400 likes | 513 Views
Trade Remedy Actions in NAFTA for Agriculture & Agri-food Industries : Increasing? Alternatives? Linda Young, John Wainio and Karl Meilke. Our objectives:. Examine the economic rationale for administered protection Does it hold in NAFTA? Evaluate data on the use of AD/CVD
E N D
Trade Remedy Actions in NAFTA for Agriculture & Agri-food Industries: Increasing? Alternatives?Linda Young, John Wainio and Karl Meilke
Our objectives: • Examine the economic rationale for administered protection • Does it hold in NAFTA? • Evaluate data on the use of AD/CVD • Propose changes to current procedures • Broaden the options-new ideas
Economic Rationale: • AD actions make little economic sense, particularly within an FTA • Protectionist actions rewarding rent-seeking behavior • Punish firms for behavior in foreign markets that is considered normal for domestic firms • Expensive to initiate and defend, but… • CVD actions are different • Economic efficiency losses associated with both
AD/CVD Cases Initiated by NAFTA Countries1/1/1984 - 6/30/2001
. • As traditional trade barriers are lowered, the use of trade remedy law rises.
Trade Liberalization Has Not Resulted in More AD/CVD Investigations Pre-CUSFTA Post-CUSFTA Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
NAFTA Partners Target Each Other’s Imports Less Than Those of Other Countries 1989 - 1999
NAFTA Countries Are Far More Likely to be the Target in Cases Investigating Agricultural Trade1989 - 1999
Is Agricultural Trade Overrepresented in AD/CVD Cases? (1989 - 1999)
Even in Agriculture, the Three Countries Target Partner’s Trade Less Than Others 1989 - 1999
Active AD/CVD Measures Within NAFTA As of 6/30/2001 United States United States Mexico Canada Mexico Canada
Malt beverages (220300)Initiation - 1991 Duty - 1991 Revoked - 1994
Tomato paste (200290)Initiation - 1992 No injury finding - 1993
Cauliflower (070410)Initiation - 1992 No injury finding - 1993
Refined Sugar (1701 & 1702)Initiation - 1995 AD duty in effect
What do we want to achieve? • Reduce incidence, retaliation, costs • Maintain transparency • Maintain ability to protect producers • Cognizant of the goals of FTA; • And…
One more criterion • The extent to which changes assist producers in considering their domestic market to be tri-national • Why? • Rules have changed quickly • Paradigms and institutions have not kept pace
Trinational Market (almost) • However, producers still largely identify with the national market • Slow to develop bi or tri-national commodity groups • Such institutions may increase gains to producers through cooperation in market development, research, joint work on SPS, lowering costs of crossing the border, other joint efforts
Options for Change: Tweaks • Increase the difficulty of requirements to impose duties or change criteria for the level of the duty • Increase the de minimis level • Increase the level of negligible imports • Restrict the duty to address injury only • Change the calculation of duties to account for practices in the domestic industry.
Options for Change: Tweaks (con’t) • Provision requiring evaluation of the impact of duties on the general interest of the FTA
Consultations • Not required for AD/CVD • Important component of dispute resolution systems of NAFTA and WTO • Involve: • Clarification of legal basis of dispute • Discussion on why policy undertaken • Options for resolution explored
How Successful are Consultations? • WTO considered 51 cases (July 2001) with completed panel reports • 37 cases resolved in consultations, 7 more before completed panel reports • Thought required to adopt within NAFTA AD/CVD • Scope of parties included
Eliminate AD Suits Entirely • Australia and New Zealand have • Canada and Chile have • Also working on eliminating CVD • Why? Trans-Tasman market: • Hamper efficient allocation of resources • Rationale no longer exists • Detrimental to commercial relationships
Introduce Alternative Dispute Resolution • ADR: processes usually involve a third party neutral • Why change a system? Does the current system produce: • Acceptable and durable outcomes? • Are the costs acceptable? • Impact on relationships-does it matter? • Disputant involved in the resolution?
Factors Leading to AD/CVD Suits-More than rents • Import surge • Change in industry structure • Low prices • Misinformation • Different policies and marketing institutions • Leadership bid AD/CVD process Duty or not
Tensions underlying are not alleviated! Treat one symptom, low prices (maybe) Causes of dispute largely unalleviated Causes of dispute Reoccurrence!
Characteristics of Dispute Resolution Systems • Assessment of resolution options • Identification of issues and development of agenda of issues • Fact finding • Collaborative problem solving • Settlement
AD and CVD processes:Are not dispute resolution systems! • ‘Administrative review’ • No choice of resolution options to participants • Does not considered broad interests • Access to other NAFTA markets • Avoidance of a counter-suit • General de-escalation of use of trade-remedies
AD/CVD are not dispute resolution systems (con’t) • Regulatory and policy harmonization • Trade liberalization generally • Unified domestic industry • Fact finding rigid, not participatory • No problem solving – duties or not • Settlement- trade tension still exists
Good Offices • When a third party works to correct misunderstandings and fear, and increase communication • Used by the WTO and the UN • Good Offices might be useful within NAFTA
Mandatory Facilitated Dialogue • Proposal: complainants engage in a dialogue, facilitated by a neutral, before the suit can be investigated by national protection agencies • Purpose: • In general a type of mediation to explore interests, issues and options, less geared toward settlement
Mandatory Facilitated Dialogue • Specifically, to engage the complainant in a wide-ranging discussion on the consequences, costs and benefits widely defined, of pursuing the suit
Costs and Benefits • Will the defending industry retaliate? • Is the domestic industry unified? Costs of proceeding? • Gains from cooperation – how affected? • Correct misinformation through joint data collection
It could happen… • If one NAFTA industry is selling below the costs of production then likely all are • … might be discussed during the facilitated dialogue
Need to think further a field • Tensions from economic integration inappropriately channeled into AD/CDV • NAFTA needs processes for industry groups for managing those tensions • An array could include good offices, faciliated dialogue, mediation offered by the NAFTA secretariate
What is Possible • Economists have long been disenchanted with AD/CVD processes- • Political opposition to eliminating them is fierce • Leaving them in place may make it possible to put more effective measures of dispute resolution up front