1 / 11

Network Defenses to Denial of Service Attacks

Network Defenses to Denial of Service Attacks. John Kristoff jtk@depaul.edu +01 312 362-5878. DoS attack prevention is difficult. Applications, hosts and networks are often significantly oversubscribed. Internet (data) traffic is naturally bursty on all time scales, thus

bonita
Download Presentation

Network Defenses to Denial of Service Attacks

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Network Defenses to Denial of Service Attacks • John Kristoff • jtk@depaul.edu • +01 312 362-5878

  2. DoS attack prevention is difficult • Applications, hosts and networks are often significantly oversubscribed. • Internet (data) traffic is naturally bursty on all time scales, thus • discerning bad traffic from good can be hard. • There is no one, easy thing to fix that will make the problem go away. Its been proposed that re-architecting the Internet is a solution, but no one wants to go through that pain.

  3. Visualizing DoS Attack Data

  4. Visualizing Bottlenecks

  5. What are the popular defenses? • Block bogon, invalid and attack packets. • Monitor traffic thresholds, patterns and trends. • Rate limit traffic to help prevent oversubscription. • Prevent end hosts from becoming DoS agents. • Black hole victim hosts/networks. • Maintain good incident response and support staff. As you might guess, no one defense solves it all.*

  6. In depth look at packet blocking • Blocking invalid/bogon packets from reaching the net is generally considered a best practice. • However, it may severely impact forwarding performance and be difficult to manage. • Blocking on general attack characteristics may also block and break legitimate applications. Many ISPs mitigated the recent Slammer/Sapphire worm by temporarily blocking UDP port 1434 traffic.

  7. Traceback • Enabled routers generate or encode trace information to the traced destination. • Victims can use trace information to discover the real path back to the original source. • Authentication, deployment and practical issues exist.

  8. Source path isolation engine • Routers keep a hash of all packets passing through and send to a collector. • To trace a packet, query the collector based on packet characteristics. • SPIE can potentially trace a single packet. • Significant scaling and deployment issues.

  9. Pushback • A mechanism to signal downstream routers to aggressively drop/limit attack traffic. • Routers must detect attack traffic. A similar problem shared by signature based filters. • If attack traffic is widely distributed, pushback may be ineffective. IMHO, pushback and related techniques are the most interesting and elegant network-based solutions.

  10. Slammer/Sapphire the DoS attack

  11. Other defenses • Legal action. Costly (in more ways than one) and problematic when crossing legislative borders. • Mirror and distribute victims. Costly and management intensive. • User education? Security Forum 2003! Thanks! Stop by for a visit at http://ntg.depaul.edu/rd/

More Related