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SODA : S ervice- O n- D emand A rchitecture for Application Service Hosting Utility Platforms Dongyan Xu, Xuxian Jiang Lab FRIENDS (For Research In Emerging Network and Distributed Services) Department of Computer Sciences
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SODA: Service-On-Demand Architecture for Application Service Hosting Utility Platforms Dongyan Xu, Xuxian Jiang Lab FRIENDS (For Research In Emerging Network and Distributed Services) Department of Computer Sciences Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS) Purdue University
Outline • Motivations and goals • Related work • Research components of SODA • Summary and on-going work
Motivations • Vision of utility computing • Computation utility • Storage utility • Application service hosting • Conference management • e-Campaign • Digital government • Serving the underserved communities • IT function shadowing for disaster recovery • Virtual enterprise, collaboratory, and community
Our Goal • To build a value-added application service hosting platform based on shared infrastructure, achieving: • On-demand creation and provisioning • Virtualization • Isolation • Protection • Accountability • Privacy
Related Work • Utility computing architectures • VERITAS, HP UDC, IBM Oceano • Grid platforms • Computation:Globus, Condor, Legion, NetSolve, Harness, Cactus • Storage and data:SRB, NeST, Data Grid, OceanStore • Shared infrastructure • PlanetLab, Emulab • Active services • Active Service Grid, Berkeley Active Service Framework, CANS (NYU), Darwin, WebOS
Related Work • Resource isolation • GARA, QLinux (UMass), Virtual service (UMich), Resource Container, Cluster Reserves (Rice) • Virtualization technologies • Virtual super computer (aggregation):NOW, HPVM • Virtual OS, isolation kernel (slicing): VMWare, Xen (Cambridge), Denali (UW), UML, UMLinux, Virtual Private Server (Ensim) • Grid computing on VM: Virtuoso (Northwestern), Entropia • Virtual cluster:Cluster-on-Demand (Duke)
SODA • Service-On-Demand Architecture for application service hosting utility platforms • Research components of SODA • General architecture • Protection, intrusion detection, logging • Confined and VM-based overlay • Market-driven planning and management
Outline • Research components of SODA: • General architecture • Security and protection • Confined VM-based overlay • ‘Property’ planning and management
Detailed Information • Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, "SODA: a Service-On-Demand Architecture for Application Service Hosting Utility Platforms", Proceedings of The 12th IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing (HPDC-12), Seattle, WA, June 2003.
Overview of SODA AS Virtual service node AS’ SODA Host (physical)
AS1 ASn … Guest OS Guest OS Host OS One SODA host Virtualization: Key Technique • Two-level OS structure • Host OS • Guest OS • Strong isolation • Administration isolation • Installation isolation • Fault / attack Isolation • Recovery, migration, and forensics • Virtual service node • Application service (AS) • Guest OS • Internetworking enabled
Service Requests From Clients Service Requests From Clients Service Switch for S Service Switch for S’ Service S SODA Daemon Service S Service S’ SODA Daemon Service S’ SODA Daemon Virtual servicenode Guest OS Guest OS Guest OS Guest OS Host OS Host OS Host OS SODA Master SODA Agent Service Creation Requests From ASP
On the Same SODA Host WWW service Honeypot
Host OS and Guest OS • Guest OS: based on User-Mode Linux (UML), an open-source virtual OS (different from UMLinux and VServer) • By Jeff Dike, http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net • Running in user space of host OS • Separate kernel address space • Physical memory usage limit • Host OS: Linux (linux-2.4.19, enhanced) • CPU fair share scheduler (for CPU isolation between virtual service nodes)
Experiment: CPU Isolation VM1: CPU-intensive VM2: IO-intensive VM3: Web Original Linux Scheduler Enhanced Linux Scheduler
On-Demand Service Priming • Performed by SODA Daemon • Customization of guest OS (“cook to order” ) • Active service image downloading • Automatic bootstrapping of virtual service node
System call UML Linux getpid 27,276 1,208 geteuid 26,648 1,064 dup2 1,084 26,904 mmap 27,864 1,208 munmap 27,044 1,200 gettimeofday 1,368 37,004 Slow-Down (w/o optimization) Application level System call level (clock cycles)
Outline • Research components of SODA: • General architecture • Security and protection • Confined VM-based overlay • ‘Property’ planning and management
Detailed Information • Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, Rudolf Eigenmann, "Protection Mechanisms for Application Service Hosting Platforms", Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Int'l Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid (CCGrid 2004), Chicago, IL, April 2004. • Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, "Collapsar: A VM-Based Architecture for Network Attack Detention Center", to appear in Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium (Security '04), San Diego, CA, August 2004.
AS1 ASn … Guest OS Guest OS Host OS Security and Protection • Virtual switching and firewalling • IDS in guest OS kernel • Untamperable logging (‘blackbox’-ing)
Virtual Switching and Firewalling Virtual machine (with IP addr.) Guest OS Guest OS Guest OS Host OS Firewall SODA host (Invisible on Internet)
Kernort: IDS in Guest OS Kernel • Problems with traditional IDS • Encrypted traffic (e.g. ssh) makes NIDS less effective • App-level IDS process will be “killed”, once a machine is compromised • Log may be tampered with • Fail-open • Related projects • Backtracker (Michigan) • VMM-based retrospection (Stanford) • Forensix (OHSU) • ESP(Purdue CERIAS) • Open-source projects: Snort, Saint Jude
Kernort • VM-based IDS • Deployed in each VM • Inside guest OS kernel: a unique vista point • Customizable without affecting host OS • Clearer view • Untamperable logging (saved to SODA host) • Renewable signature (read from SODA host) • Fail-close instead of fail-open
Kernort: IDS in Guest OS Kernel Guest OS Guest OS IDS IDS
Kernort • Components • Kernort sensor • Event-driven (system call and packet reception) • Renewable signature set • Matching against a small signature set (“Top 20 most wanted”) • Kernort blackbox • Untamperable logging • Privacy preservation of ASes • Analyzer • Exhaustive signature matching • Detection of complex attack patterns • Session replay
Kernort Virtual machine Host OS Kernort (shaded areas: logs)
Outline • Research components of SODA: • General architecture • Security and protection • Confined VM-based overlay • ‘Property’ planning and management
Detailed Information • Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, "vBET: a VM-Based Emulation Testbed", Proceedings of ACM Workshop on Models, Methods and Tools for Reproducible Network Research (MoMeTools, in conjunction with ACM SIGCOMM 2003), Karlsruhe, Germany, August 2003. • Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, "VIOLIN: Virtual Internetworking on OverLay INfrastructure", Department of Computer Sciences Technical Report CSD TR 03-027, Purdue University, July 2003. • Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, “A Middleware Architecture for Confined Virtual Machine Overlays", in preparation, March 2004.
Traditional Overlay Network • Problems with traditional overlays: • Open for attacks • Attacks from the outside (i.e. Internet) against overlay nodes • Attacks from an overlay node against the outside • Difficult to manage • An overlay across multiple administration domains • A host participate in multiple overlays • Difficult to enforce overlay topology and traffic volume • VPN does not solve the problems
Firewall Firewall Firewall Traditional Overlay Network
VM-based Overlay • The case for VM-based overlay • Multiple overlays on shared infrastructure • On-demand creation • Confinement and isolation • VM introduces new network administration complexity • “What is this new machine that has suddenly appeared in my domain?” • “Where is the machine that was in my domain yesterday?” • “How much network connectivity should a VM have?” • “How many IP addresses for VMs?”
Confined VM-based Overlay • In addition to VM, we need VN for VMs • VN: a highly overloaded term (VPN, X-bone…) • What is new: Confined andVM-based overlays • Applications • Multi-institutional collaborations • Philanthropic (volunteer) computing systems • Network emulations
Firewall Firewall Firewall Confined VM-based Overlay VM VM VM ≤2Mbps ≤2Mbps Virtual infrastructure ≤1Mbps
Key Properties • Confined overlay topology and traffic • No attack possible from inside the overlay to the outside world • Virtual IP address space • No need for application modification and re-compilation
A More Generic Picture VIOLIN: Virtual Internetworking on OverLay INfrastructure
vBET: an Example of Confined Overlays on Demand • An education tool for network and distributed system emulation • Fidelity-preserving setup • Maneuverable network entities • Real-world network software • Strict confinement (network security experiment) • Flexible configuration • Not constrained by device/port availability • No manual cable re-wiring or hardware setup • Simultaneous experiments • Cost-effective
vBET vBET Features • Can be deployed in n ≥ 1 vBET servers • Efficient startup and tear-down of emulated entities • Strong network virtualization • IP address space • Virtual routers, switches, firewalls, end-hosts, links • Communications confined by virtual topology • Dynamic addition, deletion, migration, configuration of network entities
Emulation of OSPF Routing Demo video clip at:http://www.cs.purdue.edu/~jiangx/vBET/videos/vbet_ospf.avi
Outline • Research components of SODA: • General architecture • Security and protection • Confined VM-based overlay • ‘Property’ planning and management