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controls in biosafety i emd545b lecture 5

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controls in biosafety i emd545b lecture 5

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    1. Controls in Biosafety I EMD545b Lecture #5 Facility Design & Engineering Controls Supplemental Video for this presentation is entitled, “BSL3 for Service and Maintenance Personnel” which provides an overview in of what Containment or BSL3 facilities are used for and how they operate. It also shows how individuals work (briefly) within the BSL3 lab and how the lab contains aerosols in the event of a release outside of primary containment. The remainder of the video shows maintenance personnel what the process is to request access to such facilities and how to work within the facilities once inside the lab. This video is available at any time through the web at www.yale.edu/oehs. Once on this site open Biosafety, then open the icon “More Info.” Once this is open click on the BSL3 for Service and Maintenance Personnel video to play it online. The instructor can determine how best to utilize the video and when to show it if at all. Supplemental Video for this presentation is entitled, “BSL3 for Service and Maintenance Personnel” which provides an overview in of what Containment or BSL3 facilities are used for and how they operate. It also shows how individuals work (briefly) within the BSL3 lab and how the lab contains aerosols in the event of a release outside of primary containment. The remainder of the video shows maintenance personnel what the process is to request access to such facilities and how to work within the facilities once inside the lab. This video is available at any time through the web at www.yale.edu/oehs. Once on this site open Biosafety, then open the icon “More Info.” Once this is open click on the BSL3 for Service and Maintenance Personnel video to play it online. The instructor can determine how best to utilize the video and when to show it if at all.

    3. Facility Design Overview Security/Life Safety Elements fire rated doors emergency lighting Intrusion alarms (motion detectors, etc.) restricted access (locks, keycard) lock boxes, locked storage equipment background checks on personnel

    4. Facility Design Overview Secondary Barriers BSL1 - BSL4 Laboratories BSL1 - basic lab BSL2 - basic lab + aerosol confinement biosafety cabinet BSL3 - containment laboratory 2 door separation from building occupants BSL4 - maximum containment laboratory separate building from general research population

    5. Biosafety Level 1 Laboratory Door Sink Easily cleaned work surfaces Impervious bench tops Sturdy furniture Windows fitted with fly screens

    7. BSL2 Laboratory BSL1 Lab plus: lockable doors chairs covered with non-fabric material Biosafety cabinets installed as needed eyewash available negative airflow, non-recirculation recommended door closed when work is in progress autoclave within facility

    8. Signs and Labels Biohazard warning labels on equipment

    9. Biosafety Level 3 “The laboratory has special engineering and design features.” CDC/NIH BMBL, 5th Ed. 2007

    11. Photo of a series of HEPA filters from a high containment laboratory.Photo of a series of HEPA filters from a high containment laboratory.

    12. BL3 Lab Design Elements 2 door entry (ante-room, airlock) Solid easily cleanable surfaces (floor, walls, ceiling) Coved floors Sealed penetrations Lighting flush to ceiling Hands-free sink near exit door Eyewash/shower station Pass through autoclave

    15. Signs and Labels BL3 Door Sign agent name entry requirements emergency contact(s) lab personnel safety personnel campus emergency responders

    16. BL3 Lab Design Elements Negative airflow (into lab) Most negative at rear of lab > 12 air changes per hour -0.05”H20 pressure diff. Dedicated exhaust fan Exhaust/supply interlock Exhaust velocity >3000 fpm, away from intakes, people Direct exhaust, no recirculation

    17. BL3 Lab Design Elements Airflow monitor, gauges CO2/N2 feed from outside Keycard, locked access Doors open inward, self-closing Access fixtures from outside space Door sign at entry Class II BSC Canopy exhaust over BSC Means of communication to areas outside lab

    18. BSL-3 Lab Design

    19. BSL-3 Lab Design

    20. BSL-3 Lab Design

    21. BSL-3 Lab Design

    22. BSL-3 Lab Design

    23. BSL-3 Lab Design

    24. BSL-3 Lab Design

    25. BSL-3 Lab Design

    26. BSL-3 Lab Design

    27. Preparation Procedures Entry Procedures Verify airflow Enter ante room Close outer door Sign log book Don PPE Supplies Enter laboratory Photos of pressure gauges that can be used to provide a visual indicator of airflow into the laboratory. Researchers can reference the pressure levels with previous readings. Significant deviations in either direction should be reported to Building Services and the Biosafety Office for investigation. Devices should have audible and visible alarms to help signal low pressure or airflow reversal. This alarm should be audible from inside the laboratory if it were to occur while work was in progress. Photos of pressure gauges that can be used to provide a visual indicator of airflow into the laboratory. Researchers can reference the pressure levels with previous readings. Significant deviations in either direction should be reported to Building Services and the Biosafety Office for investigation. Devices should have audible and visible alarms to help signal low pressure or airflow reversal. This alarm should be audible from inside the laboratory if it were to occur while work was in progress.

    28. For work in a Biosafety Cabinet solid-front or wrap-around gown gloves (double gloving) face protection (face shield or mask and safety glasses)

    30. For work outside a Biosafety cabinet solid-front or wrap-around gown or jump suit gloves (double gloving) face protection (face shield or mask and safety glasses) Respiratory protection if aerosols are generated

    32. BL4 Lab - Max Containment

    33. Containment Lab Planning Team Project managers, engineers, architects, electricians, HVAC, controls, safety, researchers, USERS! Formal program document of requirements description of all proposed activities #’s (personnel occupancy) major equipment requirements space allocation general environmental control criteria facility controls

    34. Containment Lab Planning Team Questions: Specific single project? Future changes, government regulations? Flexibility in design? Pathogenic microbes used? Quarantine areas needed? Animals? #’s? Species? Treatment of liquid or air effluents? Transitional areas needed? Finishings, Services (water, vacuum, gas, air, etc.) Commissioning/Verification

    35. Communication Local/state public health offices Public affairs office Biosafety Committee Citizens (neighbors) Toronto debacle Winnipeg’s “accident” CDC (in the shadow of Emory University) The BU BSL4 Lab Establishing a relationship with the local community early in the “Planning” phase is essential for the success of the project (especially for high containment or BSL4 Laboratory Facilities). Toronto: A BSL4 facility was constructed without awareness by the public. When an announcement was made regarding the impending opening of the BSL4, the citizens protested so vehemently that it was never allowed to perform BSL4 experiments and is regarded as the world’s most expensive BSL3 laboratory. Canada’s remarkable BSL4 laboratory in Winnipeg had an unfortunate moment when BSL3 research waste was accidentally released to the sewer without decontamination. Although the risk was very low, this demonstrated a potential release of biohazards just before the start date for BSL4 experiments. Ordinarily, this would have been a public relations disaster, but Winnipeg had such a strong relationship with the local community that they were able to explain what happened, the low risk, and what was done to prevent a future release and have had a very successful BSL4 opening. The CDC’s BSL4 laboratory is adjacent to Emory University. Occasionally, Emory students are asked if they are fearful that the most dangerous agents in the world are handled next to their campus. The usual response by the students (or least 10 – 15 years ago) was not of concern, but of admiration for the research that is conducted there. Emory students also have access to CDC researchers in classes and for lab research opportunities so this relationship has been strong for some period of time. The Boston University (BU) BSL4 laboratory has seen its official opening day delayed in large part due to pressure from activist groups. It could open as the National Biocontainment Laboratory as planned when the dust settles or could become the new “most expensive BSL3 lab” in the world. Establishing a relationship with the local community early in the “Planning” phase is essential for the success of the project (especially for high containment or BSL4 Laboratory Facilities). Toronto: A BSL4 facility was constructed without awareness by the public. When an announcement was made regarding the impending opening of the BSL4, the citizens protested so vehemently that it was never allowed to perform BSL4 experiments and is regarded as the world’s most expensive BSL3 laboratory. Canada’s remarkable BSL4 laboratory in Winnipeg had an unfortunate moment when BSL3 research waste was accidentally released to the sewer without decontamination. Although the risk was very low, this demonstrated a potential release of biohazards just before the start date for BSL4 experiments. Ordinarily, this would have been a public relations disaster, but Winnipeg had such a strong relationship with the local community that they were able to explain what happened, the low risk, and what was done to prevent a future release and have had a very successful BSL4 opening. The CDC’s BSL4 laboratory is adjacent to Emory University. Occasionally, Emory students are asked if they are fearful that the most dangerous agents in the world are handled next to their campus. The usual response by the students (or least 10 – 15 years ago) was not of concern, but of admiration for the research that is conducted there. Emory students also have access to CDC researchers in classes and for lab research opportunities so this relationship has been strong for some period of time. The Boston University (BU) BSL4 laboratory has seen its official opening day delayed in large part due to pressure from activist groups. It could open as the National Biocontainment Laboratory as planned when the dust settles or could become the new “most expensive BSL3 lab” in the world.

    36. Community Design Wish List HEPA filtered exhaust air Alarms & supply/exhaust interlock Emergency back-up power (fan, biosafety cabinets, freezers) Effluent sterilization system Pass through autoclave Shower The Community is going to want the institution to have “everything.” All possible primary and secondary containment features will be desirable by the Community. The Community is going to want the institution to have “everything.” All possible primary and secondary containment features will be desirable by the Community.

    37. Community Design Wish List True airlock Separate clean (entry) and dirty (exit) anterooms Glove boxes Ducted or canopy connected biosafety cabinets Dunk tanks, pass through autoclaves, facility sterilization system Backflow prevention

    38. Community Design Wish List Trained architect/planners/builders Trained research and safety staff Initial and ongoing commissioning Written facility policy manual Emergency procedures known and practiced Focus on eliminating community exposure Not in my backyard!

    39. Engineering Controls Primary Barriers Mechanical devices that minimize exposure Must be applied before work practices and personal protective equipment

    40. Chemical Fume Hood Room air drawn into front opening Direct ducted exhaust to exterior of building at roof level 100 fpm inflow velocity dilution of toxic, flammable chemicals

    41. Class I Biosafety Cabinet HEPA-filtered fume hood Protects worker and environment No product protection inflow velocity 75 fpm Exhaust to room or hard-ducted

    42. Class II Type A1 Biosafety Cabinet inflow velocity 100 fpm 70% air recirculation Protection of worker, product, and environment

    43. Class II Type B2 BSC Total exhaust BSC Can use small quantities of chemicals or radioactive materials

    44. HEPA-filtered Gloveboxes

    45. Animal Care Containment Cage dumping station Confinement of pathogenic waste, allergens

    46. Clean Bench - Horizontal Flow Product protection only Air blown at operator from across work area Not for use with potential biohazards, cell culture work, or allergens

    47. Sharps Percutaneous exposure risk employ safe work practices utilize safe sharp devices Aerosol risk work practices, containment equipment for confinement

    48. Safe Sharps Devices

    49. Sharps with Integrated Shields

    50. Safer Products Mylar wrapped glass capillary tubes Plastic Vacutainers

    51. Other Engineering Controls Animal Care & Use microisolater cages, ventilated cage racks ventilated cage racks poles & collars (NHP’s) squeeze-back cages Spill-clean up tongs, forceps, broom & dust pan, manila folder paper towels, bench matting

    52. Engineering Controls Gasketed blenders, homogenizers Cotton plugs, filters for flasks in shakers filtered pipette tips HEPA and hydrophobic vacuum line filters Plastic pipettes Gas burners w/ shield, microincinerator Centrifuges interlock, solid cover, safety buckets, O-rings

    53. Transport Containers

    54. Rigid Medical Waste Containers For items that could puncture a bag Never allow to overfill

    55. Reusable Sharps Use tongs to handle Place in disinfectant bath Use labeled leak-proof container 15 minute decon prior to handling Clean and terminal disinfection

    56. Plastic for Sharps Avoid glass pasteur pipettes Plastic transfer pipettes Plastic aspiration pipettes Other plastic products

    57. Centrifuge Containment Load/unload in BSC Wait 2 minutes after run to allow aerosols to settle Decontaminate centrifuge and buckets after each use

    58. Mechanical Devices for Sharps Keep hands away from needles Use mechanical methods for removal Only use if absolutely required as part of a process

    59. Scalpel Removal Device

    60. Confinement at Source

    61. Vacuum System Protection

    62. Medical Waste Receptacles Biohazard bags and boxes Sharps containers

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