). • Possible solutions: • Another body (not suitable for the air interface) • Another protocol (why?) • New headers (preferred)

  8. Extensible authentication • Or providing support for past and future authentication schemes (6.23.1) • Security always needs setup/infra • Undesirable to change the infrastructure • Most of the cost is in the cards, processes … • 3GPP requirement on being able to use SIM cards • Only place for a single card, undesirable to have additional user configurations • Proposal • HTTP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

  9. Authentication (6.23.2.3) • Want to avoid extra roundtrips (both INVITE and towards AAA), computation • Initial authentication followed by lower-cost protection for subsequent signaling • Long term keys are stored outside the SIP server • This issue is raised in both security frameworks • Proposal • Authenticate the first SIP message (typically REGISTER) + security association between proxies and UA • Enhanced integrity protection in HTTP digest

  10. Picking security scheme (6.23.3) • Or making SIP aware of security in the path • Digest is vulnerable to MitM attack • SIP has many security methods, how to choose between these • Large, long-lasting deployments can’t switch to new sw/new policy; still want to use new equipment and avoid MitM • Proposals: • NEGOTIATE (does not prevent MitM) • Security agreement: draft-arkko-sip-sec-agree-00.txt

  11. Security in the phone (6.23.4) • Can’t have public key operations, PKI deployment, extra roundtrips, TCP only operation • Hop-by-hop solves only part of the problem. Need for end-to-end and end-to-middle protection • Proposal • Extended digest to improve integrity protection (not just hop-by-hop) draft-sen-sipping-onehop-digest-00.txt

  12. Conclusion • We will work on the following I-Ds: • PATH header • Source loose routing (rolled into bis?) • Cell-ID, visited network name, charging-ID headers • Network initiated session release (rolled into bis?) • HTTP extensible authentication protocol • Security agreement • One hop digest

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