Terrorist Motivations

1. Terrorist Motivations James JF Forest, Ph.D. Director of Terrorism Studies

2. Terrorist Motivations Key questions • Why do people resort to violence in pursuit of political or ideological ends? • What motivates terrorists? • What role do economics, psychology, sociology or other grievances play in motivating terrorist groups? Topics: • Psychological • Sociological • Strategic • Ideological

3. 3 Categories of Academic Theory • What influences individuals’ decision to join a terrorist group? • What local circumstances allow terrorist groups to thrive and grow? • What organizational dynamics influence group motivations?

4. Category 1: Individual Motivations • Terrorism is an individual’s strategic choice most often driven by combination of: • Intense grievances • Sense of crisis • Address a power imbalance - empower the disenfranchised • Combination of ideology and psychology • Religious ideology has replaced revolutionary ideology as most common • Domestic terrorists tend to be forward-looking (apocalyptic future) • International terrorists tend to be backward-looking (sense of grievance, humiliation, deprivation, or neglected duty)

5. Category 1: Individual Motivations • Psychological and Social dimensions • Moral disengagement • Displacement of responsibility • Disregard for/distortion of consequences • Dehumanization • Moral justification • Retributional Terrorist • The ties that bind: training camps, extended family, social networks; trusted networks = key

6. Psychological Factors Two basic schools of thought in psychology: • Terrorism as strategic logic(rational choice) • Terrorism as psycho-logic(psychological drives) Most well-known rational choice advocate is Martha Crenshaw, and most well-known psychological drive advocate is Jerrold Post.

7. Psychological Factors Rational Choice Approach Cost/Benefit Calculation => Strategic Bargaining => Management of Effect => Targeted Violence • Cost/benefit learning takes place thru exhausting unsuccessful methods or by contagion (copycat effect) • Bargaining treats terrorism as another form of blackmail or extortion (iterative game strategy) • Effect management refers to propaganda and publicity (calculus of terrorism) • Rationality most evident in choosing targets of violence or targets of influence

8. Psychological Factors Psychological Drive Approach Delusional Logic => Personality Traits => Need to Belong => Groupthink => Violence for Sake of Violence • Delusional logic is belief in rhetoric (“us vs. them”) • Personality traits most like narcissism or borderline disorder (externalization and splitting) • Need to belong (to a “basic assumption” group; e.g., task force) • Groupthink means excessive optimism and risk-taking (illusions of invulnerability, one-dimensional perceptions) • Violence becomes very reason for being, and not well-targeted

9. Psychological Factors Other Psychological Motivational Dimensions: - ideological absolutism- necrophilia (obsession with death)- self-assertion- selfish ends- self-identity- youth romantic appeal and heroism- giving the special importance to the activity - challenge to estrangement- conformity, standardization, satiety of society- game motivation (“one upsmanship”)

10. Sociological Factors Five ideas in sociology about terrorism: • The frustration-aggression hypothesis • The relative deprivation hypothesis • The negative identity hypothesis • The narcissistic rage hypotheses • The moral disengagement hypothesis Some of these discussed in Rex Hudson’s (2002) book Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why These are also discussed at http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/429/429lect02.htm

11. Sociological Factors Frustration-Aggression “Every act of aggression presupposes a frustration, which in turn, presupposes an instigation or stress.” Instigation/Stress => Frustration => Aggression • Instigations are repeated acts that bother or hassle • Stressors are events perceived as linear and cumulative

12. Sociological Factors Relative Deprivation “A fraternal feeling of injustice develops when similar others are perceived as receiving favored advantages.” Comparison with others => Sense of Injustice => Potential for Violence • Sometimes called “vicarious” frustration or inequity • Comparison group can be real or imaginary

13. Sociological Factors Negative Identity “A vindictive rejection of life’s role may develop from covert disappointments in identity development.” Disappointments => Vindictiveness => Identity-Defining Violence • Sometimes called “Romeo & Juliet Effect” if reject family’s plan • Or “Pastor’s Son Syndrome” if reject how morally raised • Called Negative Cases of Control Theory in criminology

14. Sociological Factors Narcissistic Rage “Inadequate reality testing and narcissistic injury during childhood creates need to blame others for inadequacies or shame.” Narcissistic injury => Need to avoid shame => Rage • Inadequate reality testing can be parent’s fault or own • Narcissistic injury = unique self-esteem problem for grandiose individuals who “split” self and project faults • Rage takes form of maintaining high ideals for self and avoiding blame

15. Sociological Factors Moral Disengagement “Insulation of self usually accompanies disinhibition and deindividuation in horrific acts of violence.”(A. Bandura) Insulation of Self => Disinhibition/Deindividuation => Violence • Self usually seen as hero, functionary, or crusader (Hacker 1996) • Disinhibition is freedom to act without moral restraints • Deindividuation is state of decreased self-evaluation (crowd psychology)

16. Psychiatric Factors Five main ideas in psychiatry about the terrorist as mentally ill: • Terrorist as psychopath • Terrorist as alienated • Terrorist as depressive • Terrorist as suicidal fanatic • Terrorist as Machiavellian None of these postulate insanity, a legal concept. Likewise, no one has found cases of psychosis.

17. Category 2: Local Circumstances • “Root causes” refers to political, economic and social conditions, before terrorism • However, these conditions exist in numerous places without terrorism • Also, conditions change once the conflict begins • Will policies that address grievances actually reduce terrorism? Expectations Opportunities

18. Category 3: Group Dynamics • Terrorism as weapon in a strategy • Terrorist attacks = form of strategic communication • Terrorism as a means to achieve goals and objectives • Strategic goals include: • Political change (e.g., overthrow govt.) • Social change (e.g., France headscarf ban) • Economic change (e.g., stop resource export) • Religious change (e.g., fundamentalism)

19. Category 3: Group Dynamics Strategic objectives of terrorism include: • Recognition: Gaining national or international recognition for their cause; recruiting new personnel; raising funds; demonstrating their strength • Coercion: Force a desired behavior of an individual or government • Intimidation: Prevent individuals, groups, or governments from acting • Provocation: Provoking overreaction by a government to the attack on symbolic targets or personnel, thereby gaining sympathy for their cause. • Insurgency support: Forcing the government to overextend itself in dealing with the threat, thereby allowing the insurgency to gain support and commit further attacks against the government.

20. Terrorism Works • In 6 of the 11 campaigns that ended terrorists achieved at least partial political gains (Pape, 2005) • Target states • Fully or partially withdrew from territory • Began negotiations • Released a terrorist leader • Represents 55% success rate • Other punishment strategies such as airpower or economic sanctions work no more 15% of the time • Suicide campaigns have been successful against a variety of democratic governments -- even hawkish ones • Reagan Administration • Netanyahu

21. Terrorism Works • The successes of terrorism become part of a group’s ideology, which feeds recruitment and internal motivation • For al Qaida, the terrorism strategy has produced some results which benefit their ideological cause • Understanding the ideology of al Qaida (and other groups) is vital to our understanding of terrorist motivation

22. Al-Qaida: Ideological Motivation Themes • Palestinians’ plight and their “liberation” is a central cause for Muslims, as is fighting against the anti-Islamic campaigns in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Kashmir • Bin Laden is not only the leader of AQ, but the imam for all Muslims, thus the Islamic “nation” should rally around him • Muslims need to wake up to their “depressed condition,” not stand passively by but actively participate in the (armed) jihad • Complicity of the Arab/Muslim “agent regimes” makes them legitimate targets of the jihad too • The “far enemy” must be targeted first, but beware of the continuing threat from the “near enemy” • Since the UN is a lackey of the US and its tool for oppression, and is itself against Islam, it is also a legitimate target

23. Al-Qaida: Ideological Motivation Themes • Two forms of terrorism: - “Commendable”: the fight to stop America’s oppression of/injustice toward Muslims, and its support for the Zionists (Israel); and - “Abhorred”: what Israel is practicing (and US supporting) in Palestine, and what America is doing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and all over the world • America’s “crusade” against the Islamic world will fail: Muslims adhere to their principles/faith; they are more cohesive domest-ically and internationally; Al-Qaida and the Taliban are now a major presence on the world political and psychological map; and the Crusader “enemy front” is in conflict/disintegrating • Fall of Baghdad marks the return of “direct colonialism” in the Arab world (and follows fall of Jerusalem, Beirut and Kabul)

24. Al-Qaida: Ideological Motivation Themes • US is really out to control region’s oil wealth, dominate Muslim territories: “veiled colonization” • The 9/11 ghazwah (“raids”) were legitimate and justified, due to US mistreatment of Muslims, continuing “occupation” of Saudi Arabia, and support to Israeli aggression • US is mistreating, illegally holding the mujahidin at Guantanamo (in subhuman conditions), they are suffering for a noble cause, and must be freed • Usama bin Laden is still alive, and Al-Qaida will “stay the course” in the fight against the US, in spite of losses in personnel and its base of operations in Afghanistan • Women mujahidin are being mobilized to join the jihad (“noble cause”) • Al-Qaida even took credit for the August 2003 power outages in the Eastern US, and highlighted America’s structural weakness and ineffectiveness of response to the situation

25. The Religious Dimension • Hard for Westerners to understand what leads a person to cause his (or her) own violent end: Death is inevitable, so pursue martyrdom – the ultimate submission to God • Promise to Muslims from a hadith that “the gates of Paradise are under the shade of the swords” – meaning that death for Allah’s sake (martyrdom) is the only assured way to personal entry (and favorable consideration for one’s family) into Paradise • Involves personal, spiritual, intellectual and emotional considerations -- martyr must: love God more than life; be willing to sacrifice himself against power of the devil and infidel forces; see the answers to all of these questions clearly; and must overcome the physical fear of death • “The purest joy in Islam is to kill and be killed for Allah” – Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini • Appears prominently in Al-Qaida literature: heading for a key series of articles in al-Neda on “Why We Fight America”

26. Summary: Individual and Group Motivations • Some Individuals who join a terrorist group willingly give up power over their behavior, personal decisions • Some draw prestige from group membership; being part of something greater than oneself • Many groups exploit need for member’s ego validation • Group membership in many cases offers individuals a sense of power over their destiny which they lack elswhere • A powerful motivating message: “You can make a difference in this world, not only for yourselves but for your children and grandchildren”

27. Questions? “You have to be lucky everyday – We only have to be lucky once” - IRA Bomber