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Preparing Melbourne’s Electrical Supply For The 2006 Commonwealth Games

Preparing Melbourne’s Electrical Supply For The 2006 Commonwealth Games. Presented by Michael Farr Manager Networks – Queensland Sinclair Knight Merz. Commonwealth Games 2006. Biggest event ever staged in Victoria Held over 11 days in March 2006 71 nations 7,200 athletes

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Preparing Melbourne’s Electrical Supply For The 2006 Commonwealth Games

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  1. Preparing Melbourne’s Electrical Supply For The 2006 Commonwealth Games Presented by Michael Farr Manager Networks – Queensland Sinclair Knight Merz

  2. Commonwealth Games 2006 • Biggest event ever staged in Victoria • Held over 11 days in March 2006 • 71 nations • 7,200 athletes • 3,100 media representatives • 1.6m tickets sold • 90,000 visitors

  3. Melbourne Statistics

  4. Commonwealth Games 2006 • All major venues in the inner suburbs of Melbourne (Citipower) • Venues supplied at 11kV • First time all venues operated at full capacity simultaneously • CBD was very busy at this time

  5. Orientation

  6. Orientation

  7. Historical CBD Reliability Incidents • 1998_Auckland multiple cable failure – 3 out of 4 cables ultimately failed causing extended disruption (~A$75M) • 1998_New York incident approximately A$75M. • 2001_Cost of the two Melbourne CBD incidents estimated at $10M and $3M based on commercial VCR. • In both events initial planned plant outages were followed by secondary faults a number of days later that resulted in loss of supply to areas of the CBD. • 2003_SKM commissioned to conduct security of supply analysis • 2004_Somerville enquiry (Qld) • Transmission and sub-transmission feeders: N-2 • Transformers: N-1 • 2005/06_NSW Government mandates N-2 reliability down to the zone substations (132kV and 66kV)

  8. Historical Melbourne CBD Development The review findings were: • Although the network was designed and operated to an “N-1” security standard, there was little flexibility to reconfigure the 66kV network after a prior outage. • This lack of flexibility was one of the major reasons behind the two outages. • To provide improved network flexibility would require the network to be designed to a higher security standard.

  9. Historical Melbourne CBD Development In addition, the review found that Melbourne’s CBD security of supply was ranked very low in a comparison of equivalent major cities worldwide. Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Auckland, Wellington, Glasgow, Johannesburg, Capetown (Based on Planning Criteria and Energy at Risk)

  10. What security standard should apply for the Melbourne CBD?

  11. What security standard should apply for the Melbourne CBD? Recommended security standard is “N-1 Secure” Consistent with Transmission security standard; • Considers the nature and impact of the customers affected. • Cost effectiveness; • Captures most of the security benefits associated with “N-2” standard. • Accepted by ESC • ESC allocates A$250M for refurbishment and security of supply works

  12. Commonwealth Games 2006 • Key Risk Areas • Opening and closing ceremonies • Greatest loads, crowd volumes, dignitaries, media attention • Damage to underground assets • Pegs from temporary facilities eg tents • Overall system load • Co-incident with previous years system peak load period • All loads continuously monitored • Asset failure • All venue feeder maintenance and vegetation management brought forward • Access to assets • Accreditation for staff and vehicles • Most challenging

  13. Risks and Assessment • Key Focus Areas • Assets • Image • Incident management • People • Service • Stakeholders

  14. Commonwealth Games Specific Infrastructure Impact • Augmentation projects • Increase security of supply to major venues • Increase available capacity at the main venues

  15. Infrastructure Impact • Citipower HV CBD network • Cables are run to maximum capacity • Feeders arranged into groups • Each group can consist of up to 10 feeders • Each group has a dedicated standby feeder

  16. Infrastructure Impact • Standby arrangements reviewed • Second standby feeder to the MCG from a separate zone substation • Load projections provided by games officials did not consider harmonic components • Significant amount of extra lighting and computers/laptops would add min 10% additional load due to harmonics • Installation of 2 x 1.5MVA kiosk substations along the bank of the Yarra River

  17. Zone Sub station 1 L2 L1 L3 Standby Feeder 1 L4 L6 L5 Zone Sub station 2 Figure 2a . Existing MCG lights arrangement Zone Sub station 1 L2 L1 L3 Standby Feeder 2 Standby Feeder 1 L4 L6 L5 Zone Sub station 2 Figure 2b. . Altered MCG lights arrangement MCG Supply Arrangements

  18. Infrastructure Impact Cont’d • Inspection and Maintenance • High priority • Confirmed inspections policy • Additional substation, public lighting and reliability patrols – daily • Corona (UV) and infrared surveys of all key assets • All planned maintenance of key assets undertaken early incl zone substation equipment, HV insulator washing and vegetation management • Distribution substation audit regime • RMU types • HV and LV switchgear installed • Fuse condition, ventilation • Mobile phone reception • Confirmed each venue substation had suitable alternate LV inter-connector

  19. Infrastructure Impact Cont’d • Work Restrictions • Many Games venues were “locked down” 1 month before the start of the Games • Self imposed restrictions • Rescheduling works outside of the Games period • Not working on feeders or zone substations supplying key venues • Restricting all planned work near major venues or the CBD • Work on sub-transmission and transmission lines supplying zone substations supplying Games events restricted (H&S excluded)

  20. Infrastructure Impact Cont’d • Enhanced Field Response • Roster of site field technicians • Additional to system normal • Minimise switching times • Avoid access issues • Reported current, voltage, transformer temperatures – hourly to control room • Load monitoring model • Self updating graph – load profile • Additional (dedicated) fault response units (flying squads) • Ensure spare equipment placed at strategic sites • Standby generators • Quicker response than immediate repairs (access constraints) • Strategically located • Daily patrols of public lighting and general assets

  21. Infrastructure Impact Cont’d • Other Considerations • Ban on changes to systems • IT • Telecommunications • Call centre • Protection operating points recorded • Fuse size, condition, stocks • System stress tests undertaken twice before the Games period • Incident management • Network contingency and escalation plans enacted (min level 3 of 5)

  22. Outcome • Demand – 116.8 MW more than same period last year • Energy – 13,000 MWHr more than same period last year • Capacity – 16.4 MVA installed and 10MVA portable • Assets – 140 maintenance activities brought forward • Reliability (fortnight) customers off supply 4,451 (average 7011) • Staff 68 directly involved (fortnight) + additional 115 indirectly involved in the lead up • No outages at any of the Commonwealth Games Venues

  23. Legacy • Enhanced infrastructure to the major venues and open space areas • Minimal outages • Significantly enhanced reputation with stakeholders • Whole of business support • Increased revenue for the period

  24. Thank you for your time

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