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Graham Floater

Graham Floater. What is the economics of climate change and how does it depend on the science?. Analytic foundations: Climate change is an externality with a difference: Global Long-term Uncertain Potentially large and irreversible Hence key roles in the analysis of: Economics of Risk

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Graham Floater

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  1. Graham Floater

  2. What is the economics of climate change and how does it depend on the science? Analytic foundations: Climate change is an externality with a difference: • Global • Long-term • Uncertain • Potentially large and irreversible Hence key roles in the analysis of: • Economics of Risk • Ethics • International Action

  3. Working with Uncertainty Population, technology, production, consumption Emissions Cumulative CO2 Emissions Atmospheric concentrations Radiative forcing % Change in Global Cereal Production Temperature rise and global climate change Probability Direct impacts (e.g. crops, forests, ecosystems) Socio-economic impacts

  4. Socially Market ‘Non - Market’ contingent Limit of coverage of some studies, including Mendelsohn Projection None Some studies, e.g. Tol Bounded None risks System Limited to Nordhaus and Boyer/Hope change/ None None surprise Models only have partial coverage of impacts Values in the literature are a sub-total of impacts Source: Watkiss, Downing et al. (2005)

  5. Projected impacts of climate change Global temperature change (relative to pre-industrial) 0°C 1°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C Food Falling crop yields in many areas, particularly developing regions Falling yields in many developed regions Possible rising yields in some high latitude regions Water Significant decreases in water availability in many areas, including Mediterranean and Southern Africa Small mountain glaciers disappear – water supplies threatened in several areas Sea level rise threatens major cities Ecosystems Extensive Damage to Coral Reefs Rising number of species face extinction Extreme Weather Events Rising intensity of storms, forest fires, droughts, flooding and heat waves Risk of Abrupt and Major Irreversible Changes Increasing risk of dangerous feedbacks and abrupt, large-scale shifts in the climate system

  6. Stabilisation and eventual change in temperature 400ppm CO2e 5% 95% 450ppm CO2e 550ppm CO2e 650ppm CO2e 750ppm CO2e Eventual temperature change (relative to pre-industrial) 0°C 1°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C

  7. Likelihood (in %) of exceeding a temperature increase at equilibrium Source: Hadley Centre: From Murphy et al. 2004 • Those who argue e.g. for stabilisation levels of 650ppm CO2eand above are accepting very big risks of a transformation of the planet • Figures similar to IPCC AR4 (no probabilities in TAR)

  8. Damage function exponent (γ) Consumption elasticity of social marginal utility (η) 1 1.5 2 2 10.4 (2.2-22.8) 6.0 (1.7-14.1) 3.3 (0.9-7.8) 2.5 16.5 (3.2-37.8) 10.0 (2.3-24.5) 5.2 (1.1-13.2) 3 33.3 (4.5-73.0) 29.3 (3.0-57.2) 29.1 (1.7-35.1) Sensitivity of total cost of climate change to key model assumptions Sensitivity of total cost of climate change to damage function exponent and consumption elasticity of social marginal utility in baseline-climate scenario (mean BGE loss, 5-95% confidence interval). • Costs measured in terms of percentage changes in Balanced Growth Equivalent (Mirrlees and Stern, 1972, JET) between BAU and no climate change. Stabilisation at 550ppm CO2e or below would save big majority of these costs. Model omits many important risks to carbon cycle and is conservative on climate sensitivity

  9. FUND 2.8 DICE/RICE-99 PAGE2002 IPCC AR4 ‘likely’ range Meinshausen (90%) Eventual temperature change (relative to pre-industrial) 0°C 1°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C Estimates of climate sensitivity from IAMs compared to GCMs (100%) (66%)

  10. The modelled costs of climate change with increasing global temperatures

  11. Delaying mitigation is dangerous and costly Source: Stern Review

  12. Estimating Costs of Mitigation Expected cost of cutting emissions consistent with 550ppm CO2e stabilisation trajectory averages 1% of GDP per year. • Macroeconomic models: 1% of GDP in 2050, in range +/- 3%. • Resource cost: 1% of GDP in 2050, in range –1% to +3.5%. Costs will not be evenly distributed: • Competitiveness impacts can be reduced by acting together. • New markets will be created. Investment in low-carbon electricity sources could be worth over $500bn a year by 2050. Strong mitigation is fully consistent with the aspirations for growth and development in poor and rich countries.

  13. Mitigation policy instruments • Pricing the externality - carbon pricing via tax or trading, or implicitly through regulation. • Bringing forward lower carbon technology - research, development and deployment. • Overcoming information barriers and transaction costs - regulation, standards. • Promoting a shared understanding of responsible behaviour across all societies - beyond sticks and carrots.

  14. Reducing emissions requires action across many sectors

  15. Cost estimates • Review examined results from bottom-up (Ch 9) & top-down (Ch 10) studies: concluded that world could stabilise below 550ppm CO2e for around 1% of global GDP • Subsequent analyses Edenhofer/IPCC top-down have indicated lower figures • So too have bottom-up IEA and McKinsey • Options for mitigation: McKinsey analysis examines approach of chapter 9 of Review in more detail • Starting planning now with clear targets and good policies allows measured action and keeps costs down. Delayed decisions/actions (or “slow ramp”), lack of clarity, bad policy will increase costs

  16. 2030 AvoiddeforestationAsia Coal-to-gas shift Industrial feedstock substitution Cost of abatement EUR/tCO2e CCS; coal retrofit Soil Forestation Waste Livestock/soils Wind;lowpen. CCS EOR;New coal 40 Smart transit Solar 30 Small hydro Forestation Nuclear 20 Industrial non-CO2 Airplane efficiency 10 Stand-by losses 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 -10 -20 Avoided deforestation America Industrial CCS Celluloseethanol Industrialnon-CO2 -30 Co-firingbiomass CCS;new coal Sugarcanebiofuel -40 AbatementGtCO2e/year -50 Industrial motorsystems Fuel efficient vehicles -60 Water heating -70 -80 Air Conditioning -90 Lighting systems -100 -110 • ~27 Gton CO2e below 40 EUR/ton (-46% vs. BAU) • ~7 Gton of negative and zero cost opportunities • Fragmentation of opportunities Fuel efficient commercial vehicles -120 -130 -140 -150 Insulation improvements -160 McKinsey bottom-up approach

  17. Reducing emissions from deforestation could be relatively cheap and effective (McKinsey curve needs updating) an area the size of England Deforestation emissions are the same or higher than China and the US * UK GHG inventory; ** IEA; †UNFCCC 4th Assessment The combination of weak governance and powerful economic incentives to cut forests down result in 13 million Ha destroyed every year, which equates to 5.9 billion tons of CO2 emissions a year FAO (2005), World Bank (2006)

  18. Illustrative Distribution of Emission Savings by Technology

  19. Interaction between policy instruments Marginal cost of producing electricity New technology Established technology Learning through R&D and deployment support Carbon price effect Market certainty (regulation) B A Cumulative installation

  20. Growth, change and opportunity • Strong mitigation costs around 1% p.a. worldwide • Strong, efficient and co-ordinated mitigation is fully consistent with the aspirations for growth and development in poor and rich countries. Business as usual is not. • Costs will not be evenly distributed • Competitiveness impacts can be reduced by acting together • New markets will be created • Mitigation policy can also be designed to support other objectives: • energy - energy security and access, efficiency, local air quality • forestry - watershed protection, biodiversity, rural livelihoods

  21. The Global Deal

  22. Copenhagen – A global deal • Bali in December 2007 – Important steps made. Bali Action Plan towards Copenhagen. • Poznan (Poland) in December 2008 • Copenhagen in December 2009 – A global deal?

  23. Commitments: percentages • G8 Heiligendamm – 50% by 2050 (consistent with stabilisation around 500ppm C02e) • California (and US under e.g. H. Clinton) - 80% from 1990 levels by 2050 • France – 75% by 2050 (Factor 4), relative to 1990 • EU Spring Council: 60-80% by 2050 and 20-30% by 2020, relative to 1990 • Germany – 40% by 2020, relative to 1990

  24. Target: stocks, history, flows • Current 40-45 GtCO2e p.a. Current stocks around 430ppm CO2e; pre-industrial stocks 280ppm • The United States and the EU countries combined accounted for over half of cumulative global emissions from 1900 to 2005 • 50% reduction by 2050 requires per capita global GHG emissions of 2-3T/capita (20-25 Gt divided by 9 billion population) • Currently US ~ 20+, Europe ~10+, China ~5+, India ~2+ T/capita • Thus 80% reductions would bring Europe, but not US, down to world average. Many developing countries would have to cut strongly too if world average of 2-3 T/capita is to be achieved

  25. Per capita CO2 emissions (in tonnes)

  26. The GHG ‘reservoir’ • Long-term stabilisation at 550ppm CO2e implies that only a further 120ppm CO2e can be ‘allocated’ for emission, given that we start at 430ppm CO2e (or further 70ppm if targeting 500ppm) • Can view the issue as the use of a “collective reservoir” of 270ppm (i.e. 550 minus the 280ppm of 1850) over 200 years. Over half of reservoir already used mainly by rich countries. Or could “start the clock” at XT, the stock when problem was first recognised at T (e.g. around 20 years ago) • Equity requires a discussion of the appropriate use of this reservoir given past history • Thus convergence of flows does not fully capture the equity story, from emissions perspective • Equity issues arise also in adaptation, given responsibilities for past increases

  27. Key elements of a global deal / framework (I) • Targets and Trade • Confirm Heiligendamm 50% cuts in world emissions by 2050 with rich country cuts at least 75% • Rich country reductions and trading schemes designed to be open to trade with other countries, including developing countries • Supply side from developing countries simplified to allow much bigger markets for emissions reductions: ‘carbon flows’ to rise to $50-$100bn p.a. by 2030. Role of sectoral or technological benchmarking in ‘one-sided’ trading to give reformed and much bigger CDM market

  28. Key elements of a global deal / framework (II) Funding Issues • Strong initiatives, with public funding, on deforestation to prepare for inclusion in trading. For $10-15 bn p.a. could have a programme which might halve deforestation. Importance of global action and involvement of IFIs • Demonstration and sharing of technologies: e.g. $5 bn p.a. commitment to feed-in tariffs for CCS coal would lead to 30+ new commercial size plants in the next 7-8 years • Rich countries to deliver on Monterrey and Gleneagles commitments on ODA in context of extra costs of development arising from climate change: potential extra cost of development with climate change upwards of $80bn p.a.

  29. Nature of deal / framework • Combination of the above can, with appropriate market institutions, help overcome the inequities of climate change and provide incentives for developing countries to play strong role in global deal, eventually taking on their own targets. • Within such a framework each country can advance with some understanding of global picture. • Individual country action must not be delayed (as e.g. WTO) until full deal is in place. • Main enforcement mechanism, country-by-country, is domestic pressure. • If we argue that, “it is all too difficult” and the world lets stocks of GHGs rise to 650, 700 ppm or more must be clear and transparent about the great magnitude of these risks

  30. Conclusions from Stern analysis • Our understanding of the risks of climate change has advanced strongly. • We understand the urgency and scale of action required. • We know that the technologies and economic incentives for effective action are available or can be created • We are in a much better position now to use our shared understanding to agree on what goals to adopt and what action to take.

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