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A ntitrust Economics 2013. David S. Evans University of Chicago, Global Economics Group. Elisa Mariscal CIDE, Global Economics Group. Topic 13: Predatory and other pricing strategies. Topic 13| Part 1 29 October 2013. Date. Overview. Key Takeaways.
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Antitrust Economics 2013 David S. Evans University of Chicago, Global Economics Group Elisa Mariscal CIDE, Global Economics Group Topic 13: Predatory and other pricing strategies Topic 13| Part 1 29 October 2013 Date
“Third-Degree Price Discrimination” Price Group 2 pays lower price P1 > P2 P1 P2 MC D2(P2) D1(P1) q2 q1 Output MR1 MR2
Price P1 P2 P3 D(P) MC q1 q2 q3 Output “First Degree Price Discrimination” Maximum profit for the firm; maximum total surplus; minimum consumer surplus.
Fee Members of Group 1 = Fee Members of Group 2 = Economics of Two-Part Tariffs Demand schedule is for member of group Price P1 P2 MC D2 D1 Q2 Q1 Output MR2 MR1
Bundled Products and Price Discrimination: The Case of Block Booking Suppose two products and two customers and each product costs $0. Source: George J. Stigler, “United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block Booking,” Supreme Court Review 152 (1963), pp. 152-157
Demand Aggregation and Package Sales Suppose two products and two customers and each product costs $0.
Price PI MCE PI ‘ MCI MR Output Monopoly Facing Actual or Potential Entry
Entrant Stay out Enter Incumbent 0 10 Fight Accommodate -1 0 4 5 Monopoly Facing Actual or Potential Entry